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Inductive reasoning and more specifically, analogical reasoning, is a basic process involved 
in a wide range of higher cognitive processes and is often seen as representing a core 
component of intelligence (Halford, 1993; Morrison et al., 2004). Much research investigated 
the development of this reasoning process in young children (e.g., Goswami, 2002), including 
its involvement in instruction (Kolodner, 1997), testing (tzuriel & Kaufman, 1999) and 
classroom learning (Csapó, 1997; tzuriel & George, 2009; Vosniadou, 1989). Various 
research studies have shown that, even before primary school entry, many children can utilize 
analogical reasoning if they are given appropriate assistance and already possess some domain 
knowledge of the relationships upon which the analogical problems are based (e.g., Goswami 
& Brown, 1989; Klauer & Phye, 2008; Richland, Morrison & Holyoak, 2006; Singer-Freeman, 
2005). Nevertheless, the first few years of primary school are a particular time for the rapid 
development of analogical reasoning ability and, unsurprisingly, this results in variable inter- 
and intra-individual strategic analogical behavior (e.g., Siegler & Svetina, 2002; Hosenfeld, 
Van der Maas, & Van den Boom, 1997a, 1997b). 
 to date, few studies have investigated differences in individual learning trajectories in 
analogical performance over time. Conclusions with respect to the nature of changes in 
the ability to reason by analogy have frequently been drawn on the basis of results from 
cross-sectional training studies (e.g., Brown, 1989; Chen, 1996). Hence, the studies in this 
dissertation are designed to provide greater insight in the variation between children’s inter- 
and intra-individual learning trajectories in solving and constructing complex analogical 
tasks. Results are projected to provide detailed accounts of children’s (changing) strategic 
analogical behavior as a consequence of repeated assessments over time, a short (dynamic-
test-type) training procedure and a self-construction (transfer) task respectively. to do so, 
specific methods, designs and analyses will be employed to uncover these children’s inter- 
and intra-individual differences, and so enable us to come to a fine-grained understanding of 
the variation in their change trajectories.
The Microgenetic Research Method
A specific method for obtaining such fine-grained understanding of inter- and intra-individual 
differences concerns the microgenetic research method, which involves the close study of 
children at times when they are likely to display rapid developmental growth. to achieve 
this, these designs utilize dense sampling of performance over a rather short time period. 
Development is considered to occur naturally, as, in principle, the practice sessions should 
include no explicit forms of intervention. Observation of children’s responses, when given 
these repeated practice experiences, enables the researcher to identify changes in reasoning 
strategies and differential developmental trajectories as they happen (Flynn & Siegler, 2007; 
Siegler & Crowley, 1991). 
 While several research traditions (e.g. Piagetian) focus on particular ages in which certain 
skills or knowledge are obtained, microgenetic research distinguishes itself by investigating 
the cognitive change processes through which development or learning occurs (Siegler, 
2006). these processes include, for example, regressions and progressions in more or less 
advanced strategy use and ways of reasoning and behaving that occur only for a short period 
of time and right before important strategy changes take place (e.g., Siegler & Stern, 1998; 
Siegler & Svetina, 2002). Findings from microgenetic research studies have resulted in the 
assertion that development in various domains, from theory of mind (e.g., Flynn et al., 
2004) to mathematical skills (Ven, Boom, Kroesbergen, & Leseman, 2012), involves more 





improved capacity to select the best problem-solving strategy at any given moment, greater 
reliance on more advanced strategies, and improved execution of those strategies. to reach 
these conclusions, microgenetic research studies often utilize video and voice recordings of 
children’s behavior and immediate (retrospective) verbal reports to investigate trial-by-trial 
strategy use (Siegler, 2006). Likewise, for the studies in this dissertation, video recordings 
of children’s behaviors and immediate (retrospective) verbal reports will be employed to 
capture cognitive changes as they happen. 
  Some drawbacks of this type of research are the time and costs involved in the 
frequent sampling, and detailed analyses, of the observations that are made. to manage 
the trade-off between these drawbacks and the sample size, the study in Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation will take the form of a preliminary study with a smaller sample of children, which 
will be enlarged for the operation of the studies in Chapters 4 and 5.
Dynamic Testing
Repeated assessments, such as those utilized in microgenetic research, involve  ‘unprompted’ 
practice experiences that draw upon an essentially static procedure (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 
2002). A more dynamic form of assessment, however, demonstrating what children can 
achieve when they are provided with tailored assistance during the testing procedure, may 
add important information about children’s potential, should they be given an appropriate 
educational program (Grigorenko, 2009; Resing & Elliott, 2011; Swanson & Lussier, 2001). 
 Dynamic testing, therefore, has become increasingly popular for the study of inductive 
reasoning (e.g., Bethge, Carlson, & Wiedl, 1982; Resing, 2000; tzuriel, 2000; tzuriel & 
Flor-Maduel, 2010; tzuriel & Kaufman, 1999). Conventional static tests, administered at a 
certain moment in time, are considered to be means to measure already developed abilities. 
Dynamic modes of testing are designed to assess developing or yet-to-develop abilities which 
are the products of underlying, but often unrecognized, cognitive capacities (e.g., Hessels, 
2000; Elliott, 2003; Lidz & Macrine, 2001; Resing, 2006; Sternberg et al., 2002; Sternberg & 
Grigorenko, 2006). Dynamic testing therefore, has been found a means to gain insight into 
the cognitive and meta-cognitive strategies used by the examinee, their responsiveness to 
examiner assistance and support, and their ability to transfer learning from the test situation 
to subsequent unaided situations (Elliott, 2003). 
 For the studies in this dissertation (Chapters 3, 4, and 5), therefore, it is considered 
important to investigate the influence of a dynamic testing approach upon children’s inter- 
and intra-individual developmental trajectories in analogical reasoning.
 Unlike most other dynamic test or training formats, the measures that will be used in 
this dissertation will proceed from difficult to easy items. Where children need assistance, 
a minimum amount of help required to solve the tasks independently will be provided. 
the nature of the help that will be provided will be in accordance with Resing’s (e.g., 1993, 
1997) graduated-prompts dynamic test format. this ‘technique’ was originally pioneered by 
Campione, Brown, Ferrara, & Steinberg (1985) and has been successfully utilized in several 
subsequent studies (e.g., Resing, 2000; Resing & Elliott, 2011; Wang, 2010, 2011a,b; Resing, 
Xenidou-Dervou, Steijn, & Elliott, 2012). this type of procedure involves the use, during 
the dynamic testing session, of a series of adaptive and standardized, hierarchically ordered, 
metacognitive (self-regulating) and cognitive (task-specific) prompts that proceed from 
general to increasingly task-specific, and are only provided if a child is unable to proceed 
independently. As such, a minimum number of prompts, which are increasingly explicit, are 














typically, microgenetic research data sets are analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Qualitatively, graphical techniques are often used to display various cognitive changes over time 
(Siegler, 2006). In this dissertation, every study will utilize a variety of graphical techniques to 
provide more in-depth understanding of the (quantitative) findings. Quantitatively, repeated-
measures ANOVA has been widely used to analyze longitudinal data involving repeated 
measurements of the same individuals. this more traditional type of analysis will be utilized 
in Chapter 2. 
 However, repeated-measures ANOVA does not enable the researcher to analyze individual 
children’s trajectories of performance and take individual variation into account. these 
weaknesses can be overcome by viewing microgenetic data sets as comprising a specific 
instance of multilevel data, where repeated measurements are nested within individuals. 
Generally, multilevel regression models involve hierarchically structured data, where lower 
level observations are nested within higher level(s). As such, employees can be nested in 
firms or students in schools (Hox, 2002, 2010; Kreft & De Leeuw, 2007; Snijders & Bosker, 
1999; Van der Leeden, 1998). 
 In the case of this dissertation (Chapters 3 and 4), repeated measurements will be viewed 
as nested within individuals, where the test sessions that children receive will be modeled at 
the first level and individual children at the second level. By creating a model with varying 
regression coefficients at the session level (Level-1), multilevel analysis will be able to include 
growth trajectories that vary for each individual child (Level-2). An additional feature of 
multilevel analysis is the possibility to include two types of explanatory variables in the model: 
time constant and time varying variables. this feature will enable the modeling of both the 
average growth trajectories of each group, as well as the individual growth trajectories of each 
child (Hox, 2002, 2010). thus, analyzing microgenetic data with multilevel analysis will allow 
not only for the inspection of learning trajectories (Level-1) for each individual (Level-2), 
but also the inspection of systematic variation between these trajectories as a function of 
background variables (such as working-memory) and experimental treatment (dynamic 
testing) (Van der Leeden, 1998).
 Analogical tasks, sometimes incorporating dynamic testing procedures (Grigorenko, 
2009), have been employed for the purposes of differentiating and, potentially, predicting 
(young) children’s cognitive development and educational progress. to achieve these goals, 
in-depth, fine-grained understanding of children’s developmental trajectories at various ages 
is needed. Here, the use of a microgenetic research design may prove especially helpful (e.g. 
Siegler & Svetina 2002; tunteler & Resing, 2007a,b).
The Overlapping Waves Theory
Microgenetically observed cognitive changes and variations between individual children 
could be meaningfully interpreted by Siegler’s (1996) overlapping waves theory. this theory 
co-evolved alongside the microgenetic research method to interpret microgenetic research 
outcomes. Interpretations of research outcomes are made along five dimensions of cognitive 
change: the source, rate, path, breadth and variability of change. 
The Source of Change
the source of change refers to underlying factors that encourage changes in reasoning 
(Siegler, 2006). two related sources of change are the age of the child and repeated practice 





developmental growth in the area of interest, are thought to accelerate natural development 
(Siegler, 2006). In Chapters 2-5 it will be investigated whether repeated practice experiences 
are sufficient to accelerate growth in analogical performance in children attending 1st grade 
(Chapter 2) and 2nd grade (Chapters 3-5). 
 A second source of change that will be considered in this dissertation is training in 
analogical reasoning. It is considered that the acquisition and development of cognitive 
abilities may show differing pathways when acquired through instruction than as a result of 
more ‘natural’ unprompted opportunities. these potentially differing pathways make it useful 
to examine both in combination (Kuhn, 1995; Bjorklund, Miller, Coyle & Slawinsky, 1997; 
Opfer & Siegler, 2004). therefore, in addition to unprompted repeated practice, instruction 
derived from two types of training will be included. these will be based on the component 
processes of analogical reasoning put forward by Sternberg and Rifkin (1979): encoding, 
inference, mapping and application. Other studies have successfully used these component 
processes to train young children in analogical reasoning as well (e.g., Alexander et al., 1989; 
Resing, 1990, 2000; White & Caropreso, 1989). 
 In the studies reported in this dissertation, repeated practice and training tasks will consist 
of pen-and-paper open-ended classical geometrical analogical tasks (Chapter 2) and open-
ended figural matrix analogical tasks (Chapters 3 and 4). the study in Chapter 2 will include 
a short training procedure that will consist of a standardized step-by-step procedure, which 
will prompt children to explain the reasoning behind the experimenters’ correct analogical 
solution. Explaining the nature of the correct solutions of a more knowledgeable person has 
been found to induce learning (Siegler, 1995; Siegler, 2002; Rittle-Johnson, 2006). In Chapters 
3 and 4 a dynamic test approach will be taken to train children. Key to this approach is the 
incorporation of feedback and training during the testing phases (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 
2002; Elliott, 2003; Swanson & Lussier, 2001). 
 A third source of change considered is working-memory, a process that will be considered 
in every phase of this dissertation. Working-memory may be thought of as the workspace for 
the construction of relational representations for solving a given analogical task while using 
knowledge stored in semantic memory. this workspace is limited in the number of relations 
that can be processed in parallel although these typically increase with age and maturation. 
However, complex relations can be recoded into representations of lower complexity or be 
segmented into smaller parts in order to process them serially (Halford, Wilson & Philips, 1998, 
2010). the type of relationship or task that needs to be managed appears to be influenced by the 
differential involvement of separate components of working-memory. Various components 
have been investigated in a variety of inductive reasoning or academic tasks (e.g, Raghubar, 
Barnes & Hecht, 2010; Alloway & Passolunghi, 2011). the age of the child and the differential 
involvement of these components in different types of tasks were first demonstrated by 
Alloway, Gathercole and Pickering (2006). In line with Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) working-
memory model, they found that children as young as 4 years exhibit a structural organization 
of memory into a domain general component for processing information, and verbal and 
visual-spatial domain specific components for storage. Furthermore, they found that these 
components could be assessed in a reliable way. In Chapters 3 and 4, the focus is explicitly 
on the differential involvement of verbal and visual-spatial working-memory components, to 
examine their possible role in respect of analogical reasoning development in second graders. 
these components were examined separately with a working-memory assessment that made 
sufficient storage and processing demands (Alloway, 2007) and which would help us explore 













 A fourth source of change that will be investigated concerns children’s variability in 
analogical strategy use. It has been suggested that high initial variability of strategy use often 
predicts substantial subsequent learning (Siegler, 2006, 2007).  therefore in Chapters 2 (1st 
grade children) and 4 (2nd grade children) the influence of initial variable analogical strategy 
use on analogical performance change will be investigated.
The Rate of Change
the rate of performance change in a certain task domain refers to the amount of time and 
experience a child requires to change from their initial to their current performance, the 
child’s change from initial to consistent adequate performance is referred to as the rate 
of uptake (Siegler, 2006). In the current dissertation, the rate of change in relation to the 
above-mentioned sources of change will be investigated. the microgenetic timeline will be 
inspected for the particular times where children display lesser and greater rates of change. 
these moments of change will be investigated in relation to sources of change, for example, 
children’s varying (working-memory) capacities, and variable analogical strategy use. the 
resulting varying developmental trajectories including lesser and greater rates of change of 
the different analogical performance measures will be made visible through regression lines 
for the separate conditions (Chapter 2, 3 and 4), smaller subgroups of learners, and individual 
children within their respective subgroups (Chapters 3 and 4). these smaller subgroups 
of learners will be based on a combination of background variables (sources of change) to 
investigate their combined influence on subgroup and individual children’s developmental 
trajectories. In order to do this, in Chapters 3 and 4 a different means of analysis will be used: 
multilevel analysis (MLA) for longitudinal, repeated measurement data (as described earlier).
The Path of Change
the term, path of change, refers to developmental trajectories in terms of sequences of 
changing knowledge states and problem-solving behavior (Siegler, 2006). to investigate 
these, Siegler (2007) posited the benefit of trial-by-trial assessments of strategy use, focusing 
upon four component processes: 1) acquisition of new strategies; 2) increased usage of the 
most advanced strategies in the child’s current repertoire; 3) increasingly efficient execution 
of strategies; and 4) improved choices among strategies. In Chapters 2 and 4, a qualitative 
microgenetic, session-by-session assessment will be employed in order to investigate 
variability in subgroup and individual children’s use of analogical and non-analogical strategies 
and subsequent progress in a) their behavioral responses and b) the verbal explanations that 
they were able to offer for these. 
 the value of immediate retrospective self-reports of solution strategies together with 
observations of behavioral solution strategies on the part of children aged five years and 
older, has been indicated by an increasing body of developmental literature – from arithmetic 
(Siegler & Stern, 1998) to reading (Farrington-Flint, Coyne, Stiller, & Heath, 2008), to 
inductive reasoning (Resing, et al., 2012). these self-reports are not expected to impact 
upon children’s developmental trajectories as long as the researcher remains neutral and no 
feedback is provided (Siegler, 2006). Rather, they may reveal additional information about 
the depth of understanding children possess about the strategies they employ to tackle the 





The Breadth of Change
the breadth of change refers to transfer, to the generalization of newly acquired strategies 
to other contexts and problems. transfer of learning has been the subject of research for 
more than a century (Larsen-Freeman, 2013; Engle, 2012). With reference to dimensions 
such as content and context (Barnett & Ceci, 2002), researchers have differentiated between 
surface versus deep transfer (Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1995), formal versus material transfer 
(Klauer, 1998), and near versus far transfer. transfer has been found to occur consciously 
and unconsciously (Day & Goldstone, 2012; Day & Gentner, 2007), instantaneously and very 
gradually (Siegler, 2006), after task mastery (Siegler, 2006), or after more variable strategic 
behavior (Perry, Samuelson, Malloy, & Schiffer, 2010).
 Differing findings from transfer studies with both adults and children have been attributed 
to – among other things – individual differences in study participants, such as differences 
relating to working-memory and task domain expertise (sources of change) (Day & Goldstone, 
2012). More specifically, is has been suggested that individual differences that emerge while 
solving transfer tasks could be used to identify children’s differential potential for learning, by 
assessing how well they can flexibly use previously learned strategies (Bosma & Resing, 2006; 
Campione et al., 1985).  
 therefore, in Chapter 5 it will be attempted to assess differences in children’s learning of 
analogical strategic behavior – induced by repeated practice experiences with classical figural 
analogies and a dynamic-test-type training procedure – by assessing children’s differences in 
making so-called analogical construction tasks. For this transfer task, children will no longer 
be required to solve figural analogies in a classical way of assessment, but instead they will be 
asked to take a more active role by constructing similar figural analogies for the examiner to 
solve (Bosma & Resing, 2006). 
 to encourage transfer of previously learned strategies, the surface commonalities of this 
analogical construction task will be the same as the open-ended classical figural analogical 
tasks that children solved during the repeated practice and dynamic training session (i.e. the 
same matrix-format and the same animal cards exhibiting the same possible transformations 
that could be constructed with these cards), thereby priming children to use what they will 
previously have learned (Day & Goldstone, 2012).
 Nevertheless, these surface similarities will not necessarily make the process of transfer 
straightforward. the construction format will be more challenging than the open-ended 
classical version, since the former will require children to extract analogical strategies from 
schemas in their memory in order to construct the transformations. Such complexity is not 
required when tackling the classical format (Martinez, 1999). Effective constructors in the 
current sample will therefore be regarded as having gained a more thorough or ‘deeper’ 
understanding of the underlying principles of the analogical tasks (Harpaz-Itay et al., 2006; 
Perkins, 1992). As such, providing children the opportunity to move beyond practice 
experiences and a dynamic training with classical figural analogies to engagement in problem 
construction, is expected to shed new light on their developing use of strategic reasoning 
(e.g., Pittman, 1999; May, Hammer, & Roy, 2006; Kim, Bae, Nho, & Lee, 2011; Haglund & 
Jeppsson, 2012; Siegler, 2006). 
 Accordingly, the analogical construction task in Chapter 5 serves a twofold purpose. First, 
it is intended to assess the extent to which children’s learning in relation to performance on 
a traditional analogical task will subsequently transfer to one that will involve construction. 
Second, it is intended to examine the ways in which this may provide additional information, 













(Grigorenko, 2009; Resing, 2013). to achieve this purpose and reveal more clearly the 
depth of children’s strategic reasoning when tackling the analogical construction task, again 
immediate retrospective self-reports will be employed (e.g., Siegler & Stern, 1998; Church, 
1999; Bosma & Resing, 2006). 
The variability of change
the variability of change refers to differences between children in the source, rate, path 
and breadth of change, as well as changes within individual children’s array of strategies 
(Siegler, 2006; 2007). Siegler (2007) posits that cognitive variability is an important variable 
in understanding, predicting, and describing the amount and type of cognitive change. He 
refers to cognitive variability as the differences between children in terms of change agents, 
developmental trajectory, generalization, and speed of change, but also changes within the 
individual child’s repertoire of strategies. As described above, and throughout this dissertation, 
inter- and intra-individual variable analogical reasoning will be encouraged and investigated 
both quantitatively and qualitatively, thereby being the most important and complex focus of 
this study. this focus is both complex and important, since gaining greater understanding of 
individual children’s learning trajectories in relation to various cognitive processes, such as 
analogical reasoning (e.g., tunteler, Pronk, & Resing, 2008), is likely to be valuable both for 
understanding the nature of intellectual development and for informing targeted educational 
intervention at an early stage (e.g., Grigorenko, 2009).
Outline of the Dissertation
the current dissertation used a microgenetic approach to investigate young children’s 
inter- and intra-individual variable analogical reasoning in accordance with Siegler’s (1996) 
overlapping waves theory, which interprets cognitive change along five dimensions: the 
source, rate, path, breadth and variability of change. 
 Chapter 1 introduced the various studies that made up this dissertation and gave an 
overview of their theoretical and methodological background.
 Chapter 2 focused on unprompted changes in children’s analogical reasoning on geometric 
tasks and the additional effect of a short training procedure. this study will took the form of 
a 5-session microgenetic procedure, with a follow-up test session after 3 months. As such, 
it aimed to investigate changes in children’s analogical performance due to either practice 
alone or a short training procedure. Moreover, it was examined whether this short training 
procedure had a greater effect on children showing variable, inconsistent analogical reasoning 
over trials than on children who fail to show this kind of behavior; and whether changes in 
analogical reasoning, either because of repeated practice alone or because of the short training 
procedure, persisted over a period of 3 months. Finally, it was explored whether children’s 
analogical reasoning performance is related to their memory and inductive reasoning skills.
 Chapter 3 focused on the inter- and intra-individual developmental trajectories of 
analogical reasoning with open-ended figural matrix analogies in a dynamic test and non-
guided practice setting. In this study, the microgenetic research method was combined with 
Multilevel Analysis (MLA) to investigate developmental trajectories as a function of their 
background variables and experimental treatment: a dynamic-test-type training. Background 
variables included verbal and abstract-visual-spatial working-memory capacity. this study, as 
mentioned earlier, was a preliminary study for the study in Chapter 4. As such, participants in 





 Chapter 4 described the first follow-up study of the investigation of Chapter 3. Here 
subgroups of children with similar learning trajectories in analogical reasoning were 
investigated microgenetically and with the use of MLA. Subgroups’ inter- and intra-individual 
paths of change were compared through children’s behavioral strategy use and verbal 
reports thereof. Subgroup categorization was based on condition and potentially important 
background variables, which included verbal and spatial working-memory, and variable 
analogical performance. 
 Chapter 5 described the second follow-up study of the research described in Chapters 
3 and 4.  this study examined the breadth and depth of progress in analogical performance 
by means of a transfer task that required children to construct analogies rather than solve 
them. With respect to this aim, both quantitative and qualitative inter- and intra-individual 
analogical measures were investigated. 
 In Chapter 6 the results of the various studies were discussed, as well as the implications 




Inter- and intra-individual variability  
in the process of change in the use of analogical 
strategies to solve geometric tasks in children:  
A microgenetic analysis
tunteler, E., Pronk, C.M.E., & Resing, W.C.M. (2008). Inter- and intra-individual variability in 
the process of change in the use of analogical strategies to solve geometric tasks in children: A 





















































this study focused on unprompted changes in children’s analogical reasoning on geometric tasks and the 
additional effect of a short training procedure. Participants were 36 grade 1 level children (M=6;8 years) 
divided over a not-trained and a trained condition. the study was a 5-sessions microgenetic procedure, 
with a follow-up test session after 3 months. the results showed considerable inter-and intra-individual 
variability in the process of change in the use of analogical strategies in both not-trained and trained 
children. Repeated practice, without explicit prompting, caused a spontaneous improvement in analogical 
reasoning. this improvement was mainly due to an increase in implicit analogical reasoning. the short 
training procedure caused an improvement above and beyond that of practice alone (Estrained/not-
trained=.96), inducing in 9 children a continuation of a gradual process of change, while in 4 other children 
it caused a rather rapid change in analogical performance. the training effect was greatly due to an 
increase in explicit analogical reasoning. Both effects were still visible after a period of 3 months. Because 
the study may have implications for geometric learning with young children, the authors recommend 
further investigations of young children’s use of analogies on tasks involving geometric transformations. 
the authors also recommend further research into transfer to other mathematical competencies to 
investigate implications for mathematics besides geometry.
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Inter- and intra-individual variability in analogical strategy changes
2.1 Introduction
Our primary goal in this study was to gain insight into the nature of young children’s analogical 
reasoning ability by investigating whether children’s analogical performance changes due 
to practice alone, without explicit prompting, and whether a short training procedure that 
provides children with some explicit modeling and feedback improves their performance. 
Unlike other studies on young children’s analogical ability (e.g., Alexander et al., 1989; Brown, 
1989; Goswami & Brown, 1989; Hosenfeld, Van der Maas, & Van den Boom, 1997a,b; tunteler 
& Resing, 2002), this study investigated children’s unprompted analogical performances 
over a period of weeks both before and after a short training in analogical reasoning. this 
was compared with the performances of children of the same age who were given multiple 
practice opportunities over time, but no instructions or explicit prompting.
 the ability to reason by analogy has long been regarded as central to human cognition 
(Goswami, 1991, 1992; Halford, 1993) and as an important skill for classroom learning (e.g., 
Csapó, 1997; Goswami, 1992; Vosniadou, 1989) and instruction (e.g., Kolodner, 1997). During 
the past few decades, a considerable number of researchers have focused on understanding 
the development of this reasoning ability in children (e.g., Alexander et al., 1989; Brown, 
1989; Gentner, 1989; Goswami & Brown, 1989; Halford, 1993; Hosenfeld, Van der Maas et al., 
1997a,b; Singer-Freeman, 2005; Singer-Freeman & Goswami, 2001). Although these studies 
have resulted in much information on children’s analogical reasoning competency under 
various circumstances, there is still no consensus about the nature of this reasoning ability 
in young children. An increasing number of studies, in which a variety of analogy tasks were 
used, showed that very young children can already reason analogically after a certain amount of 
help on the condition that they understand the relationships on which the analogies are based 
(e.g., Brown, 1989; Chen, 1996; Chen & Daehler, 1989, 1992; Singer-Freeman, 2005; Singer-
Freeman & Goswami, 2001). In this research tradition, developmental changes in children’s 
analogical reasoning ability is generally assumed to be gradual and quantifiable, and driven by 
a growing knowledge base or increasing metacognitive skills (Brown, 1989; Goswami, 1991). 
However, other researchers (e.g., Halford & McCredden, 1998; Halford, Wilson & Phillips, 
1998; Hosenfeld, Van der Maas et al., 1997a,b) are more apprehensive about young children’s 
analogical capacity; they posit that developmental changes in analogical reasoning is a matter 
of changes in global competence. this lack of consensus may cause one to question whether 
the claim for analogical reasoning at an early age made in some studies might be an artifact of 
the experimental manipulations in these studies.
 Review of the literature on analogical reasoning showed that the conclusions with respect 
to the nature of changes in the ability to reason by analogy described above were frequently 
drawn on the basis of results from cross-sectional training studies (e.g., Brown, 1989; Gholson, 
Morgan, Dattel, & Pierce, 1990; Gentner, 1989; Chen, 1996; Chen & Daehler, 1989, 1992). Yet, 
Bjorklund, Miller, Coyle and Slawinsky (1997) asserted that natural, unprompted changes, as 
opposed to changes induced by training, may show a different path. Moreover, various other 
authors stressed that such single-occasion assessments could produce an incomplete or even 
over-optimistic picture of the process of change of the cognitive strategy under investigation 
because they address changes indirectly (e.g., Granott & Parziale, 2002; Kuhn, 1995; Siegler, 
1995, 2006).
 Despite the many studies in the field of analogical reasoning conducted in the past, very 
few of them have focused on a comparison of changes over time in children’s analogical 





































two exceptions worth mentioning are the longitudinal studies conducted by Alexander et 
al. (1989) and Hosenfeld, Van der Maas et al., 1997b). Alexander et al. (1989) used simple 
3-dimensional geometric analogical tasks of type A:B::C:D, and monitored the analogical 
performances of trained 4–5 year-old children and that of not-trained children of the same 
age over a period of months. they showed that children of this age were able to benefit from 
an extensive training in analogical reasoning skills, but revealed little about the paths of 
change in the two conditions. Moreover, it should be noted that the not-trained children in the 
Alexander et al. (1989) study were repeatedly given explicit instructions to the tasks before 
and during testing, and explicit instructions may also be seen as a form of training. Hosenfeld, 
Van der Maas et al. (1997b) observed 6–8 year-old children’s analogical performance on 
paper and pencil classical geometric tasks over a period of months. these authors posited 
an age-related transition in analogical reasoning on geometric tasks in children of this age. 
However, the children in their study were given extensive instructions for the tasks, both 
before and during testing so that we are unable to determine the natural and unprompted 
analogical reasoning of those children. Such natural reasoning might not proceed in the same 
way suggested by the sequence of instructions given by Hosenfeld, Van der Maas et al.
 More recently tunteler and Resing (2007a) microgenetically investigated the performances 
on problem analogy tasks over a period of weeks of 5–7 year-old children who were given 
repeated practice opportunities without any instruction or feedback in comparison to the 
performances of children who were previously given a short training consisting of some 
instructions in how to use analogies. A microgenetic procedure allows close observation 
of change mechanisms over a relatively short period of time, as well as the identification 
of the conditions and transition strategies leading up to change (Siegler & Crowley, 1991). 
the microgenetic procedure used in the tunteler and Resing study allowed the authors to 
distinguish three groups of reasoners: 1) children showing consistent analogical reasoning 
over trials; 2) children showing consistent inadequate, non-analogical reasoning; and 3) 
children showing variable, adequate and inadequate, reasoning. Some children had difficulty 
with using analogies despite of the training, while other children of the same age and even 
some younger children consistently used analogies over trials without reminding. Over time, 
an increasing number of children, particularly in the trained group, showed very consistent 
analogical reasoning, while a decreasing number demonstrated inadequate, non-analogical 
reasoning. However, variable and diverse strategy use over trials existed in a considerable 
number of both the trained and not-trained children of the two age groups. the authors 
concluded that variability in strategy use on problem analogy tasks is not only common in 
situations in which children are not explicitly given instructions as they demonstrated earlier 
(tunteler & Resing, 2002, 2007b), but apparently exists in trained children as well.
 According to tunteler and Resing (2007a), this pervasiveness in variability in children’s 
strategy use on analogical problem solving tasks indicates that the ability to reason by analogy 
on this type of analogy tasks develops over a protracted age range. It also underlines the 
importance of a microgenetic research method in studying the process of change in the 
domain of analogical reasoning. therefore, we realized that in order to gain more insight 
into the nature of young children’s analogical reasoning ability, we needed, in addition to 
the tunteler and Resing study, to microgenetically examine changes in young children’s 
analogical reasoning under different conditions–trained and not-trained–on another type of 
analogy task. In this study we used classical geometric analogy tasks. this type of analogy 
tasks is said to measure analogical reasoning more purely than verbal analogical tasks, since 
they need no vocabulary and domain specific knowledge (Goswami, 1992).
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 the advantages of the microgenetic approach have been extensively described elsewhere 
(e.g., Kuhn, 1995; Siegler & Crowley, 1991; Siegler, 2006). It should however be noted 
that even though most older microgenetic studies sought to accelerate the natural process 
of developmental changes by increasing the density of exercises within the domain under 
investigation, this research method is not restricted to this purpose (Siegler, 2006). Adding 
an element of training is assumed to be informative regarding the development of the 
skills examined (Kuhn, 1995; Opfer & Siegler, 2004). Recently, microgenetic studies have 
increasingly focused on the effectiveness of various learning experiences (see Siegler, 2006). 
Our study is similar to this latter type, because it observed changes in children’s analogical 
reasoning performance as a result of practice alone, as well as changes that occurred as a 
consequence of a short training procedure. Siegler (2006) asserted that change as a result 
of practice alone, without explicit instructions or prompting, may be considered as natural 
because it does not arise from explicit interventions. We therefore considered a study that 
couples observations of children’s unprompted analogical performances over time with that 
as a result of a short training procedure as a valuable tool to increase knowledge of the nature 
of analogical reasoning in young children.
 Because the type of intra-individual variability in strategy use described earlier has been 
shown to predict later learning substantially (Siegler, 2006), we thought it might be useful 
to investigate whether a short training procedure would have a greater effect on children 
showing variable, inconsistent analogical reasoning over trials than in children not showing 
this kind of behavior. Participants in the study were 6–8 year-old children from first grade. 
Results of prior studies on analogical reasoning on various types of analogy tasks showed that 
changes in analogical reasoning are most prominent at this age (e.g., Goswami & Brown, 1989; 
Hosenfeld, Van der Maas et al., 1997a,b; tunteler & Resing, 2007a,b).
 In the current study, analogical reasoning was measured by a combination of both 
children’s overt solutions to the problems and their verbal explanations for their solutions. 
Siegler (2006) stated the advantage of using retrospective self-reports of strategy use next 
to overt solution behavior in studies on strategy development, because self-reports may give 
additional information about the strategy used. According to Siegler (2006), this additional 
information would enhance the accuracy of classification of strategy use substantially. We 
therefore assumed that a combination of both an overt behavior and a verbal measure for 
analogical reasoning in our study would reveal more about the development of analogical 
reasoning on classical geometric analogy tasks, than just one measure. Because several 
authors (e.g., Halford, 1993; Halford et al., 1998) stated that analogical reasoning may depend 
on memory capacity, we also collected data on children’s memory capacity prior to the study. 
these data provided a means of assessing the role memory may have in the development of 
analogical reasoning on geometric tasks in children.
 the short training procedure in the current study consisted of a standardized step by 
step procedure, which prompted the child to explain the reasoning behind the experimenters’ 
correct analogical solution. Explaining correct solutions of a more knowledgeable person 
has been found to induce learning (Siegler, 1995; Siegler, 2002; Rittle-Johnson, 2006). the 
step by step procedure was based on the component processes of analogical reasoning put 
forward by Sternberg and Rifkin (1979): encoding, inference, mapping and application. these 
component processes have also been successfully used by others in training young children 






































 Due to the microgenetic research design, in combination with several experimental 
conditions we used, we could examine possible changes in children’s analogical performances 
both before and after the short training procedure, as well as differences between conditions. 
Furthermore, after three months we conducted a final testing to investigate whether a progress 
in analogical performance lasted over a more extended period of time, over both conditions in 
the study.
 In sum, the present study aimed to answer the questions whether: 1) children’s analogical 
performance changes due to practice alone, without explicit prompting, and whether a short 
training procedure adds to this effect; 2) the short training procedure has a greater effect 
on children showing variable, inconsistent analogical reasoning over trials than on children 
not showing this kind of behavior; and 3) changes in analogical reasoning either because 
of repeated practice alone or because of the short training procedure lasts over a period of 
3 months. In addition, in an attempt to investigate the role memory capacity and inductive 
reasoning skills plays in the development of analogical reasoning we exploratively investigated 




Participants in this study were 36 children, 17 girls and 19 boys, from grade 1 of two 
elementary schools located in a midsize town in the Netherlands. From each school, eighteen 
children were randomly selected. For all children Dutch was the primary language in their 
home. Parental permission to participate was obtained for all children. At the start of testing, 
the children ranged in age from 5 years and 11 months to 8 years (M=6 years and 8 months, 
SD=4.9 months). Both genders were approximately equally represented within each condition. 
No child dropped out during the extended period of testing.
Material
two pretests were used in the study: Exclusion and Memory Span. Both tests are subtests of 
a Dutch child intelligence test (Revisie Amsterdamse Kinder Intelligentie test, Bleichrodt, 
Drenth, Zaal, & Resing, 1984). the exclusion test is a visual inductive reasoning test. It calls 
upon children’s ability to infer rules, an ability that is assumed to be important for successful 
analogical reasoning. the test consists of 50 items of four abstract figures. three figures belong 
together according to a rule, the child’s task is to discover the rule and select the figure that 
does not satisfy the rule. the test served grouping purposes, but was also used to investigate 
whether analogical reasoning was related to inductive reasoning skills. the memory span 
test measures children’s visual memory capacity. the testing material consists of two small 
booklets and two sets of small blocks with pictures. One set measures concrete visual memory 
and contains pictures like a fish and a flower. the other set measures abstract visual memory 
and contains abstract pictures with undefined forms. the pictures in the booklet are given in a 
certain order, which the child needs to remember and reproduce with the blocks. the amount 
of pictures increases steadily, making it harder to remember and reproduce the sequence. the 
test was used to examine whether analogical reasoning was related to memory capacity.
 testing material consisted of five parallel sets of open-ended paper and pencil geometric 
analogy tasks of the type A:B::C:D. Each of the five sets contained 20 items of various levels 
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of difficulty. the original set of items represented a selection of 20 items from a highly 
homogeneous scale of 36 items created by Hosenfeld, Van den Boom and Resing (1997). 
these items were constructed out of six basic geometrical shapes – circles, squares, triangles, 
pentagons, hexagons, and ellipses – and five possible transformations – adding an element, 
changing size, halving, doubling, and changing position (Hosenfeld, Van den Boom, et al., 1997; 
Mulholland, Pellegrino, & Glaser, 1980). Earlier research (Mulholland et al., 1980) showed 
that the number of elements and transformations the item contained could satisfactorily 
predict its level of difficulty. However, it should be noted that although the difficult items 
contained more information than the easier ones, they could be reduced to smaller sets of 
information and consequently be solved in small steps. In this way, the amount of information 
that had to be processed in parallel remained small (Hosenfeld, Van der Maas, et al., 1997a). 
Some examples of items of various difficulty levels used in the current study are displayed in 
Appendix 2A.
 Because of the repeated testings required in the current study, we developed 4 additional 
tests with parallel test items. the parallel items contained different geometric shapes, but 
were constructed according to comparable construction rules as were the items in the original 
set. the five sets were therefore supposed to be highly comparable. Each set of 20 analogical 
items was presented in a separate booklet. the order of presentation of difficult and easy 
items in each set was mixed, but remained the same over participants and sessions. Every 
analogical item was printed on a separate sheet of paper and presented in an open-ended 
format, which gave children the opportunity to come up with their own solution. Children 
had to draw their solution with a pencil in the last, empty box.
 Additionally, a set of 6 analogical items of various difficulty levels was used during the 
short training procedure. these training items were constructed so that all of the five possible 
transformations were presented at least once.
Design
One week before the experiment started, children were pretested on the Exclusion and 
Memory Span tests. they were randomly allocated to either a trained or a not-trained 
condition based on blocked scores on the exclusion test. As can be seen in table 1, children 
in both conditions were presented with the analogical reasoning tasks at weekly intervals 
over a period of 5 consecutive weeks. During test sessions 1 and 2 children in both conditions 
were administered a set of 20 geometrical analogies without any instruction or feedback 
concerning the correctness of their responses. During the training session, a short 15- minute-
training in  analogical reasoning was delivered to the children in the trained condition, while 
the not-trained children were presented with the same tasks, but without explicit prompting 
or any instructions. During test sessions 3 and 4, all children were again given a set of 20 
geometrical analogies without any instructions or feedback. In addition, three months after 
test session 4 all children—trained and not-trained—were given a follow-up test during which 




























































Trained x x x x x x x
Not-trained x x x - x x x
Note: ¹During the Training session, children in the not-trained condition needed to solve the same analogical items 
as children in the trained condition, but without receiving any instruction or feedback.
²Follow-up test session was administered after a period of 3 months.
General procedure
Children were tested individually. testing took place in a separate room in the child’s own 
school during weekly sessions lasting approximately 15–20 minutes each. the testing 
procedure was basically the same for both trained and not-trained conditions, during all, but 
the training session. Children were presented with the booklets with the geometric analogy 
items. the six basic geometric shapes were displayed on the cover sheet of each booklet. At 
the beginning of each test session, the instructor named each geometric figure in a way that 
the child could understand, and asked the child to copy it underneath the corresponding figure 
printed on the sheet. this procedure served two purposes. It gave the child the opportunity to 
get familiar with the testing material prior to the test. In addition, it allowed the experimenter 
to observe how a child drew a particular figure. this served the purpose of controlling for 
drawing ability, because it allowed the experimenter to take possible difficulties with drawing 
into account.
 Subsequently, the analogy items were presented one by one with a minimum of instruction; 
the child was merely told that this was a kind of ‘puzzle’ with four boxes, the first three 
containing figures (the experimenter pointed to the A, B, and C boxes), but not the fourth 
one (the experimenter pointed to the empty D box). the child was then asked to draw what 
needed to be drawn in the fourth, empty box in order to solve the ‘puzzle’. then the child was 
given the opportunity to draw his own solution to the problem, and asked to verbally explain 
his way of solving the ‘puzzle’.
 Both the overt solution drawn on the paper and the verbal explanation provided by the 
child were recorded on video and analyzed afterwards. In order to ensure that the child 
would not just solve the analogy items over sessions on the basis of mere recognition, items 
consisting of the same level of difficulty but containing different geometrical shapes, were 
alternately administered.
Training procedure
During a short training session of approximately 15 minutes, children were given similar 
analogical items as they received during the test sessions. this time however, children in the 
trained condition were given a short standardized training procedure in which they were 
step by step prompted to explain the way they thought that the experimenter had found the 
correct solution to the so-called ‘puzzle’.
 First, they were presented with an analogy item of medium difficulty. they were given 
comparable instructions as they were given before during the test sessions. then, they were 
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told that the experimenter would help them this time and show them the correct solution 
after they finished their drawing. When the child completed the first analogy item, the 
experimenter revealed the correct solution and gave feedback concerning the correctness of 
the child’s own solution. Subsequently, regardless of the correctness of the child’s solution, 
the child was asked to explain how he thought that the experimenter had arrived at his 
solution. Prompting children to explain the correct solutions of someone more experienced 
has been shown to improve subsequent learning even more than self-explanations of their 
own solutions or corrective feedback (Siegler, 1995, 2002; Rittle-Johnson, 2006). Children 
who subsequently put forward a correct analogical explanation were still given all the steps 
of the analogical reasoning process in order to avoid a disadvantage for the more advanced 
children when new, or more difficult items were presented.
 However, these children were not asked any more questions about the analogy for which 
they gave a correct analogical explanation. Children who put forward incorrect reasoning or 
partly incorrect reasoning, were given the necessary step by step questions, prompting them 
to correct analogical reasoning. these questions were based on the component processes 
put forward in studies by Sternberg and Rifkin (1979) and Resing (1990, 2000): encoding, 
inference, mapping and application (see Appendix 2B).
 After this procedure for the first item, children were presented with a second item, which 
was easier than the one they just solved. Here they first had to explain what they were going to 
do and why, before they were allowed to draw. If necessary, they were systematically helped 
towards the right analogical answer, using the above mentioned procedure. In this way they 
could practice out loud what they had just learned and could be corrected if they would fall 
back into any incorrect old pattern of solving the analogical item. the third training item was 
more difficult again and children were taken through the same procedure as they were during 
the first training item. the fourth training item was about as difficult as the third one, but 
followed the same procedure as the second training item. the fifth training item was the most 
difficult kind of analogical item they would encounter during testing. this item contained 
three elements and five different transformations. the procedure was equal to that for the 
first training item. the sixth and last training item was once again an easier item in order not 
to discourage children who found the fifth item too difficult. the procedure followed for the 
sixth training item was the same as for the first one.
Scoring
test items were scored on the basis of a combination of both children’s drawing and their 
verbal explanations. Some children sometimes experienced difficulties with drawing the 
geometrical shapes. However, this did not cause any problems, because the experimenter had 
seen how the child had drawn all of the figures on the cover sheet and therefore usually knew 
what the child meant by a particular drawing. Whenever she doubted, she asked the child 
to point out and explain which figure(s) he meant by that (e.g., can you point out or tell me 
which figure this one is supposed to be?).
 the scoring-system that we used was adapted from a scoring-system used by Hosenfeld, 
Van der Maas, et al. (1997b) for comparable geometric analogy tasks and earlier by Resing 
(1990) for verbal analogies. this scoring-system consisted of 4 types of solutions: explicit 
correct analogical (Category 1); implicit correct analogical (Category 2); incomplete 
analogical (Category 3); and non-analogical, associative (Category 4). Explicit and implicit 
solutions (Categories 1 and 2) are both considered correct analogical solutions. However, 





































transformations the analogy item contained, while an implicit solution indicates that the 
drawing looked correct, but the child has not explicitly stated all the transformations that the 
analogy item contained. An incomplete analogical solution indicates that analogical reasoning 
is present but only partially, for either one or more, but not all, of the transformations the 
item contained was drawn and mentioned verbally. the non-analogical, associative type 
of solution indicates that the solution was produced by an association strategy instead of 
analogical reasoning. Solutions scored in this category are for example: a copy of elements 
from the A, B or C terms; a complete or partial copy of the A, B or C term; a copy of A, B or C 
with horizontal or vertical position change. Some examples of children’s descriptions of their 
own reasoning are displayed in table 2.
Inter-rater reliability
All data were coded by the second author. to estimate coding reliability, data for the first two 
weeks (40%) were coded by the first author who was blind to the child’s condition. Inter-rater 
agreement was 97%, indicating that the data were scored reliably.
2.3 Results
Before investigating the research questions, we examined children’s initial level of inductive 
reasoning. the result of a one-way ANOVA, with the independent variable being condition with 
two levels—not trained and trained—and the dependent variable being children’s score on the 
inductive reasoning Exclusion test, showed no significant effect for condition. this finding 
indicates that the two conditions did not have different levels of inductive reasoning prior 
to the first test session. the first research question concerned whether children’s analogical 
performance changed due to practice alone, without explicit prompting, and whether a short 
training procedure added to this effect. In order to answer this question, we analyzed the 
data at both the group level and the individual level. the analyses at the group level were 
expected to provide general information on changes in the analogical performances of the two 
experimental conditions. the analyses at the individual level were expected to provide more 
detailed information on how changes occurred.
Analyses at the group level
First, it was important to investigate whether the two conditions had comparable levels of 
analogical reasoning at the start. A one-way ANOVA was conducted, with the independent 
variable being condition with two levels – not trained and trained – and the dependent variable 
being the number of correct analogical – explicit and implicit – solutions on test session 1. 
We included both Category 1 and Category 2 types of solutions in this analysis because these 
two types of solutions are both considered correct analogical solutions. An overview of the 
mean number of correct analogical solutions per session and condition is displayed in table 
3. the results showed no significant effect for condition, indicating that children in the two 
conditions did not differ with respect to their levels of analogical reasoning at the start.
 Next, we conducted a one within (Session: test sessions 1–4) and one between (Condition: 
not trained and trained) repeated-measures ANOVA to investigate whether the two conditions 
changed their use of analogical strategies over time. the dependent variable in the analysis 
was the number of correct analogical—explicit and implicit—solutions (Category 1 and 
2) for each test session (see table 3). the results showed a statistically significant session 
27
2
Inter- and intra-individual variability in analogical strategy changes
effect, Wilks’ λ=.33, F (3, 32)=21.28, p<.001, partial η2=.67, but, more important, there was 
also a statistically significant interaction effect between session and condition, λ=.51, F (3, 
32)=10.44, p<.001, partial η2 =.50.
Table 2. Examples of children’s descriptions of their own reasoning
Category Example Description
Non-analogical 1 Here you can see a hexagon (points to C). Therefore I draw the same in here 
(points to D) [child copied the C-term]
2 Here I see a square and there I see a pentagon (points to the figures in A). I draw 
the same in here (points to the figures in D) [child copied the A-term]
3 A circle with a pentagon in it (points to C). I did the same here (points to D) [child 
copied the C-term]
Incomplete 1 Here circle (points to A) and half circle (points to B). There hexagon (points to C) 
and a bowl (points to D) [child draw a half hexagon; lower half]
2 Look, here (points to B) you see a square with a star in it and there (points to A) 
you can see a square with no star. And there (points to the pentagons in B) you 
can see 2, and there (points to pentagon in A) you see only one. Here (points to 
oval in C) is also only one. Therefore, I have 2 of them (points to 2 ovals in D) [child 
draw the correct transformations, but no star in the triangle]
3 Look, here is an oval in a hexagon (points to the figures A). And there (points to 
the figures in B), there are two of those things in a big oval. That is why I have 
drawn 2 circles in a big pentagon [child draw only one of the transformations]
Implicit 1 Circle (points to A), half circle, half circle (points to B). There is a hexagon (points 
to C). Half hexagon, half hexagon (points to D) [child draw the correct figures]
2 Square, pentagon (points to the figures in A). Square, star, pentagon, pentagon 
(points to the figures in B). Triangle, oval (points to the figures C). therefore, 
triangle, oval, oval [Child draw the correct figures; with a star in the triangle]
3 Here I see a hexagon with an oval in it, and there a triangle (points to the figures 
in A). And here I see another triangle, but there is an arrow in it (points to B). And 
here I also see 2 small hexagons with a big oval around it (points to B). Then I did 
the same with these figures (points to C) and got this (points to D) [Child draw 
the correct figures]
Explicit 1 Here is a circle (points to A), and there are two half circles (points to the figures 
in B). And there (points to C) I can see a hexagon. Therefore, I did the same here 
and draw 2 of these (points to the 2 halves of the hexagon drawn in D) [Child draw 
the correct figures] 
2 Here is a square and a pentagon (points to the figures in A). Here is also a square, 
but with a star in it (points to B). And there are also two pentagons. Here is a 
triangle and there one oval (points to the figures in C) and look there is no star in it 
(points to the triangle in C). That is why I draw a triangle with a star in it here, and 
there 2 ovals (points to the figures in D) [Child draw the correct figures]
3 An oval with a hexagon around it, and a triangle (points to the figures in A). Circle 
with a pentagon and a square (points to the figures in C). Here is an arrow in the 
triangle and a big oval around the two hexagons (points to the figures in B). That 
is why (points to D) square with an arrow in it here, and pentagon with 2 circles in 
it there [Child draw the correct figures]





































Table 3. Means and standard deviations of the number of analogical responses per condition and session
Condition Session
1 2 3 4
Not trained
M 3.17 4.83 5.17 5.06
(SD) (4.73) (6.46) (6.95) (6.70)
Trained
M 3.11 5.78 12.06 12.00
(SD) (3.41) (6.39) (6.22) (6.22)
the results of follow-up repeated contrasts evaluating the session effect revealed that there 
was a difference in the number of analogical solutions between test sessions 1 and 2, and 
between test sessions 2 and 3, F (1, 34)=17.85, p<.001, partial η2 =.34 and F (1, 34)=28.85, 
p<.001, partial η2 =.46, respectively. As can be seen in table 3, the means for the second test 
session were higher relative to the means for the first test session, and the means for the 
third test session were higher relative to the means for the second test session, indicating 
an improvement in analogical solutions from test sessions 1 to 3. No significant difference 
was found between test sessions 3 and 4, indicating that children’s analogical performance 
stabilized from test sessions 3 to 4.
 Investigation of the session by condition interaction effect using repeated contrasts 
follow-up analyses, revealed that there was a difference among conditions between test 
sessions 2 and 3, F (1, 34)=23.32, p<.001, partial η2=.41. the trained children showed greater 
improvement in their use of analogical strategies between test sessions 2 and 3 relative to 
the not-trained children, who hardly improved their analogical performance between these 
two test sessions (ES
trained/not-trained
=.96)1, as can be seen in Figure 1. these findings led us to 
conclude that practice alone led to an increase in the use of analogical strategies between test 
sessions 1 and 2. However, the short training procedure led to an improvement in analogical 
reasoning between test sessions 2 and 3 over and above that of practice alone. 
 Because averaging data over strategies may distort conclusions about several aspects 
of children’s performance (Siegler, 1987), we also examined the performances of the two 
conditions generated by each strategy separately. On this account, we conducted 4 separate 
one within (Session: test sessions 1–4) and one between (Condition: not trained and trained) 
repeated-measures ANOVAs. the dependent variables in the separate analyses were the 
number of explicit correct analogical (category 1), implicit correct analogical (category 2), 
incomplete analogical (category 3) and non-analogical, associative (category 4) solutions on 




represents the standardized mean difference (d) between the scores of test sessions 
3 (after the training) and 2 (before the training) for the trained group minus the standardized mean 
difference (d) between the scores of test sessions 3 and 2 for the not-trained group.
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Figure 1. Changes in the number of correct analogical solutions by condition.
Figure 2. Changes in the number of explicit analogical, implicit analogical, incomplete analogical, and non-analogical 
solutions by condition and session.
Explicit analogical solutions
the results of the first ANOVA, the analysis on the number of explicit correct analogical 
solutions, showed a statistically significant effect for both session and the interaction between 
session and condition, Wilks’ λ=.46, F (3, 32)=12.30, p<.001, partial η2 =.54 and Wilks’ λ=.60, F 





































contrast analyses showed that there was a difference among the means for test sessions 2 and 
3 and for test sessions 3 and 4, F (1, 34)=31.57, p<.001, partial η2 =.48 and F (1, 34)=6.94, 
p=.013, partial η2 =.17, respectively. the difference between test sessions 1 and 2 was almost 
significant, F (1, 34)=3.63, p=.065, partial η2 =.10. Investigation of the session by condition 
interaction effect revealed a difference among conditions only between test sessions 2 and 3, 
F (1, 34)= 14.22, p=.001, partial η2 =.30. As can be seen in Figure 2, these results suggest that 
children, regardless of condition, used the explicit analogical strategy slightly more frequently 
from test sessions 1 to 2. From tests sessions 2 to 3 both conditions further improved their use 
of explicit solutions, but the improvement was considerably greater for the trained condition. 
From test sessions 3 to 4 the two conditions showed a slight decrease in their use of the 
explicit analogical strategy.
Implicit analogical solutions
the results for the second ANOVA, the analysis on the number of implicit correct analogical 
solutions, also showed a statistically significant effect for session, Wilks’ λ=.75, F (3, 32)=3.63, 
p=.023, partial η2=.25, but not for the interaction between session and condition. Evaluation 
of the session effect using repeated contrast analyses indicated that, regardless of condition, 
there was a statistically significant difference in the number of implicit analogical solutions 
between test sessions 1 and 2, and between test sessions 3 and 4, F (1, 34)=7.65, p=.009, partial 
η2=.18 and F (1, 34)=6.66, p=.014, partial η2=.16, respectively. these results suggest that the 
use of the implicit analogical strategy improved through practice alone; the short training 
procedure had little additional effect on its use since both conditions changed their number of 
implicit analogical solutions approximately the same during the period of the study.
Incomplete analogical solutions
the results of the ANOVA on the number of incomplete analogical solutions showed a 
statistically significant effect for session only, Wilks’ λ=.72, F (3, 32)=4.22, p=.013, partial 
η2=.39. the results of repeated contrast analyses evaluating this session effect revealed that 
the effect was due to an improvement in the number of incomplete analogical solutions 
between test sessions 2 and 3, F (1, 34)=7.02, p=.012, partial η2 =.17. As can be seen in Figure 
2, the trained condition showed more frequently incomplete solutions than the not trained 
condition, particularly during test sessions 3 and 4. Further inspection of the data revealed 
that with this progression, children in the trained condition decreased their use of non-
analogical, associative strategies even more.
Non-analogical solutions
the results of the ANOVA on the number of non-analogical solutions revealed a statistically 
significant effect for session as well as for the interaction between session and condition, 
Wilks’ λ=.41, F (3, 32)=15.19, p<.001, partial η2=.59 and Wilks’ λ=56, F (3, 32)=8.35, p=.001, 
partial η2=.44, respectively. Evaluation of the session effect showed that there was a difference 
in the use of non-analogical strategies between test sessions 1 and 2 and between test sessions 
2 and 3, but not between test sessions 3 and 4, F (1, 34)=9.63, p=.004, partial η2=.22 and F (1, 
34)= 23.87, p<.001, partial η2=.41, respectively. the results of follow-up analyses evaluating 
the session by condition interaction effect revealed that the effect was due to a difference 
among conditions between test sessions 2 and 3 only, F (1, 34)=19.88, p<.001, partial η2=.37. 
this result indicates that practice alone led to a rather continuous decrease in the use of non-
analogical strategies from test sessions 1 to 3, as can be seen in Figure 2. However, the short 
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training procedure decreased the use of these inappropriate, non-analogical strategies even 
more. After the third session the use of non-analogical strategies stabilized.
Analyses at the individual level
In order to gain more detailed information on the process of change in the use of analogical 
strategies, we also investigated the data on analogical reasoning at the individual level. We 
were particularly interested in whether the data for the individual children of both conditions 
revealed specific patterns of change over the 4 test sessions. We therefore observed for each 
individual child the number of correct analogical – implicit and explicit – responses on each 
of the 4 test sessions. Next, we investigated change in the distributions of their response 
categories from test sessions 1 to 4. If a child progressed 15% (3 out of the 20 items) or more 
from one test session to another, this was considered an improvement in analogical reasoning. 
Various patterns of improvement in analogical reasoning were then identified within the two 
conditions. Children with a similar pattern of improvement were grouped together. these 
subgroups of children took varying routes in the acquisition of analogical strategies to solve 
geometric tasks (see table 4). 
 As can be seen in table 4, within the not-trained condition, three subgroups of children 
with varying patterns of change in analogical reasoning were identified. the first subgroup 
consisted of 10 children who made no progression at all during the period of the study. these 
children practically only used non-analogical strategies across the 4 test sessions. A second 
subgroup consisted of 7 children who progressed from test sessions 1 to 2 only. Finally, there 
was 1 child who made no progression because he scored high from the beginning.
 table 4 also displays that within the trained condition 4 subgroups of children with varying 
patterns of change in the use of analogical strategies were identified. the first subgroup 
consisted of 2 children who, despite the short training procedure, only used inadequate, non-
analogical strategies during the 4 test sessions. the second subgroup consisted of 3 children 
who improved considerably through practice from test sessions 1 to 2, but did not progress 
any further after the short training procedure. the third subgroup consisted of 9 children who 
made no progression from test sessions 1 to 2. However, after the short training procedure this 
subgroup made considerable progression during the third test session. the fourth subgroup 
consisted of 4 children who progressed from test sessions 1 to 2, and after the short training 
procedure made additional progress during test session 3.
Table 4. Number of children per subgroup and condition















Not trained 10 7 - - 1
Trained 2 3 9 4 -
Note: 1N=18 per condition, 2Improvement due to practice alone, 3Improvement due to training alone, 4Improvement 





































Next, it was important to investigate the distributions of the various response categories of 
the individual children within each of the subgroups more closely in order to say something 
about the pattern of changes in the use of analogical strategies within individuals. For the not-
trained condition only the distribution of the response categories of the second subgroup was 
examined, because the children in the other two subgroups made no improvement. For the 
trained condition, we examined only the distributions of response categories of subgroups 3 
and 4, since the first subgroup made no improvement and the second subgroup only consisted 
of 3 children of which two children reached near maximum score during test sessions 2 to 4.
Not-trained condition
the distributions of the response categories of the individual children in the second subgroup 
(increases from test sessions 1 to 2) of the not-trained condition are displayed in Figure 3. 
As can be seen in this figure, there was much within-child variability within this subgroup. 
Moreover, the children who relatively often showed incomplete analogical responses during 
Figure 3. Number of responses per category, session and child of subgroup 2 of the not-trained condition.
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the first test session, made the most improvement in test session 2. this observation suggests 
that the earlier described practice effect between these two test sessions was mostly due to a 
progression from incomplete to complete – either explicit or implicit –  analogical solutions.
Trained condition
the distributions of the response categories of the individual children in the third subgroup 
(increases from test session 2 to 3) of the trained condition are displayed in Figure 4. 
this figure reveals that the 5 children (6, 12, 13, 22, and 31) who showed some analogical 
reasoning in the first 2 test sessions showed a considerable increase in analogical – either 
complete or incomplete – solutions from the second to the third test session. After test 
session 3 their response patterns stabilized. However, the remaining 4 children (3, 4, 24 and 





































34) in this subgroup went from completely non-analogical to approximately 15 complete plus 
5 incomplete analogical solutions. A rather rapid change in analogical thinking was thus made 
at one time. therefore it can be concluded that the short training procedure had a different 
effect on the process of change in the use of analogical strategies in children at this age.
 the distributions of the response categories of the individual children in the fourth 
subgroup (increases from test session 1 to 2 and test sessions 2 to 3) of the trained condition 
are displayed in Figure 5. this figure shows that all children in the fourth subgroup increased 
in all analogical – either complete or incomplete – response categories from test sessions 1 to 
2.
Figure 5. Number of responses per category, session and child of subgroup 4 of the trained condition.
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this improvement can be attributed to practice. From test sessions 2 to 3 they particularly 
increased their number of explicit analogical solutions. Apparently, the short training 
procedure led these children to become more explicitly analogical. It can also be seen that 
these children did not give non-analogical responses any longer during this third test session; 
they gave incomplete analogical responses instead. During the fourth test session, the 
facilitating effect of the short training procedure continued for 3 of the 4 children.
 Because the age range of the participants seems a bit wide, we conducted several Mann-
Whitney U tests to evaluate whether the observed differences in response patterns over 
sessions among the various subgroups were due to age. For the not-trained condition, we 
compared subgroups 1 versus 2 with respect to age. For the trained condition, we compared 
the ages of subgroups 1 versus 2, subgroups 1+2 versus 3, subgroups 3 versus 4, and within 
subgroup 3 for children who showed some analogical reasoning on the test sessions 1 and 2 
versus children who showed no analogical reasoning on the first two test sessions. We did not 
find any significant difference among the various subgroups with respect to age, indicating 
that the observed differences in responding over time among the various subgroups were not 
due to age. 
 Next, we conducted several Mann Whitney U tests to examine possible differences among 
the subgroups with respect to inductive reasoning and memory (concrete and abstract) 
capacity. Results of all comparisons were not significant, indicating that the observed 
differences between the various subgroups in responding over time were not due to children’s 
inductive reasoning or memory capacity either.
Change in inconsistent analogical reasoners
Next, we examined the question whether the short training procedure had a greater effect on 
children showing variable, inconsistent analogical reasoning over trials than in children not 
showing this kind of behavior. to answer this question we divided the trained children, based 
on their scores in test session 2 (before the training), into three groups: non /weak-analogical 
reasoners, children who had less than 25% of the items correct; variable, inconsistent 
analogical reasoners, children who had 25%–75% of the items correct; and strong analogical 
reasoners, children who had more than 75% of the items correct. then, we conducted an 
ANCOVA, with the dependent variable being the number of correct analogical responses 
(category 1 and 2) in test session 3 (after the training) and the covariate being the number 
of correct analogical responses (category 1 and 2) in session 2 (before the training). the 
independent variable consisted of two levels: non/weak-analogical reasoners (N=11) and 
variable analogical reasoners (N=5). the third group (strong analogical reasoners) was not 
included in this analysis since these children could not improve much more. A preliminary 
analysis evaluating the homogeneity-of-slopes assumption indicated that the relationship 
between the covariate and the dependent variable did not differ significantly as a function of 
the independent variable, F (1, 12)=.02, MSE=26.40, p=.89, partial η2=.00. the results of the 
ANCOVA were non-significant, indicating that the short training procedure did not have a 
greater effect on children showing variable, inconsistent analogical reasoning over trials than 
on children not showing this kind of behavior.
Duration of the effects
the next question related to whether the improvement in the use of analogical strategies 
observed in the microgenetic study lasted over a longer period of time. For the purpose of 





































month after test session 4. A one within (Session: test sessions 4 and follow-up test session) 
and one between (Condition: not trained and trained) repeated-measures ANOVA, with the 
dependent variable being the sum of correct analogical – explicit and implicit – responses for 
each session, was conducted. the results of the analysis associated with the within-subject 
effects showed a statistically significant effect for session, Wilks’ λ=.82, F (1, 34)=7.39, p=.01, 
partial η2=.18, but no interaction effect. the means of both the trained and the not-trained 
condition were higher on the follow-up test session (M=13.06, SD=6.10 and M=6.06, SD=6.81, 
respectively) than on test session 4 (M=12.00, SD=6.22 and M=5.06, SD=6.70, respectively), 
indicating an increase in the use of analogical strategies over a period of 3 months for both 
conditions. Since there was no interaction effect, it can be concluded that children in both 
conditions improved their analogical performance in a similar manner. the results of the 
analysis associated with the between subject effects showed statistically significant differences 
in the use of analogical strategies among the two conditions, F (1, 34)=10.80, p=.002, partial 
η2=.24. Observation of the means revealed that the trained children (M=12.53, Std. Error=1.5) 
gave considerably more analogical responses than the not-trained children (M=5.56, Std. 
Error=1.5) on the two sessions combined. 
Relation between variables
the next question concerned whether children’s analogical reasoning performance was related 
to their memory or inductive reasoning scores. We computed correlational coefficients among 
the analogical reasoning measure (represented by the number of correct analogical explicit 
and implicit solutions for the first—two test sessions before the training—and second—two 
test sessions after the training—half of sessions) and the inductive reasoning and memory 
(concrete and abstract) measures. the correlational coefficients were computed for the 
two conditions separately to eliminate conditions from the relations, allowing us to make 
comparisons across conditions. the results showed for the two conditions non-significant 
correlations among the inductive reasoning and analogical reasoning scores on both halves 
of sessions. the correlations among the concrete memory and analogical reasoning scores on 
the two halves of sessions were also non-significant for the two conditions. However, for the 
relation between the abstract memory and analogical reasoning scores, we found statistically 
significant correlations for the trained children on the second half of sessions (r
pearson
=.678, 
p=.02). these results suggest that the trained children who were scoring high on the abstract 
memory measure also tended to score high on the analogical reasoning measure during the 
two test sessions after the short training procedure.
2.4 Discussion
the main purpose of this study was to gain insight into the nature of young children’s 
analogical reasoning ability by investigating whether the analogical performance on geometric 
tasks of 6–8 year-old first-grade children changed due to repeated practice alone, without 
explicit prompting, and whether a short training procedure that provided children with some 
explicit modeling and feedback added to this effect. As stated in the introduction, several 
studies on children’s analogical reasoning ability have been conducted in the past, but only 
one study (tunteler & Resing, 2007a) has focused on a comparison of the path of natural, 
unprompted changes in analogical reasoning performance with that of changes induced by 
a short training procedure. the present study differs from the tunteler and Resing (2007a) 
37
2
Inter- and intra-individual variability in analogical strategy changes
study in that it focused on geometric tasks, rather than problem analogy tasks. In addition, the 
short training procedure in our study was given between test session 2 and 3, which allowed 
us to investigate changes in children’s analogical performances both before and after the short 
training procedure.
 the results of our microgenetic study revealed new insights into the nature of changes in 
analogical reasoning on geometric analogical tasks in grade 1 level children. One of our findings 
was that the analogical performances of children of this grade level changed spontaneously as 
a result of practice alone, without any helpful instruction to the task or prompting. According 
to Siegler (2006), this type of change may be considered as natural because it does not arise 
from explicit interventions. the finding that practice alone was sufficient to activate the use 
of analogical strategies on geometric tasks then suggests that analogical reasoning skills must 
have been already present, though in a more rudimentary form, in the repertoire of children 
of this age and that the opportunity to practice accelerated it’s spontaneous use. this result is 
consistent with earlier findings of tunteler and Resing (2002, 2007a,b), who demonstrated 
that 4- to 8-year-old children spontaneously improved their use of analogical strategies to 
solve problem analogy tasks after practice experiences. Similar results have also emerged 
from studies that have examined young children’s knowledge of geometric transformations 
in the plane; Logo experiences have been shown to increase young children’s awareness 
of geometric figures and their ability to communicate about spatial ideas (see Clements & 
Battista, 1992; Clements, Battista, Sarama & Swaminathan, 1997).
 Another finding of the study is that spontaneous, unprompted changes in analogical 
reasoning performance was most prominent between test sessions 1 and 2; the analogical 
performance of the not-trained children remained rather stable during test sessions 3 and 
4. In a study by Alexander et al. (1989), similar changes in geometric analogical reasoning 
were found in preschoolers and kindergartners. the authors suggested that this improvement 
was due to familiarity with the test-items, but they gave the children in their study extensive 
instructions to the tasks. As instructions may be seen as a form of training, one may object 
that the increase in analogical performance observed in the Alexander et al. study may also be 
attributed to the instructions repeatedly given to the children. In our study, the geometrical 
analogy tasks were given with no instruction other than that the tasks were like a ‘puzzle’; 
neither was any feedback given. therefore, our results clearly demonstrate that young 
children can indeed change their knowledge and strategy for analogy by experience alone, 
confirming that it is well within their developmental range of growth to grasp analogical ideas 
related to geometric shapes.
 Our results were interesting in the light of other microgenetic studies, which tended 
to reveal that changes in a cognitive competency is a result of a changing distribution of 
various strategies of varying adequacy (Kuhn, 1995; Siegler, 2006). In this study, changes in 
the distribution of the various response categories were analyzed at both the group and the 
individual level. Analyses at the group level indicated that the natural, unprompted increase in 
analogical performance observed between test sessions 1 and 2 was greatly due to an increase 
in implicit correct analogical solutions. More in-depth analysis of the patterns of change in 
the use of analogical strategies within individuals of the not-trained condition added to this 
finding that approximately half of the not-trained children did not progress during the study 
period, while another half of the children did. the distributions of the response categories of 
this latter subgroup showed considerable variability in task performance within individuals, 
referring to diverse and variable strategy use within as well as across trials. this finding is 





































2002, 2007a,b). the children who relatively often showed incomplete analogical responses 
during the first test session, made the most improvement during test session 2, suggesting 
that the observed increase in analogical performance was mostly due to a progression from 
incomplete to complete – either implicit or (to a less extent) explicit – analogical solutions. 
Although not the focus of the study, this finding seems to provide evidence for the propositions 
that children make unconscious discoveries of analogical strategies, which subsequently 
becomes conscious analogical reasoning. this observation confirms research from Siegler and 
Stern (1998) who found similar results with children in a study on strategy discovery on an 
arithmetic task. However, it should be noted that the not-trained children in our study were 
not given any instruction or feedback with respect to their solutions. they may therefore have 
executed an analogical strategy at a conscious level, but did not report it because they did not 
know that it was better to do so. therefore, further research is recommended to investigate 
this issue in more detail.
 With respect to the paths of change of the trained children, the results showed that the 
short training procedure caused an increase in the use of analogical strategies on geometric 
tasks that could not be explained by practice alone. Examination of the performance of this 
group of children generated by each strategy separately revealed that the short training 
procedure particularly had an effect on children’s use of explicit correct analogical strategies 
and, although to a lesser extent, on their use of incomplete analogical strategies. Our findings 
suggest that children after the short training procedure mastered their correct responses 
mostly explicitly and when they were not up to a complete analogical solution, they solved 
the item partly analogically without entirely reverting back to an associative response. these 
changes in the use of analogical strategies observed in the trained group tended to go together 
with a rather rapid decrease in the use of non-analogical, associative responses, while a rather 
continuous decrease in the use of this non-analogical strategy was observed in the not-trained 
group. 
 More in-depth analysis of the patterns of changes within individuals of the trained 
condition revealed a varied picture. Within this condition, there were 2 children who 
remained consistent non-analogical, regardless of the short training procedure, and 3 children 
who spontaneously improved their analogical reasoning through practice alone. Another 4 
children improved through practice and also through the short training procedure, after which 
they particularly became more explicitly. these children showed a gradual change in their 
distribution of correct analogical responses over time, confirming the microgenetic picture of 
learning proposed by Kuhn (1995). the remaining 9 children made a relatively larger change 
towards analogical reasoning after the short training procedure. Surprisingly, in this subgroup, 
it were not the children with variation in strategies that showed the most improvement, 
but the children exhibiting only non-analogical strategies during the first two practice 
sessions. this latter group of children even went from completely associative reasoning to 
consistent analogical reasoning after the short training procedure, indicating a rather rapid 
change within one time point. these results provide evidence for Siegler’s observation 
(2006) that microgenetic studies tend to show a relatively large number of children going 
through a gradual change in their rate of discovery and generalization of a cognitive strategy, 
while a smaller number shows a more rapid change in this respect. they also challenge the 
position that analogical reasoning on geometric tasks is an age related competence which can 
not be induced by training in children only showing non-analogical, associative reasoning 
(Hosenfeld, Van der Maas, et al., 1997b). Apparently analogical reasoning was already present 
in the cognitive processing abilities of these young children, but needed some prompting.
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 taken together, consistent with results of tunteler and Resing (2007a) with problem 
analogy tasks, our results showed considerable inter and intra-individual variability in the 
use of analogical strategies in both not-trained and trained first-grade children. According 
to Siegler (2006) such intra-individual variability in strategy use has been shown to predict 
later learning substantially. the findings described above provide evidence for this position 
for the not-trained group. Within this group, a natural increase in analogical reasoning was 
evidenced in children showing variable, diverse strategies on the first test session, whereas 
children practically only showing non-analogical, associative reasoning did not change their 
performance over time. However, no conclusive evidence was found for the trained group. 
the short training procedure did not only induce change in the analogical performances of 
children initially showing variable analogical reasoning, but also in children only showing 
non-analogical, associative reasoning during the test session prior to the training session. 
Moreover, analysis at the group level showed that the short training procedure did not have 
a greater effect on children who displayed variable analogical reasoning, defined by having 
25%–75% correct analogical solutions on the test session prior to the training session, than 
on children not showing this kind of behavior. It should however be noted that this outcome 
should be interpreted with some caution, since the groups in this analysis were rather small 
and of unequal sizes and the age range of the participants was a bit wide. Replication of these 
results is therefore needed to verify and extend our results.
 Another result of the study is that both the trained and not-trained children improved 
their analogical performances in a follow-up test session that was conducted after a retention 
period of 3 months after test session 4. It is not clear whether this improvement occurred as a 
result of our experimental procedure or because of another variable. More important however, 
this finding indicates that the observed progress in analogical performance lasted over a more 
extended period of time, over both conditions in the study. Apparently, changes in analogical 
reasoning obtained through experience or a short training procedure do not only persist 
over a period of time during which children are repeatedly given practice opportunities, as 
tunteler and Resing (2007a,b) showed earlier with problem analogy tasks, but also last over a 
longer period of time during which children are not given these experiences. this observation 
then suggests that these young children had incorporated the analogical strategy within their 
existing set of strategies for solving geometric analogy tasks.
 Finally, in an attempt to investigate the role memory capacity and inductive reasoning 
skills may play in the development of analogical reasoning, we investigated whether children’s 
analogical reasoning performance was related to their memory (abstract and concrete) or 
inductive reasoning scores. Our results only revealed a relation between children’s analogical 
reasoning scores and their scores on the abstract memory test for the trained children 
during the test sessions after the training session. the analogical items used in our studies 
consisted of geometric shapes of various difficulty levels. the difficult items contained more 
information than the easier ones, but they could be solved in small steps by reducing them to 
smaller sets of information. the short training procedure consisted of a standardized step by 
step procedure, which prompted the child to explain the reasoning behind the experimenters’ 
correct analogical solution. We suggest that the short training procedure made children more 
aware of the fact that they could solve the analogical tasks in small steps, reducing the amount 
of information that had to be processed in parallel, allowing them to solve analogical items 
of increasing levels of difficulty. the finding that this relation was only found for the trained 





































 Although individual differences and variability in the acquisition of novel strategies are 
not unique for the area of analogical reasoning (e.g., Kuhn, 1995; Siegler, 1995, 2006), it is 
important to consider these issues with respect to the acquisition of analogical strategies on 
geometric tasks more closely in future studies. At this moment it is not clear why some of 
the children in our study increased their use of analogical strategies through practice, some 
others through training, again some others through a combination of the two, while still some 
others did not progress even despite of the short training procedure. One objection may be 
that the age range of the participants was a bit wide, and that these children therefore may 
have been in a different developmental range of growth with respect to analogical reasoning. 
Yet, it should be noted that no age differences were found among the various subgroups 
with different patterns of responding over time. Explanations in terms of a lack of inductive 
reasoning skills or memory capacity are not sufficient either, because our results showed no 
differences in this respect among the various subgroups.
 It is also not clear why the children who only gave associative responses prior to the 
short training procedure, improved their analogical reasoning performance more during the 
unprompted test sessions after the short training procedure, than their peers who already 
showed some analogical reasoning prior to the short training procedure. Apparently, 
the absence of any partially formed strategy among these children allowed them to adopt 
strategies they had learned about as they tried to explain the steps taken by an interviewer as 
she solved the tasks. A possible explanation for this finding could therefore be that children 
who already solved some analogical items correctly may have improved less, because learning 
a completely new strategy may be easier than integrating a more advanced strategy with an 
old, less advanced one or replacing a less advanced strategy with a more advanced one. this 
observation might then indicate that correctly instructing young children from the beginning, 
before giving them the opportunity to practice, might prove a better way to accelerate the 
process of acquisition and generalization of analogical strategies in some children, because 
correctly instructing them from the beginning might prevent interference of less adequate or 
deficient analogical strategies. this result has important implications for geometry education 
as it clarifies how 6-8 year old children from first grade can address logical operations on 
spatial objects through analogies. Yet, the data here came from one experiment and the 
subgroups consisted of relatively small numbers of children; any conclusions drawn from 
these data must be treated with the necessary caution. We therefore recommend further 
research into young children’s use of analogies on tasks involving geometric transformations.
 It was clear from our data that the short training procedure had an additional effect above 
practice alone on a considerable number of children of this age. One may then question what 
factors could have led to this effect. In essence, our short training procedure consisted of 
modeling and a step by step procedure of prompting children to self-explain all the steps of 
correct analogical reasoning proposed by Sternberg and Rifkin (1979) and Resing (1990). 
As discussed above, the increase in analogical performance due to the short training 
procedure observed in this study was mostly due to an increase in explicit correct analogical 
responses, meaning that children not only solved the analogical item correctly, but also 
verbally explained correct analogical reasoning for their solutions without explicitly being 
told to do so. Additionally, besides the increase in complete analogical responses, there was 
also an increase in incomplete analogical responses after the short training, while completely 
associative responses were nearly extinguished. these findings certainly reveal conceptual 
mastery. We therefore suggest that our results confirm the prediction made by Rittle-Johnson 
(2006) “… that direct instruction on a correct procedure and conceptual explanation for the 
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procedure would lead to the greatest learning and transfer if students were also prompted 
to self-explain” (p. 13). Yet, in this study we did not compare the effects of various types of 
training on analogical reasoning at this age. therefore, future research needs to be conducted 
in which instruction procedures are varied in order to give a conclusive answer to the question 
cited above. Moreover, it would be advisable to investigate whether similar results can be 
obtained while instructing children of other ages and also with different types of analogical 
tasks.
 In sum, we can conclude from our results that although repeated practice has a beneficial 
effect on the natural, unprompted use of analogical strategies to solve geometric tasks by 
first-grade children, the provision of a short training procedure that provides children with 
some explicit modeling and feedback adds to this effect. the short training procedure used 
in our study induced in 9 of the 18 children a continuation of a gradual process of change in 
the acquisition of analogical strategies, while in 4 others it induced a rather rapid change in 
analogical reasoning. Since this observation may have important implications for analogical 
learning in educational settings, it would be good to investigate whether teachers could 
obtain similar results with their children (Alexander et al., 1987) and whether children will 
extend their learning to other (analogical) tasks as well. Moreover, it would be interesting 
to extend this research to research on dynamic assessment in educational settings (Elliott, 
2003). It could, for example, be investigated exactly how much instruction children need to 
improve their analogical reasoning and what this amount of help subsequently means for their 
readiness to learn by analogy.
 Given that the analogical ability is generally assumed to be related to a variety of 
mathematical competencies besides geometry (e.g., numeric representations, calculation, 
understanding fractions), our results imply that children’s potential growth on tasks with 
analogical reasoning may contribute to mathematical development besides geometry. this is 
an important implication for mathematics education. However, in this study we did not assess 
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Appendix 2B
Step by step procedure during the short training.
Step 1. [Encoding]
Question: What did I start with, do you think?
Answer: I first took a few good looks at all the figures in all of these boxes (point to A, B and 
C).
Step 2. [Inference]
Question: What did I do after that, do you think?
Answer: I then saw that this box (point to A) and this box (point to B) belong together’
Step 3. [Inference]
Question: ‘How come that I thought of that, do you think?’
Answer: Experimenter explained for each geometric shape in A separately which 
transformation was applied to it in B.
Step 4. [Mapping]
Question: Which idea did I come up with next?
Answer: I then thought: “this box (point to A) and this box (point to C) look like each other, 
because...” (show/explain for all geometrical shapes separately why A looks like C).
Step 5. [Application]
Question: After this, what did I draw in this box (point to D) and why did I do that?
Answer: Well, I thought that I should draw something in this box (point to D) that would 
make these two boxes (point to C and D) belong to together, just like these two boxes (point 
to A and B) belong to together.
the experimenter then asked for each geometrical shape in A and B which transformations 
were applied and explained that the same transformations needed to be applied to the 
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In the current study we investigated the inter- and intra-individual developmental trajectories of analogical 
reasoning in a dynamic test and non-guided practice setting. the study employed a microgenetic research 
method together with Multilevel Analysis to investigate developmental trajectories as a function of their 
background variables and experimental treatment. Background variables included verbal and abstract-
visual-spatial working-memory capacity. Participants were 32 children aged 7-8 years with a mean age 
of 90 months. Half of the children followed a microgenetic design; the others followed a comparable 
design but were dynamically tested halfway the experiment, all assessment moments involving solving 
visual-spatial analogies tasks. All test sessions were undertaken individually. After repeated assessment 
sessions, children showed inter-individual growth in analogical reasoning through non-guided practice, 
but even more through dynamic testing. Growth through both practice and dynamic testing appeared to 
be influenced by spatial working-memory capacity. After dividing children into subgroups, multilevel 
analysis allowed us to display intra-individual developmental trajectories that were similar in amount 
and rate of analogical reasoning change within each subgroup. these study outcomes suggest a need 
for more in-depth microgenetic research into dynamic testing of analogical reasoning in combination 
with working-memory assessment. In particular, comparing the strategy use of subgroups painted by 
the current study might be very promising in revealing specific strengths and weaknesses that influence 
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3.1 Introduction
the development and training of inductive reasoning, particularly children’s capacity to 
reason by analogy, have been the focus of much research (e.g., Alexander, Willson, White, & 
Fuqua, 1987; Alexander et al., 1989; Goswami, 1992; Resing, 2000; tzuriel & George, 2009). 
In former studies, children older than 6 years have typically displayed clear improvements 
in analogical reasoning after receiving a brief period of training or, alternatively, after having 
been given extensive instructions for such tasks as verbal analogies (Resing 1993, 1997), 
physical problem analogies (tunteler & Resing, 2007a), concrete pictorial analogies (Hessels-
Schlatter, 2002; Schlatter & Büchel, 2000; Stevenson, Resing, & Froma, 2009), and classic 
geometric analogies (Hosenfeld, Van der Maas, & Van den Boom, 1997a, 1997b; tunteler, 
Pronk, & Resing, 2008). In contrast, younger children have tended only to show such gains 
when they had received extensive training (e.g., tunteler & Resing, 2007a; Alexander et al., 
1989). therefore, this study focused on grade two children to investigate the development 
of analogical reasoning as it happens. this form of reasoning was induced by repeated non-
guided practice and the use of a dynamic test employing concrete, figural analogies. 
 Both repeated non-guided practice, and instruction while learning, have been recognized 
as valuable in investigating developmental trajectories by means of a microgenetic research 
design (Winne & Nesbit, 2010; Siegler, 2006). According to this design, repeated non-guided 
practice sessions given during a time of rapidly improving competence permits a high 
frequency of observations relative to the rate of change. Hence, changes in reasoning become 
visible at the very moment they happen, enabling the discovery of natural developmental 
pathways. these developmental pathways may be considered natural, since the practice 
sessions include no explicit forms of intervention, such as the provision of elaborate 
instructions or prompting (Flynn & Siegler, 2007; Siegler & Crowley, 1991; Siegler 2006). It 
is considered that the acquisition and development of cognitive abilities may show differing 
pathways when acquired through more ‘natural’ unprompted opportunities than when 
resulting from instruction. these potentially differing pathways make it useful to examine 
both in combination (Kuhn, 1995; Bjorklund, Miller, Coyle & Slawinsky, 1997; Opfer & 
Siegler, 2004; tunteler et al., 2008). therefore, in addition to unprompted repeated practice, 
we included instruction derived from a dynamic test.  
 Dynamic testing has become increasingly popular for the study of inductive reasoning 
(e.g., Bethge, Carlson, & Wiedl, 1982; Resing, 2000; tzuriel, 2000; tzuriel & Flor-Maduel, 
2010; tzuriel & Kaufman, 1999). Key to this approach is the incorporation of feedback and 
training during the testing phases (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2002; Elliott, 2003; Swanson 
& Lussier, 2001). Conventional, static tests are considered to be means to assess already 
developed abilities. Dynamic modes of testing are designed to assess developing or yet-to-
develop abilities which are the products of underlying, but often unrecognized, cognitive 
capacities (e.g., Hessels, 2000; Elliott, 2003; Lidz & Macrine, 2001; Resing, 2006; Sternberg 
et al., 2002; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2006). Dynamic testing has been found to be a means 
to gain insight into cognitive and meta-cognitive strategies used by the examinees, their 
responsiveness to examiner assistance and support, and their ability to transfer learning from 
the test situation to subsequent unaided situations (Elliott, 2003). In this study, we examined 
the influence over time of a dynamic approach upon children’s inter- and intra-individual 
developmental trajectories in analogical reasoning. 
 We also investigated the relationship of working-memory capacity to children’s 






































memory capacity is central to reasoning tasks such as the solving of analogies (tunteler & 
Resing, 2010; Halford, Wilson & Philips, 2010; Morrison et al., 2004; Primi, 2001) and to 
learning in school (e.g., Alloway & Alloway, 2010; Alloway, Gathercole, Kirkwood, & Elliott, 
2009; Holmes, Gathercole, & Dunning 2009; Swanson, 2008). In many studies the manner 
and extent to which inductive reasoning is related to working-memory capacity have been 
explored (e.g., Arendasy & Sommer, 2005; Meo, Roberts, & Marucci, 2007; Richland, Morrison, 
& Holyoak, 2006; Viskontas, Morrison, Holyoak, Hummel, & Knowlton, 2004; Waltz, Lau, 
Grewal, & Holyoak, 2000). When solving analogies, children’s working-memory appears to 
be particularly important for encoding and processing the terms of the analogy (Sternberg & 
Rifkin, 1979).  
 Working-memory may be considered as the workspace for construction of relational 
representations for solving a given analogical task while using knowledge stored in semantic 
memory. this workspace is limited in the number of relations that can be processed in parallel 
although these typically increase with age and maturation. However, complex relations can be 
recoded into representations of lower complexity or be segmented into smaller parts in order 
to process them serially (Halford, et al., 2010;  Halford, Wilson & Philips, 1998). 
 the type of relationship or task that needs to be managed appears to be influenced by a 
differential involvement of separate components of working-memory. Various components 
have been investigated in a variety of inductive reasoning or academic tasks (e.g., Raghubar, 
Barnes & Hecht, 2010; Alloway & Passolunghi, 2011). the age of the child and the differential 
involvement of these components in different types of tasks were first demonstrated by 
Alloway, Gathercole & Pickering (2006). In line with Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) working-
memory model, they found that children as young as 4 years exhibit a structural organization 
of memory into a domain general component for processing information and verbal and 
visual-spatial domain specific components for storage. Furthermore, they found that these 
components could be assessed in a reliable way. In the present study we explicitly focused 
on the differential involvement of verbal and visual-spatial working-memory components, to 
examine their possible role in respect of analogical reasoning development in second graders. 
We thought it important to examine these components separately with a working-memory 
assessment that made sufficient storage and processing demands (Alloway, 2007) and which 
would help us explore their influence on analogical reasoning (Resing, Xenidou-Dervou, 
Steijn & Elliott, 2012). 
 Our type of data is traditionally analyzed by means of repeated measures analysis as it 
involves undertaking the same assessments at intervals over time for a given set of individuals. 
While repeated measures analysis does not enable the researcher to include in their analyses 
the variation between individual children’s trajectories of performance, multilevel analysis 
– applied in a specific manner suited for longitudinal data -  does enable the researcher to 
include in their analyses children’s individual variation over time (e.g., Van der Leeden, 1998). 
typically when employing multilevel analysis data, the individual participants are considered 
to be the first level units, and one or more grouping variables, for example, school or region, 
form the units for the higher level(s) within the model. Multilevel analysis of longitudinal 
datasets, on the other hand, allows one to analyze individual children’s growth over time at a 
macro level, instead of at a micro level. Here the repeated measurements are viewed as the first 
level units, nested and correlated within individual children, who serve as the second level 
units (Hox, 2002, 2010; Kreft & De Leeuw, 2007; Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Van der Leeden, 
1998). By modeling varying regression coefficients at the session level (Level-1), this form 
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(Level-2). Additionally, this form of multilevel analysis enables the inclusion of two types of 
explanatory variables in the model: time constant and time varying variables. As a result, it 
becomes possible to model both the average growth trajectories of each group, as well as the 
individual growth trajectories of each child (Hox, 2002). thus analyzing our microgenetic 
data with this form of multilevel analysis enabled us to inspect growth trajectories (Level-1) 
for each individual (Level-2) and investigate systematic variation between these trajectories as 
a function of our background variables – the verbal and spatial working-memory components 
– and experimental treatment, the dynamic test (Van der Leeden, 1998).
 In summary, the main focus of the current study was upon examining inter- and intra-
individual developmental trajectories of analogical reasoning in a dynamic test and non-
guided practice setting.  this differed in several ways from earlier work (e.g., Primi, 2001; 
Hessels-Schlatter, 2002; Resing, tunteler, De Jong, & Bosma, 2009; tzuriel & George, 2009). 
Our explicit objective was to display by means of a relatively novel approach both children’s 
individual growth trajectories in analogical reasoning performance (a) and  systematic 
variation between these trajectories based on the experimental treatment and background 
variables – verbal and visual-spatial working-memory capacity (b) (Hox, 2002; Kreft & De 
Leeuw, 2007; Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Van der Leeden, 1998).
 In the current study we, therefore, investigated analogical reasoning performance in 
second grade children by means of the microgenetic research method and multilevel analysis. 
In particular, we examined the relationships over time between repeated non-guided practice 
in analogical reasoning in isolation and repeated non-guided practice combined with a 
dynamic test session based on the ‘graduated-prompts-technique’ (e.g., Resing & Elliott, 
2011) in children with differing levels of verbal and spatial working-memory capacity. 
 the objectives of the current study were to examine the inter- and intra-individual 
developmental patterns and rate of change in analogical reasoning between children, who (a) 
did or did not receive a dynamic test session, and (b) exhibited larger or smaller verbal and/or 
spatial working-memory capacity. With respect to (a) it was hypothesized that children who 
engaged in non-guided practice alone would increase their analogical reasoning performance 
over time, if they also exhibited greater working-memory performance. However, children 
who additionally received a dynamic test session were expected to show greater improvement 
over time, displaying the greatest rate of change after dynamic testing (e.g., Resing, 2000). 
With respect to (b) it was hypothesized that spatial working-memory capacity would be 
particularly important for analogical reasoning performance at the first session (e.g., Logie, 
Gilhooly, & Wynn, 1994; Rasmussen & Bisanz, 2005, tunteler et al., 2008). In contrast, verbal 
working-memory capacity would be less influential (Alloway & Gathercole, 2006; Haavisto 
& Lehto, 2004; St. Claire-thompson & Gathercole, 2006). Additionally, we expected that 
spatial working-memory capacity would influence improvement through repeated practice 
alone. Children in grade two with smaller spatial working-memory capacity were expected 
to display few changes in analogical reasoning through non-guided practice alone as their 
workspace for constructing relational representations is more limited (Halford et al., 2010). 
However, they were expected to exhibit a rather more rapid rate of change in analogical 
reasoning after dynamic testing (e.g., Carr & Schneider, 1991). the rationale was that 
dynamic testing was expected to alleviate any working-memory limitations by breaking down 
the analogical reasoning process into smaller steps that could be processed serially and by 
providing relational knowledge (Halford et al., 2010; Morrison, Doumas, & Richland, 2011). 






































show a more gradual pattern and rate of change over time through repeated practice alone, 
while receiving additional benefit from the dynamic test (e.g., tunteler & Resing, 2010). 
3.2 Method
Participants
Participants were 32 children aged 7-8 years (18 boys; 14 girls) with a mean age of 90.1 
months (SD = 4.7 months). they were selected based on their attendance in the second grade 
of two regular primary middle-class schools located in a midsize town in the Netherlands. 
Parental informed consent was obtained for each participant. 
Design
During the first study weeks, each child’s inductive reasoning and working-memory capacity 
were assessed by means of an Exclusion test and measures of spatial and verbal working-
memory. Subsequently, a microgenetic two-pretest-two-posttest control-group design was 
employed (see table 1). Children in the treatment condition received a dynamic test session 
while those in the control (practice) condition received a non-guided practice session. the 
non-guided practice session featured the same analogy tasks, but, as for the other practice 
sessions, children received no instruction, help or feedback. Non-guided practice sessions 
ranged from 20-40 minutes per child and were of equal duration for both conditions. the 
dynamic test session took 30-60 minutes per child for the treatment condition. 
Table 1. Research design
Session
Condition Pretest 1 2 D T1 3 4
Practice x x X - x x
DT1 x x X x x x
Note: 1 DT = Dynamic Test; the practice-condition contained the same items as the DT-condition, but the practice-
condition did not involve a dynamic test. 
Instruments
Exclusion
Exclusion is a visual inductive reasoning subtest of a Dutch child intelligence test (RAKIt: 
Revisie Amsterdamse Kinder Intelligentie test (Bleichrodt, Drenth, Zaal, & Resing, 1984)). 
the test consists of 40 items each comprising 4 geometric figures. three of these figures can 
be grouped together on the basis of a rule that needs to be identified. the task requires the 
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Memory span–abstract  
Memory Span-abstract is a subtest from the RAKIt that measures children’s abstract memory 
span (RAKIt, Bleichrodt et al., 1984). the test consists of a booklet and small blocks both 
containing pictures of undefined shapes. the test items in the booklet have sequences of these 
shapes (2-7) that are shown for only 10 seconds to the child. then, the child needs to reproduce 
these sequences with the blocks that have the same shapes printed on them. Although this 
test supposedly only measures memory span, it could also be considered to measure abstract-
visual working-memory capacity. Simultaneous storage and processing are arguably involved 
in good task performance since the undefined shapes need to be manipulated into something 
more recognizable to remember, while being held in memory, in order to recall and reproduce 
longer sequences of these shapes. It is highly likely that our age-group draws on executive 
resources while performing this task (Alloway & Passolunghi, 2011).
Listening recall and spatial recall 
the screening measure from the computerized Automated Working Memory Assessment 
(AWMA) battery (Alloway, 2007) was used to measure verbal and visual spatial working-
memory capacity. the AWMA measures involve both the simultaneous storage and processing 
of information. the listening recall task utilizes sequences of spoken sentences and the spatial 
recall task involves recalling the positions of arbitrary shapes that are rotated and/or flipped 
from left to right. 
Figural analogies
the analogical reasoning task consisted of an age-adapted version of the concrete figural 
analogies measure developed by Stevenson and Resing (e.g., Stevenson, Resing, & Froma, 
2009; Stevenson, touw, & Resing 2011). Four parallel sets were created with 20 open-ended 
2x2 figural matrix analogies (see Figure 1). In order to avoid responses based purely on visual 
recall, the parallel sets were designed to appear different by changing the animal-type and 
color of the figures of each item over sessions according to fixed rules. the figures consisted 
of various permutations of six types of animals with three familiar colors, and two sizes, 
features which would be easily recognized by the children concerned (Goswami, 1992). Items 
contained up to six transformations including, size, color, number, direction, position, and 
animal. Children’s ongoing engagement was maximized by mixing the order of predicted 
difficulty of the items. this order of difficulty remained the same over sessions. 
 At the start of each session, the child was presented with a booklet containing the analogies 
and baskets with small animal cards for constructing the correct answers in accordance with 
the transformations used in the items. the examiner explained – while showing the animal 
cards – the features of the cards: three different colors of the same animal, a set of small and 
large cards for each animal and that the cards could be flipped. the examiner then turned to 
the first analogy and said that this was a ‘kind of puzzle’ with three boxes with animals and 
a fourth empty box (C-term or D-term), in which the child needed to construct the solution 
to ‘the puzzle’ using the animal-cards. After producing each solution, the child was asked 
how he or she had solved ´the puzzle´. Occasionally some children changed their solutions in 







































Figure 1. Examples of figural analogies used during non-guided and dynamic testing sessions (adopted from 
Stevenson et al., 2009)
Note: Left figure: the lion is yellow; the horse is red. Right figure: the small horse, small bears and camel are blue; the 
large bear, large horses and elephant are yellow.
Figure analogies training
the dynamic test material consisted of an age-adapted set of 7 concrete figural analogies 
similar to those employed in the other sessions (adapted from Stevenson et al., 2009; 2011). 
the steps involved are described in Appendix 3A. Unlike most other dynamic test formats, 
our measure proceeded from difficult to easy items. Where children needed assistance, we 
sought to provide the minimal amount of help required to solve the tasks independently, in 
accordance with Resing’s (e.g., 1993, 1997) dynamic test format and the ‘graduated-prompts-
technique’. 
 the graduated prompts procedure used in the present investigation was originally 
pioneered by Campione, Brown, Ferrara, Jones & Steinberg (1985) and has been successfully 
utilized in several of our previous studies (e.g., Resing, 2000; Resing & Elliott, 2011; Resing et 
al., 2009, 2012; Resing, Steijn, Xenidou-Dervou, Stevenson, & Elliott, 2011). the procedure 
involves the use, during the dynamic testing session, of a series of adaptive and standardized, 
hierarchically ordered, metacognitive (self-regulating) and cognitive (task-specific) prompts 
that proceed from general (2 metacognitive prompts) to increasingly task specific (3 task-
specific prompts). the prompts are only provided when and if a child is unable to proceed 
independently. this delivery of increasingly explicit prompts continues until the child 
reaches the correct solution. Children are provided with the minimum number of prompts 
possible to enable progression through the test. While our procedure contrasts with more 
traditional psychometric approaches whereby progression through the test typically moves 
from easier to harder items, we have found our approach valuable for enabling even the higher 
performing children to be trained from the outset, and for assisting all the children to use 
their newly learned strategies when solving easier items (e.g., Resing, 1993, 2000; Resing & 
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Scoring
Working-memory capacity test-scores were converted into z-scores and subsequently into 
standard scores (M=100; SD=15). the two spatial memory tasks from the RAKIt (memory 
span-abstract) and the AWMA (spatial recall) were combined into a new variable: MemGrAVS. 
Verbal working-memory (i.e. the listening recall test) was labeled MemGrV. these two 
working-memory variables were each split into a ‘lower score’ and a ‘higher score’ category, 
based on the respective median scores on these variables of all 32 children. this yielded two 
equal groups of ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ scoring children for both working-memory variables 
separately.
 the four analogical practice sessions were scored separately for each child. Every session 
included one booklet of 20 analogical matrices that was the same for all children. Each child 
received an ‘Analogy Score’ for each individual session that was the sum total of all analogies 
that were correctly solved during that session. 
Analyses
Multilevel analysis (MLA) was used for analysis of the data. traditionally, repeated measures 
analysis has been widely used to analyze data involving repeated measurements of the same 
individuals. However, microgenetic data sets can also be viewed as comprising multilevel 
data, where repeated measurements are nested within individuals (Hox, 2002, 2010; Kreft 
& De Leeuw, 2007; Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Van der Leeden, 1998).  MLA appeared to be 
particularly valuable for the present study as it enabled us to inspect growth trajectories based 
on data obtained from repeated measurements (Level-1) for each individual (Level-2) and 
investigate systematic variation between these trajectories as a function of our background 
variables and experimental treatment (Van der Leeden, 1998). By modeling varying 
regression coefficients at the session level (Level-1), we obtained growth trajectories that 
were different for each individual child. Additionally, MLA allowed us to add two types of 
explanatory variables to the model: time constant and time varying variables. this allowed us 
to model both the average growth trajectories of each group, as well as the individual growth 
trajectories of each child (Hox, 2002, 2010). 
 For reference purposes, Appendix 3B displays the data structure and meaning of the 
variables used for the MLA. All of the variables contained a meaningful 0-point to facilitate 
interpretation (Hox, 2002).
3.3 Results
Before examining our research questions in detail, we checked for possible initial differences 
between children in the dynamic test and practice condition. the mean scores on Exclusion 
did not differ significantly, nor did the mean number of correct analogical solutions at session 







































Table 2. Means and standard deviations of analogy scores per session and condition
Session
1 2 3 4 Total
Condition Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Practice (N = 16) 1.81 (3.17) 2.38 (3.59) 2.75 (4.85) 3.44 (5.32) 2.59 (4.32)
DT (N = 16) 3.00 (2.71) 4.31 (4.85) 8.38 (4.95) 8.06 (4.64) 5.94 (4.39)
Total (N = 32) 2.41 (2.95) 3.34 (4.27) 5.56 (4.90) 5.75 (4.99) 4.72 (4.35)
 As described by Hox (2002, 2010),  Multilevel Analysis for repeated measurement data 
was run with nine hypothesized nested models (see table 3), to examine the inter- and intra-
individual developmental patterns and rate of change in analogical reasoning between children, 
who (a) did or did not receive a dynamic test session in addition to repeated non-guided 
practice opportunities, and (b) exhibited a larger or smaller verbal and/or spatial working-
memory capacity. As stated before, the nested models included the repeated measurements at 
level 1 and the individual children at level 2 (see Appendix 3B). 
Table 3. Results of the likelihood ratio and AIC tests of the multilevel analysis for analogical solutions
Model tests
Model Progression1 Deviance λ(1) P AIC
  1.   Intercept only (Null) 704.1
  2. + Session2 670.8* 33.3  < .001 678.8
  3. + Spatial Working Memory 665.2* 5.6 .018 675.2
  4. + Verbal Working Memory 665.04 .2 .655 677.2
  5. + Condition 640.3* 24.7 < .001 652.3
  6. + Session Random3 624.3* 16.0 < .001 638.3
  7. + Session*Condition 621.85 2.5 .113 637.86
  8. + Session*Spatial Working Memory7 618.8* 5.5 .019 634.8
  9. + Condition*Spatial Working Memory 618.7 .1 .752 636.7
* Significantly better fit than former models at p ≤  .05; 1each successive model included one additional variable; 2 the 
time variable with 4 time points; 3the slope of the time variable ‘session’ is modeled to vary across children in this 
and the following models; 4non-significant in both the ‘fixed effect only’ and ‘random slopes’ model, and therefore 
no longer included after this point; 5non-significant and therefore no longer included after this point; 6 the AIC diverts 
here from the likelihood ratio test  7this interactions was the last one included in the final model, as the subsequent 
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Models progressed from those including only fixed effects to those with random slopes. Each 
successive model included an additional expected variable or interaction, after which it was 
compared to the previous model with a likelihood-ratio test to determine if the succeeding 
model had a significantly better fit than the previous one. For reference purposes, table 3 
also provides Akaike’s Information Criterion (Akaike, 1987), although this was developed to 
compare non-nested models. Hox (2010), however, recommends the likelihood ratio test for 
nested models such as those used in the present study. 
Rather than testing the hypotheses one by one in separate analyses, the best fitting model – 
according to the likelihood ratio test – was used to test our hypotheses by interpreting the 
interactions and the direct effects of the explanatory variables that made up the interactions 
together as an integrated system (Hox, 2002, 2010). 
In relation to (a) it had been hypothesized that if children exhibited a greater spatial 
working-memory, repeated non-guided practice alone would improve their analogical 
reasoning performance over time, but children who had engaged in a dynamic test session 
would show greater improvement, with the greatest rate of change occurring after dynamic 
testing in relation to (b) it was hypothesized that spatial working-memory capacity would 
be particularly important for analogical performance at the first session and over time for 
gradual improvements in analogical performance through the non-guided practice sessions, 
but this would not prove to be similarly the case for verbal working-memory capacity. 
After running the MLA, the eighth and final model (see table 3) was proved to be the best fit. 
the likelihood ratio and the AIC yielded almost the same results. However, as stated above, 
the former was used to determine the final best fitting model, in accordance with Hox (2010). 
Regression lines are shown in Figure 2. For reference purposes, the regression equation for 
the best fitting model is displayed as Appendix 3C.
Figure 2 













































































 Model 8 included two significant main effects: spatial working-memory and condition, 
and one interaction: session*spatial working-memory. these effects accounted for four 
‘subgroups’ of children, each displaying a different rate of change over time (see Figure 
2). the non-significant ‘session’ effect and the significant session*spatial working-
memory interaction confirmed that children exhibiting a smaller spatial working-memory 
performance did not improve their analogical performance through repeated practice over 
time, but children exhibiting a larger spatial working-memory performance did improve their 
analogical performance through repeated practice over time. this improvement in analogical 
performance was, as expected, more gradual than the improvement that was induced by the 
dynamic test, regardless of children’s smaller or large spatial working-memory performance. 
Also, the spatial working-memory main effect confirmed the influence of spatial working-
memory on analogical performance at the first session. Verbal working-memory, as 
hypothesized, did not influence analogical performance. Furthermore, the non-significant 
interaction of session*condition showed that no significant losses or gains in dynamic-test 
induced analogical performance occurred at the fourth session for the dynamic test condition. 
Finally, the non-significant interaction of condition*spatial working-memory showed that no 
significant differences existed in dynamic test benefits between children exhibiting a smaller 
or larger spatial working-memory capacity. this confirmed that children with a smaller 
spatial working-memory capacity would be able to benefit from dynamic testing and improve 
their analogical performance in the same manner as their peers with a larger spatial working-
memory capacity. 
 to further help interpret these results, we examined a graphical display of the individual 
children’s growth trajectories (Hox, 2002). these trajectories, grouped on the basis of 
condition and spatial working-memory, are displayed in Figure 3. In general, children within 
the same condition and the same spatial working-memory group demonstrated similar growth 
trajectories. Nevertheless, their initial performance at session one displayed a fair amount 
of individual variability. this factor, in combination with spatial working-memory capacity, 
appeared to determine the growth trajectories for the sessions thereafter. 
 For the practice condition, individual growth trajectories of children  exhibiting a smaller 
spatial working-memory capacity, demonstrated virtually no growth. However,  several 
children exhibiting a larger spatial working-memory capacity displayed individual growth 
trajectories with a high initial performance and improved analogical scores over time induced 
by practice alone. 
 Children in the dynamic test condition with smaller working-memory capacity 
demonstrated one consistent pattern in common: their analogical reasoning performance 
deteriorated two sessions after the dynamic testing, although the MLA indicated that this 
reduction was not significant for the dynamic test condition as a whole. It is interesting to note 
that two children in this smaller spatial working-memory group obtained a rather puzzlingly 
high initial score. 
 Children in the dynamic test condition with larger working-memory capacity displayed 
the greatest variability in their initial analogical reasoning performance. Children in this group 
who obtained a low initial score displayed the fastest rate of change of all children across all 
of the groups; something that might be appropriately described as a ‘light bulb effect’. In 
contrast, other children in this group, as expected, displayed a more gradual rate of change in 
analogical reasoning without displaying a drop in such performance at any time. 
 Finally, it is noteworthy that no individual child in any group obtained the maximum score 
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items of the analogical task were too difficult for even the highest performing children. these 
implications of outcome are discussed below.
Figure 3. Individual growth curves for children in the practice condition with smaller working-memory capacity 
(upper left panel), children in the DT1 condition with smaller working-memory capacity (lower left panel), children 
in the practice condition with larger working-memory capacity (upper right panel), and children in the DT condition 
with larger working-memory capacity (lower right panel). 
Figure 3 
Individual growth curves for children in the practice condition with a smaller working-memory capacity 
(upper left panel), children in the DT1 condition with a smaller working-memory capacity (lower left 
panel), chil ren in the pra tice condition with a larger worki g-memory capacity (upper right panel), and 
































































































































Note: 1DT = dynamic test. Caution: not all individual growth trajectories might be (completely) visible 
due to overlap between children; children with solid lines portray complete overlap on the x-axis for all 
sessions (a 0-score for all sessions). 
Note: 1DT = dynamic test. Caution: some individual growth trajectories are not (completely) visible due to overlap 
between children; children with solid lines portray complete overlap on the x-axis for all sessions (a 0-score for all 
sessions).
3.4 Discussion
this study’s main aim was to examine the development of analogical reasoning in young 
children through the use of the microgenetic research method in combination with multilevel 
analysis. Specifically, these approaches were employed to investigate over time the inter- 
and intra-individual developmental trajectories and rate of change in analogical reasoning 
between children assigned to either a dynamic test or non-guided practice condition, while 






































 As hypothesized on the basis of group averages, children exhibiting larger spatial 
working-memory who received repeated non-guided practice alone improved their analogical 
reasoning performance over time, but not as much as those who also received dynamic 
testing. Furthermore, children who received dynamic testing subsequently displayed the 
greatest rate of change in performance. this confirms findings reported by tunteler et al. 
(2008) and tunteler and Resing (2010), who, in their microgenetic studies, found similar 
results with classical geometric analogies when children of grade 1 and 2 were provided with 
a short training procedure. 
 Second, as hypothesized, visual-spatial, but not verbal, working-memory capacity was 
related to a higher level of analogical reasoning performance at the first session. this finding 
supports earlier research in which differential involvement of working-memory components 
in various tasks was reported (Alloway & Passolunghi, 2011) and which demonstrated that 
such elements could be reliably measured in young children (Alloway et al., 2006). 
 As noted above, spatial working-memory was also related to improvement in analogical 
performance as a result of repeated practice. Dynamic testing added to this effect, with a 
subsequently greater average rate of change for all children, irrespective of their spatial 
working-memory capacity. this is in line with findings from an earlier study by tunteler 
and Resing (2010). However, in their study, children with a smaller memory span were able 
to catch up with their peers after training. In our study there was no differential effect of the 
dynamic test for children with either small or large working-memory capacity. therefore, 
those with greater spatial working-memory capacity continued to display superior analogical 
performance, even after dynamic testing. 
 It is unclear why this finding differs from that of tunteler & Resing (2010). It is possible 
that the task in the present study was more demanding as it proved to be difficult for all of 
the participants, irrespective of their level of working-memory. Children in the two studies 
may have used their working-memory capacity in a different manner when solving the 
various problems (Halford et. Al, 2010). Interestingly, after inspecting children’s individual 
growth trajectories, the results of the current study appear to have been caused in part by 
two children with a larger spatial working-memory capacity that increased their analogical 
reasoning performance very rapidly after dynamic training. this kind of performance change 
could, under different circumstances, be expected from children with smaller working-
memory capacity solving a less complex type of analogical task. 
 A further explanation for the differing results comes from the observation of the individual 
growth trajectories of children with smaller spatial working-memory. those  in the dynamic 
test condition consistently displayed a drop in performance from the session immediately 
after the dynamic test to the next session. Such children in the practice condition, displayed 
no growth in analogical performance over time. 
 In contrast, those in the practice condition with larger spatial working-memory 
performed in line with our hypothesis that such children would gradually be able to increase 
their performance through practice alone. Yet, given that only four children were able to 
score as many as 15 or 16 out of 20, some of the analogies clearly proved too difficult to 
solve even given the assistance provided. As detailed information about individual children’s 
growth trajectories was not provided in the tunteler and Resing’s (2010) study it is difficult 
to compare results across the two studies. A key strength of the present study, therefore, was 
the analysis and graphical display of children’s individual growth trajectories over time. 
 the individual growth trajectories of children’s analogical reasoning, against the backdrop 
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testing, the level of task difficulty should not be too high. Children can clearly profit from 
such a procedure, but only if the task to be solved lies within the individual’s particular zone 
of proximal development (Vygotsky, 1978). 
 Our findings are also in line with Siegler’s (2006) “overlapping waves” theory, which 
suggests that high initial variability of strategy use often predicts substantial later learning. 
Interestingly though, certain individual growth trajectories of children with larger spatial 
working-memory capacity, and who had received dynamic testing, suggested that a certain 
level of initial performance was not always necessary for rapid learning to occur. Dynamic 
testing appeared to have had a ‘light bulb effect’: after dynamic testing these children suddenly 
displayed a rate of change that exceeded all other learners.
 the current study has produced findings that demonstrate that working-memory capacity 
is an important variable in the performance over time of subgroups that have already been 
identified as similar in earlier microgenetic studies (e.g., tunteler et al., 2008; tunteler & 
Resing, 2010). While this is consistent with some studies (e.g., Rasmussen & Bisanz, 2005; 
Morrison, et al., 2011; Alloway et al., 2009), it contradicts Resing et al. (2012), who found 
significant improvements in analogical reasoning performance irrespective of the working-
memory level of the trained children. However, in this earlier study, working-memory was 
assessed in a simpler manner and a more traditional approach to data analysis was employed.
 this distinction leads us to highlight two positive methodological aspects of the present 
study. Firstly, advanced working-memory tests were used to investigate working-memory 
components separately (Alloway et al., 2006). these tests might have resulted in improved 
assignment of children to working-memory groups. Secondly, the current study used a 
different means of analysis (multilevel analysis for repeated measurement data) that facilitated 
the inspection of individual growth trajectories in combination, rather than isolation, with 
systematic variation between these trajectories as a function of the background variables and 
experimental treatment (Van der Leeden, 1998).
 Nevertheless, the current study was unable to display a clear and comprehensive 
picture of the underlying change mechanisms of the various subgroups. Similar to most 
studies with a microgenetic research design (Siegler, 2006), these only consisted of a few 
children per subgroup. this relatively small number of children did not permit us to arrive at 
comprehensive and strong conclusions. Possibly there was a lack of power to detect certain 
effects although, as we have shown, some were found in the study. Unfortunately, the small 
sample size prevented us from adding additional background variables, such as variability in 
analogical strategy use. Variable strategy use and children’s subsequent learning appeared to 
be clearly present and this fits with findings from many microgenetic studies (Siegler, 2006) 
and with current theories about the relationship between working-memory capacity and 
analogical reasoning (e.g., Halford et al., 2010; Alloway et al., 2006).
 Further studies with larger samples of children, as well as other age groups and ethnicities 
(e.g., Resing et al., 2009), larger training programs (e.g., tzuriel & George, 2009), each 
employing long-term follow-up are needed to confirm the individual growth trajectories that 
we found. Additionally, more in-depth microgenetic research examining the combination of 
dynamic testing of analogical reasoning and working-memory assessment is likely to prove 
valuable. 
 Comparison of the variability and strategy use of the four subgroups identified in the 
current study could help to reveal specific strengths and weaknesses that influence particular 
learning trajectories. this information could be used to better predict children’s learning 






































Dynamic testing may ultimately reveal particular forms of instruction, from metacognitive to 
more concrete (Resing, 2000), that are most powerful for children with different profiles. 
In addition, dynamic testing and working-memory assessment in combination may help to 
indicate the type of working-memory support or training most suited for an individual child 
(Morrison et al., 2011) although our current ability to offer classroom-based interventions for 
such difficulties remains sorely limited (Elliott, Gathercole, Alloway, Kirkwood, & Holmes, 
2010). 
 Clearly, multiple sources of information are required to guide the design of high quality 
interventions for those with learning disabilities. It is contended that information from 
dynamic testing and assessment of working-memory capacity are likely to be valuable 
components of a holistic approach to maximizing children’s learning. It is hoped that the 
present study has demonstrated the potential value of a unique approach that can aid the 
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Structure of analogical reasoning development data
Level-1 
Range
Variable Names Description Min Max
Cons Vector consisting of ones 1 1
Session Test sessions: four measurement intervals 0 3
SessionEsq Session squared 0 9
Level-2
Pupil_ID Numbers assigned to individual pupils 0 32
Condition Condition: 0 = practice; 1 = dynamic testing 0 1
MemGrV Verbal memory group: 0 = low; 1 = high 0 1
MemGrAVS Spatial memory group: 0 = low; 1 = high 0 1
Dependent Variable
Analogy Score Score for the analogy test per child and session 0 161
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Appendix 3C
Regression equations for the final multilevel model
Regression Equation
Solutions Correct = 1.98 + .10 x session + 1.19 x spatial working-memory + 3.02 x condition + 1.04 x 
session*spatial working-memory.
Note: all variables contain a meaningful 0-point (including session). To obtain regression equations per subgroup, 
variables must be replaced with group codes and session numbers (practice condition & low working-memory = 00; 
practice condition & high working-memory = 01; training condition & low working-memory = 10; training condition 




Inter and intra variability in children’s strategy 
change paths when solving figural analogies:  
A microgenetic dynamic testing study,  
utilizing multilevel analysis
Pronk, C.M.E., Elliott, J.G., de Rooij, M.J., & Resing, W.C.M. (Submitted). Inter and intra 
variability in children’s strategy change paths when solving figural analogies: A microgenetic 



















































the current study investigated developmental trajectories in analogical strategy performance of 104 
7-8-year-old children. Children received a working-memory assessment and four practice sessions 
with figural analogies, and were divided into a dynamic training and practice condition. Results showed 
that training was more influential in analogical strategy improvement than repeated practice. Also, a 
relationship was found between higher initial variable analogical strategy use and spatial working-memory. 
this relationship influenced improvement of both behavioral and explained analogical strategies over 
time, especially for the practice condition. Children with lower initial performances explained mainly 
copy-strategies, and displayed single strategy use. After training, children displayed and explained more 








Fine-grained investigation of children’s cognitive abilities is complex, as their performance on 
reasoning and problem solving tasks is often highly variable and can demonstrate significant 
fluctuation over time (Bjorklund & Rosenblum, 2001; Siegler, 2007). Nevertheless, gaining 
greater understanding of individual children’s learning trajectories in relation to various 
cognitive processes, such as analogical reasoning (e.g., tunteler, Pronk, & Resing, 2008), is 
likely to be valuable for both understanding of the nature of intellectual development and for 
informing targeted educational intervention at an early stage (e.g., Grigorenko, 2009).
 the current study investigates subgroups of children with similar learning trajectories 
in analogical reasoning, and compares these subgroups’ inter- and intra-individual paths of 
change. For this purpose, judgments are based upon two distinct data sources: a) children’s 
strategies as revealed by their performance behaviors in the test setting and b) their verbal 
explanations of these strategies. 
 Analogical reasoning is a basic process that plays an important role in a wide range of 
higher cognitive processes and represents a core component of intelligence (Halford, 1993; 
Morrison et al., 2004). Its development in young children has been the focus of much research 
(e.g., Goswami, 2002) including its role in instruction (Kolodner, 1997), testing (tzuriel & 
Kaufman, 1999) and classroom learning (Csapó, 1997; tzuriel & George, 2009; Vosniadou, 
1989). It is argued that, even before primary school entry, many children can utilize 
analogical reasoning if they are given appropriate assistance and already possess some domain 
knowledge of the relationships upon which the analogical problems are based (e.g., Goswami 
& Brown, 1989; Klauer & Phye, 2008; Richland, Morrison & Holyoak, 2006; Singer-Freeman, 
2005). Nevertheless, the first few years of primary school are a particular time for the rapid 
development of analogical reasoning ability (e.g., Siegler & Svetina, 2002; Hosenfeld, Van der 
Maas, & Van den Boom, 1997b), and it can be assumed that high levels of intra-individual 
variability will be found in this age group.
Microgenetic Research & Strategy Discovery
the strength of microgenetic research designs is that these provide a high frequency of 
observations of performance in non-guided practice settings during a time of rapidly 
improving competence. As a result, changes in reasoning strategies can be observed at the 
very moment they happen. this enables the discovery of developmental pathways that may 
be considered to be natural, as the practice sessions include no explicit forms of intervention 
(Flynn & Siegler, 2007; Siegler & Crowley, 1991; Siegler, 1996). 
 Findings from microgenetic research studies have resulted in the assertion that development 
in various domains, from theory of mind (e.g., Flynn et al., 2004) to mathematical skills (Ven, 
Boom, Kroesbergen, & Leseman, 2012), involves more than the addition of new strategies to 
a child’s current repertoire. Development involves an improved capacity to select the best 
problem-solving strategy at any given moment, greater reliance on more advanced strategies, 
and improved execution of those strategies (Siegler, 2006). In their microgenetic study of 
matrix completion, for example, Siegler and Svetina (2002) found that 6-8-year-old children 
grew considerably in task performance as a result of repeated practice experiences with 
figural matrix analogies. their analogical tasks included up to four transformations (form, 
size, color and orientation) and utilized a multiple-choice format. the most common error 
that the children made was choosing an alternative that was a duplicate of one of the terms of 



































immediately before discovery of the correct solutions, while other errors increased. After 
discovery of the correct solution strategy, its use became dominant fairly quickly. However, 
patterns in strategy use may differ when constructed response, rather than multiple-choice, 
items are used (Stevenson, Resing, & Heiser, manuscript under revision).
 tunteler et al. (2008) conducted a microgenetic study with 6-7-year-old children, using 
open-ended (constructed response) paper and pencil classical geometric analogies, and 
very little instruction. their results indicated that spontaneous improvement in analogical 
reasoning largely took the form of implicitly correct answers, meaning that children were often 
unable to explain how they solved the task. Also, spontaneous improvement often consisted 
of a progression from incomplete to complete analogical answers. these children appeared 
to possess some rudimentary form of analogical reasoning skill that was accelerated by the 
opportunity to practice. A short training procedure however, induced improved analogical 
performance in those children who had failed to demonstrate any analogical reasoning 
strategies during the preceding unguided practice sessions. After training, the children were 
largely able to explain their use of correct analogical strategies in solving the tasks. Additional 
in-depth investigations into intra-individual changes over time revealed several subgroups of 
children who changed their analogical reasoning performance in a similar fashion (tunteler 
et al., 2008). However, it remained unclear in what way children in these subgroups changed, 
and could explain, their strategies. 
 In the current study, the inter- and intra-individual paths of change were investigated by 
means of examination of children’s behavioral strategies and their subsequent explanations 
of these. An increasing body of developmental literature – from arithmetic (Siegler & Stern, 
1998) to reading (Farrington-Flint, Coyne, Stiller, & Heath, 2008), to inductive reasoning 
(Resing, Xenidou-Dervou, Steijn, & Elliott, 2012; Stevenson et al., manuscript under revision) 
– has pointed to the value of immediate retrospective self-reports of solution strategies 
together with observations of behavioral solution strategies on the part of children aged five 
years and older. these self-reports are not expected to impact upon children’s developmental 
trajectories as long as the researcher remains neutral and no feedback is provided (Siegler, 
2006). Rather, they may reveal additional information about the depth of understanding a 
child possesses about the strategies they employ to tackle the problems (e.g., Siegler & Stern, 
1998; Church, 1999).
 Our microgenetic research design permits examination of two differing measures of 
strategy use (behavioral and verbal) when children receive either repeated unguided practice 
or a dynamic-test-type of training. It is possible that the acquisition and developmental 
pathways of strategies may be different when acquired through more ‘natural’ unprompted 
opportunities than through instruction. For this reason, it may be beneficial to examine 
unprompted practice opportunities and instruction in combination (Kuhn, 1995; Bjorklund, 
Miller, Coyle & Slawinsky, 1997; Opfer & Siegler, 2004), using both behavioral and self-
reported measures of strategy change (tunteler et al., 2008). 
 In undertaking assessment geared to inform educational intervention, it has often been 
considered important to investigate not only what the child is capable of doing without help, 
but also what he or she can achieve when provided with assistance (e.g., Campione, Brown, 
Ferrara, Jones & Steinberg, 1985; Grigorenko, 2009). In this study, we therefore examined 
the influence of a dynamic-test-type of training upon children’s inter- and intra-individual 
developmental trajectories in analogical reasoning. Key to the dynamic test approach is the 
incorporation of feedback and training during the assessment phase  (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 
2002; Elliott, 2003; Resing, 2013; Swanson & Lussier, 2001). 
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Variability in strategy change
Siegler (2007) posits that cognitive variability is an important variable in understanding, 
predicting, and describing the amount and type of cognitive change. He refers to cognitive 
variability as the differences between children in terms of change agents, developmental 
trajectory, generalization, and speed of change, but also changes within the individual child’s 
repertoire of strategies. tunteler and Resing (2007a) identified three different groups of 
5-7-year-old children on the basis of problem analogy task performance over a period of 
weeks: 1) children showing consistent analogical strategy use; 2) children showing consistent 
inadequate, non-analogical strategy use; and 3) children showing variable, adequate and 
inadequate, strategy use. Children in both the trained and untrained conditions manifested 
variable and diverse strategy use over time. As a way to accurately assess variable strategy use, 
Siegler (2007) posited the value of trial-by-trial assessments focusing upon four component 
processes: 1) acquisition of new strategies; 2) increased usage of the most advanced strategies 
in the child’s current repertoire; 3) increasingly efficient execution of strategies; 4) and 
improved choices among strategies. In the current study, we employed a microgenetic, 
session-by-session assessment in order to investigate variability in children’s use of analogical 
and non-analogical strategies (tunteler & Resing, 2007a) and subsequent progress in a) their 
behavioral responses and b) the verbal explanations that they were able to offer for these.
Working-memory capacity
Working memory capacity is likely to influence children’s developmental trajectories, as it 
is considered to be the workspace for the construction of relational representations for a 
variety of problem-solving tasks while using knowledge stored in semantic memory (Halford 
et al., 2010). this workspace is limited in the number of relations that can be processed in 
parallel (Halford, Wilson & Philips, 1998). Although processing capacity typically increases 
with age (Siegler, 2006), complex relations can also be recoded into representations of lower 
complexity, or be segmented into smaller parts, in order to process them serially (Halford, 
et al., 2010). As a result, more efficient execution of strategy use is likely to reduce working-
memory demands (Siegler, 2006). the type of relationship or task that needs to be managed 
appears to be influenced by the differential involvement of separate components of working-
memory even in young children (e.g., Alloway et al., 2006). In line with Baddeley and Hitch’s 
(1974) working-memory model we explicitly focused on the differential involvement of 
verbal and visual-spatial working-memory components and examined the possible role of 
each in respect of the development of children’s strategy use. 
Multilevel Analysis
Studies with microgenetic and cognitive training designs, where data are collected for the 
same individual at several moments in time, are usually analyzed by means of repeated 
measures analysis (e.g., tunteler et al., 2008). However, this does not enable the researcher to 
include individual children’s variations in trajectories of performance. Multilevel analysis, an 
alternative approach, permits analysis of individual children’s growth over time at both a macro 
and micro level. Multilevel analysis treats the repeated measurements as nested and correlated 
within individual children (Hox, 2002; Kreft & De Leeuw, 2007; Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Van 
der Leeden, 1998). By modeling varying regression coefficients at the session level (Level-1), 
multilevel analysis enables the examination of growth trajectories that may vary for each child 
(Level-2). Multilevel analysis also permits the inclusion of two types of explanatory variable 



































the average growth trajectories both of each group and each child (Hox, 2002), as we have 
suggested in a first, preliminary study using multi-level analysis and a microgenetic design with 
a relatively small sample (Pronk, Elliott, & Resing, manuscript under revision). In this study, 
a graphical display of individual growth trajectories within subgroups suggested that initial 
variability in strategy use was an important variable in predicting growth trajectories (see 
also, Siegler, 2007). For this reason, the present study included initial variability in strategy 
use as an additional background variable in a substantially enlarged group of participants.
Research aims and hypotheses
the current study sought: 1) to investigate whether previously identified subgroups of 
children with similar learning trajectories in analogical reasoning could be detected on 
the basis of MLA, and 2) to compare the inter- and intra-individual change paths of these 
subgroups’ by examining the children’s behavioral strategies and their verbal explanations of 
these immediately after completing each task item.  
 We hypothesized that children’s analogical reasoning would improve through repeated 
unguided practice alone, but gains would be even greater following a dynamic-test-type 
assessment (e.g., Siegler & Svetina, 2002; tunteler & Resing, 2010; Resing et al., 2012). We 
expected that this development would be influenced by two additional factors: variability in 
analogical reasoning as measured at the first session (e.g., Siegler, 2007; tunteler & Resing, 
2007a) and spatial working-memory (e.g., Logie, Gilhooly, & Wynn, 1994; Rasmussen & 
Bisanz, 2005, tunteler et al., 2008). Given the nature of the test items, such an outcome was 
not anticipated in the case of verbal working-memory (Alloway & Gathercole, 2006; Haavisto 
& Lehto, 2004; St. Claire-thompson & Gathercole, 2006). 
 It was anticipated that variability in strategy use at the first session would be positively 
related to rate and amount of change in the number of behavioral and self-reported 
transformations, and also to the complete analogical solutions over time, especially for the 
non-guided practice sessions (Siegler, 2007). However, the progress of children receiving 
the dynamic-test-type training was expected to be less related to their initial performance 
as the training was intended to tap into underlying potential rather than current, unassisted 
performance  (e.g., Grigorenko, 2009). 
 Spatial working-memory was predicted to be positively related to children’s number 
of complete solutions at the first practice session (Halford et al., 1998). However, spatial 
working-memory was not expected to limit – and therefore be related to – the number of 
transformations used behaviorally, since this score also included transformations of partial 
solutions. Complete, but not partial solutions were expected to be limited by the number 
of relations to be processed in parallel, especially at the first practice session before a child 
obtained greater skill at the serial processing of transformations (Halford et al., 2010). Spatial 
working-memory was also expected to influence the number of self-reported transformations 
at the first session, as the capacity to self-report may be more advanced in children who 
exhibit a larger activation of advanced reasoning strategies (Siegler & Stern, 1998; Stevenson 
et al., manuscript under revision). 
 the path of change of the various subgroups – based on our background variables – was 
investigated through the component processes of variable strategy use as described by Siegler 
(2007), utilizing a more explorative and qualitative approach. We expected children to be 
similar in the amount and rate of change within their subgroup (Siegler, 2006). Children 
displaying higher working-memory and variable analogical reasoning skills at the start of 
the study, were expected to have a consistent rate of improvement in their use of analogical 
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strategies. Yet, children with poorer working-memory and only non-analogical skills at the 
start of this study, were expected to display both losses and gains in practice and subsequently 
training-induced analogical reasoning (Siegler, 2006). Moreover, the dynamic-test-type of 
training was designed to increase the capacity to reveal children’s ‘true’ potential, by making 
the test situation more equitable than traditional testing (Grigorenko, 2009). therefore we 
expected a subset of the children – those who displayed little analogical reasoning in the 
static sessions before training – to be able to improve rather more rapidly than their peers. 
In contrast, those children who displayed greater evidence of analogical reasoning before 
training were expected to show a rather more gradual increase in the quality of their reasoning 
(tunteler & Resing, 2007a; tunteler et al., 2008). In accordance with Siegler and Svetina 
(2002), we anticipated that the children would report a variety of non-analogical strategies 
(rather than a single strategy) immediately before progressing in the quality of their analogical 
reasoning. Finally, we expected children to rarely revert back to non-analogical strategies 
having received training-induced analogical reasoning, but rather in such cases, suboptimal 
performance would take the form of incomplete answers (tunteler et al., 2008). 
4.2 Method
Participants
Participants2 (N=104) (51 boys; 53 girls) aged 7-8 years (M=93.6 months; SD=4.8 months) 
were selected from the second grade of 8 regular primary middle-class schools located in 
midsized towns in the Netherlands. Informed parental consent was obtained for each 
participant.  
Design
During the first study weeks, each child’s inductive reasoning and working-memory capacity 
were assessed by means of an inductive reasoning test (Exclusion) and measures of spatial 
and verbal working-memory. Subsequently, a microgenetic two-pretest-two-posttest control-
group design with randomized blocks based on the induction test outcomes (described below) 
was employed (see table 1). the treatment condition received a dynamic test session while 
the control (practice) condition received a non-guided practice session. this latter condition 
contained the same analogy tasks, but, as for the other practice sessions, children received no 
instruction, help or feedback. Non-guided practice sessions took between 20-40 minutes per 
child for both conditions. the dynamic test session (for the treatment condition) took 30-60 
minutes per child. 



































Table 1. Research design
Week
1 2 and 3 4 and 5 6 and 7 8 and 9 10 and 11
Session
Condition Pretest 1 2 D T1 3 4
Practice X x x - x x
DT X x x x x x
Note: 1 DT-Session: the practice-condition received the same items as the DT-condition. The practice-condition 
received no dynamic test. 
Instruments
Exclusion
Exclusion is a visual inductive reasoning subtest of a Dutch children’s intelligence test (RAKIt: 
Revisie Amsterdamse Kinder Intelligentie test (Bleichrodt, Drenth, Zaal, & Resing, 1984). 
the subtest consists of 40 items each comprising 4 geometric figures. three of the figures can 
be grouped together on the basis of a rule that needs to be identified. the task requires the 
child to select the figure that, in each case, does not fulfill the rule. 
Listening recall and spatial recall 
the screening measure from the computerized Automated Working Memory Assessment 
(AWMA) battery (Alloway, 2007) was used to measure verbal and visual spatial working-
memory capacity. the AWMA measures assess both the simultaneous storage and processing 
of information. the listening recall task utilizes sequences of spoken sentences, and the 
spatial recall task involves recalling the positions of arbitrary shapes that are rotated and/or 
flipped from left to right. 
Figural analogies
the analogical reasoning task consisted of an age-adapted version of the concrete figural 
analogies measure developed by Stevenson and Resing (e.g., Stevenson, Resing, & Froma, 
2009; Stevenson, touw, & Resing, 2011). Four parallel sets were created with 20 open-ended 
2x2 figural matrix analogies. In order to avoid responses based purely on visual recall, the 
parallel sets were designed to appear different by changing the animal-type and color of the 
figures of each item over sessions according to fixed rules. the figures consisted of various 
permutations of six types of animals with three familiar colors, and two sizes, features that 
would be easily recognized by the children concerned (Goswami, 1992). Items contained up to 
six transformations including size, color, number, direction, position, and animal. Children’s 
ongoing engagement was maximized by arranging for the order of predicted difficulty of the 
items to be mixed. this pattern of difficulty remained constant over sessions. 
 At the start of each session, the child was presented with a booklet containing the analogies, 
and baskets with small animal cards for constructing the correct answers in accordance with 
the transformations used in the items. the examiner showed the animal cards and explained 
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their features: three different colors for the same animal, a set of small and large cards for 
each animal, and the option to flip the cards (to point the animal in the opposite direction). 
the examiner then turned to the first analogy and stated that this was a ‘kind of puzzle’ with 
three boxes containing animals and a fourth empty box (C-term or D-term), in which the 
child needed to construct the solution to ‘the puzzle’ using the animal cards. After producing 
each solution, the child was asked how he or she had solved ´the puzzle´. Occasionally some 
children changed their solutions in response to their verbalizations. In such cases, the final 
physical arrangement of the cards was scored. 
Figure analogies training
the dynamic test material consisted of an age-adapted set of 7 concrete figural analogies 
similar to those employed in the other sessions (adapted from Stevenson et al., 2009; 2011). 
Unlike most other dynamic test formats, where problems are typically designed to become 
increasingly more challenging, our measure proceeded from difficult to easy items. Where 
children needed assistance, we sought to provide the minimal amount of help required to 
solve the tasks independently in accordance with Resing’s (e.g., 1993, 1997) dynamic test 
format and the ‘graduated-prompts-technique’. 
 the graduated prompts procedure used in the present investigation was originally 
pioneered by Campione, Brown, Ferrara, Jones & Steinberg (1985) and has been successfully 
utilized in a number of other studies (e.g., Resing & Elliott, 2011; Resing et al., 2009; Resing, 
et al., 2012). the procedure involves the use, during the dynamic testing session, of a series 
of adaptive and standardized, hierarchically ordered, metacognitive (self-regulating) and 
cognitive (task-specific) prompts that proceed from general to task-specific. the prompts are 
only provided when a child is unable to proceed independently. this delivery of increasingly 
explicit prompts continues until the child produces the complete analogical solution. Children 
are provided with the minimum number of prompts possible to enable progression through 
the test. In our earlier investigations, we have found our approach, starting with the more 
demanding questions, valuable for enabling even the higher performing children to be trained 
from the outset, and for assisting all the children to use their newly learned strategies when 
tackling easier items (e.g., Resing, 1993; Resing & Elliott, 2011; Resing et al., 2009, 2012).
Scoring
the four analogical practice sessions were scored separately for each child. Every session 
included one booklet of 20 analogical matrices that was the same for all participants. Each child 
obtained several scores per session: 1) a ‘Complete Analogies Score’ consisting of the total 
sum of all analogies that were completely and correctly solved; 2) a ‘transformations Correct 
Score’ consisting of the sum of correct transformations (a maximum of 110) as evidenced 
by the child’s behavioral solutions; 3) a ‘transformations Explained Score’ consisting of the 
sum of all correct transformations that were explained as to ‘how they solved the puzzle’; 4) 
if a child did not explicitly mention one or more correct transformations when explaining 
their solution to an item, their explanation was categorized into one of seven categories (see 
Appendix 4A). Categories were created on the basis of children’s answers and were, in part, 
based upon the work of other researchers (e.g., Siegler & Svetina, 2002; tunteler et al., 2008). 
the number of explanations per category was then totaled per child and session. 
 the verbal and spatial working-memory variables were each split into ‘lower score’ and 



































104 children. this yielded two equal groups of ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ scoring children for both 
working-memory variables separately.
 In addition to assigning children to working-memory categories, participants were 
initially assigned to 3 groups on the basis of variability in analogical reasoning at session 
one: 1) children showing consistent analogical strategy use (more than 80 percent correct); 
2) children showing consistent inadequate, non-analogical strategy use (less than 20 percent 
correct); and 3) children showing variable, both adequate and inadequate, strategy use (20-80 
percent correct) (Siegler & Svetina, 2002; tunteler & Resing, 2007a; tunteler et al., 2008). 
However, because only one participant displayed consistent analogical strategy use at session 
one, this child was reassigned to the variable analogical reasoning group. thus, ultimately 
we ended up comparing only two groups: 1) children showing consistently inadequate, non-
analogical strategy use, and 2) children showing both adequate and inadequate (i.e. variable) 
strategy use. 
 taking condition, spatial working-memory capacity, and initial variability as our 
hypothesized influencing variables, eight subgroups emerged (see table 2). 
Table 2. Subgroups of children derived from the influence of background variables
Group Code1 000 001 010 011 111 110 101 100
Condition 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Spatial Working Memory 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
Variability 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
Number of children2 20 7 11 14 17 9 8 18
Note: 1Group codes based on condition: 0 = practice, 1 = training; spatial working-memory:  0 = lower, 1 = higher; 
variability: 0 = low,1 = high. 2Number of children within each subgroup.
Analyses
Multilevel analysis (MLA) was used to analyze the data. Microgenetic data sets can be viewed 
as comprising multilevel data, where repeated measurements are nested within individuals 
(Hox, 2002; Kreft & De Leeuw, 2007; Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Van der Leeden, 1998).  the 
use of MLA, in a manner specified for repeated measures data with two levels, enabled us to 
inspect growth trajectories (Level-1) for each child (Level-2) and to investigate systematic 
variation between these trajectories as a function of our background variables and experimental 
treatment (Van der Leeden, 1998). By modeling varying regression coefficients at the session 
level (Level-1), we obtained growth trajectories that were different for each individual 
child. We then added two types of explanatory variables to the model: time constant and 
time varying variables. this enabled us to model both the average growth trajectories of each 
group and the individual growth trajectories of each child (Hox, 2002, 2010). For reference 
purposes, Appendix 4B displays the data structure of the variables used for the MLA. All of 
the variables contained a meaningful 0-point to facilitate interpretation (Hox, 2002).
 After running the MLA, we focused on more in-depth analyses of individual growth 
curves of analogical reasoning over time, and examined the children’s verbal explanations. 
Siegler (2007) posited the benefit of trial-by-trial assessments of strategy use. In our case, 
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we focused upon the role of the four component processes noted earlier: acquisition of new 
strategies; increased usage of the most advanced strategies in the child’s current repertoire; 
increasingly efficient execution of strategies; and improved choices among strategies. In order 
to investigate these, we added a session-by-session assessment per subgroup (see table 2), 
over time, of individual children’s analogical and non-analogical strategy use. to achieve this, 
we examined: (a) the number of complete analogical solutions; (b) the number of correct 
transformations the child produced in both incomplete and complete analogical solutions; 
(c) the number of these correct transformations the child was able to verbalize; and (d) non-
analogical strategy use as indicated by the child’s verbal explanations.
4.3 Results
Before examining the findings from our research questions in detail, we checked for possible 
initial differences between the dynamic test and practice condition. the mean scores on 
Exclusion did not differ significantly, nor did the mean number of complete analogical 
solutions, transformations or explanations at session one. Means and standard deviations per 
session and condition are provided in table 3.
Table 3. Means and standard deviations of analogy scores per session and condition
Session
1 2 3 4
Condition Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Complete Solutions
Practice (N = 52) 4.10 (4.83) 5.6 (5.56) 5.94 (6.28) 6.31 (6.1)
DT (N = 52) 4.44 (4.33) 6.25 (5.66) 9.38 (5.35) 8.96 (5.61)
Total (N = 104) 4.27 (4.57) 5.92 (5.59) 7.66 (6.06) 7.63 (5.98)
Correct Transformations 
Practice (N = 52) 51.44 (31.99) 53.88 (35.44) 56.71 (37.09) 58.35 (36.8)
DT (N = 52) 55.88 (28.32) 59.65 (31.97) 78.37 (25.6) 76.08 (26.73)
Total (N = 104) 53.66 (29.63) 56.77 (33.71) 67.54 (33.53) 67.21 (33.28)
Explained Transformations
Practice (N = 52) 20.29 (21.11) 23.48 (24.2) 22.54 (24.31) 22.13 (22.69)
DT (N = 52) 23.25 (17.39) 26.98 (21.38) 36.6 (22.25) 32.52 (23.51)



































In accordance with Hox (2002, 2010), the specific Multilevel Analyses for repeated measures 
data were run with eleven hypothesized nested models for each of our dependent variables: 
complete analogical solutions, correct transformations, and explained transformations (see 
table 4). Repeated measurements were modeled at level 1 and for the individual children 
at level 2 (see Appendix 4B). Models progressed from those including only fixed effects, to 
those with random slopes. Each successive model included an additional expected variable 
or interaction, after which it was compared to the previous model with a likelihood-ratio 
test to determine if the succeeding model had a significantly better fit than the previous one. 
For each dependent variable, the final and best fitting model was used to test our hypotheses 
by interpreting the interactions and the direct effects of the explanatory variables, which 
made up the interactions, together as an integrated system (Hox, 2002, 2010), rather than by 
testing the hypotheses one by one in separate analyses. Regression lines were represented in 
Figures 1-3 for the three final models of the three independent variables. Also, for reference 
purposes, the regression equations for the final models are displayed in Appendix 4C.
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For our first outcome measure – the number of completely correct analogical solutions – 
model 10 (see table 4) proved to be the best fit. this model included four main effects: 
session, variability, spatial working-memory and condition, and three interactions: 
condition*variability, session*condition and session*variability, thereby accounting for eight 
subgroups of children (see Figure 1, and table 2). Outcomes confirmed our hypothesis that 
repeated practice (positive session effect), but even more than this, the dynamic-test-type 
of training (positive condition effect), were both related to an improvement in analogical 
performance over time. As expected, the effect of initial variability in the child’s ability to 
arrive at complete analogical solutions was related to an increase in analogical performance 
over time (positive session*variability effect). However, this effect, as expected, decreased 
after the dynamic-test-type training was given (negative condition*variability effect). 
Unexpectedly, the improved performance of the children who had received the training 
declined somewhat at session four (negative session*condition effect). this reduction in 
performance resulted in the high initial variability, trained children showing similar gains to 
the untrained high initial variable group (non-significant session*condition*variability effect 
of model 11 in table 4). As such, model 10 indicated that children with low initial variability 
in analogical reasoning profited more from the dynamic-test-type training than those children 
who were already capable of some analogical reasoning at the outset of this study. Finally, as 
expected, spatial working-memory, but not verbal working-memory (see model 5, table 4), 
had a positive influence on the number of complete analogical solutions at session one (spatial 
working-memory effect). 
 For our second outcome measure – the number of transformations correct – model 10 
(see table 4) was once again the best fit. the model included three main effects: session, 
variability, and condition, and three interactions: condition*variability, session*condition 
and session*variability, which accounted for eight subgroups of children (see Figure 2, and 
table 2). this mainly confirmed and paralleled the pattern described above for the outcome 
measure entitled, ‘number of complete analogical solutions’. However, as expected, neither 
spatial nor verbal working-memory were found to influence the number of transformations 
correct at session one. 
 For our third outcome measure – the number of explained transformations – model 
10 (see table 4) once again provided the best fit.  this time, the model included three 
main effects: variability, spatial working-memory, and condition, and three interactions: 
condition*variability, session*condition and session*variability, and accounted for four 
subgroups of children (see Figure 3).  Although the outcomes were similar as for ‘number of 
completely solved analogical solutions’ after having included all main and interaction effects, 
the main effect of practice (the session effect) was no longer significantly related to the 
number of explained transformations.
 Figures 4-6 display respectively the variation in the three analogical reasoning measures 
(number of complete analogical solutions, transformations correct, and transformations 



































Figure 4  Individual developmental trajectories for percentage complete analogical solutions over time per subgroup.
Note: WM = spatial working-memory. Group code numbers: 1st = condition: 0 = practice and 1 = training; 2nd = spatial 
working-memory: 0 = lower and 1 = higher; 3rd = variability: 0 = low and 1 = high. 
Figure 4  
Individual devel ental trajectories for perc ta e c mplet  analogical solutions over time per subgroup.  
Practice, lower WM, low variability Practice, higher WM, low variability Practice, lower WM, high variability Practice, higher WM, high variability 
 
Training, lower WM, low variability Training, higher WM, low variability Training, lower WM, high variability Training, higher WM, high variability 
 
Note: WM = spatial working-memory. Group code numbers: 1st = condition: 0 = practice and 1 = training; 2nd = spatial working-memory: 0 = lower 
and 1 = higher; 3rd = variability: 0 = low and 1 = high.  
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Figure 4  
Individual developmental trajectories for percentage complete analogical solutions over time per subgroup.  
Practice, lower WM, low variability Practice, higher WM, low variability Practice, lower WM, high variability Practice, higher WM, high variability 
 
Training, lower WM, low variability Training, higher WM, low variability Training, lower WM, high variability Training, higher WM, high variability 
 
Note: WM = spatial working-memory. Group code numbers: 1st = condition: 0 = practice and 1 = training; 2nd = spatial working-memory: 0 = lower 



































Figure 5  Individual developmental trajectories for percentage correct transformations over time per subgroup. 
Note: WM = spatial working-memory. Group code numbers: 1st = condition: 0 = practice and 1 = training; 2nd = spatial 
working-memory: 0 = lower and 1 = higher; 3rd = variability: 0 = low and 1 = high. 
Figure 5 
Individual evelop ental trajectories for percentage c rrect transformations over time per subgroup.  
Practice, lower WM, low variability Practice, higher WM, low variability Practice, lower WM, high variability Practice, higher WM, high variability 
 
Training, lower WM, low variability Training, higher WM, low variability Training, lower WM, high variability Training, higher WM, high variability 
 
Note: WM = spatial working-memory. Gr up code numbers: 1st = condition: 0 = practice and 1 = training; 2nd = spatial working-memory: 0 = lower 
and 1 = higher; 3rd = variability: 0 = low and 1 = high.  
85
4




Individual developmental trajectories for percentage correct transformations over time per subgroup.  
Practice, lower WM, low variability Practice, higher WM, low variability Practice, lower WM, high variability Practice, higher WM, high variability 
 
Training, lower WM, low variability Training, higher WM, low variability Training, lower WM, high variability Training, higher WM, high variability 
 
Note: WM = spatial working-memory. Group code numbers: 1st = condition: 0 = practice and 1 = training; 2nd = spatial working-memory: 0 = lower 



































Figure 6  Individual developmental trajectories for percentage explained transformations correct over time per 
subgroup. 
Note: WM = spatial working-memory. Group code numbers: 1st = condition: 0 = practice and 1 = training; 2nd = spatial 
working-memory: 0 = lower and 1 = higher; 3rd = variability: 0 = low and 1 = high. 
Figure 6 
Individual developmental trajectories for percentage explained transformations correct over time per subgroup.  
Practice, lower WM, low variability Practice, higher WM, low variability Practice, lower WM, high variability Practice, higher WM, high variability 
 
Training, lower WM, low variability Training, higher WM, low variability Training, lower WM, high variability Training, higher WM, high variability 
 
Note: WM = spatial working-memory. Group code numbers: 1st = condition: 0 = practice and 1 = training; 2nd = spatial working-memory: 0 = lower 
and 1 = higher; 3rd = variability: 0 = low and   igh.  
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Overall, as expected, developmental trajectories for children within the same subgroup were 
similar.  Nevertheless, the amount and rate of change within the subgroups was still highly 
variable, both between and within children, over sessions. For some children, the dynamic-
test-type training appeared to induce relatively rapid improvement in relation to (complete) 
analogical strategies. However, several of these children demonstrated a dip in performance 
at the following session. this appeared to be a particular feature of the lower ability group(s), 
but contrary to our expectations it was not limited to these groups. Developmental trajectories 
for explained transformations seemed to be the most modest. those children who showed the 
most improvement tended to be found in the dynamic-test-type training subgroups and the 
highest ability subgroup of the practice condition. Nevertheless, the highest ability subgroup 
Figure 6 
Individual developmental trajectories for percentage explained transformations correct over time per subgroup.  
Practice, lower WM, low variability Practice, higher WM, low variability Practice, lower WM, high variability Practice, higher WM, high variability 
 
Training, lower WM, low variability Training, higher WM, low variability Training, lower WM, high variability Training, higher WM, high variability 
 
Note: WM = spatial working-memory. Group code numbers: 1st = condition: 0 = practice and 1 = training; 2nd = spatial working-memory: 0 = lower 



































of both the practice and training conditions included children displaying significant within 
and between child variability over time and there appeared to be as many ‘losses’ as ‘gains’. 
therefore, at the individual level, the changes in explained transformations were contrary to 
our hypothesis that trained children with higher working-memory and initial variability would 
be more consistent in their amount of change and rate of up-take of analogical strategies.
 Figures 7-10 display variation and patterns of solutions strategies that were verbalized by 
individual children within each subgroup per session. 
Figure 7  Explanations of solution strategies1 (non-analogical and implicit analogical) per child and session. 
Note: 1Strategies: 1=copy; 2=part copy; 3=procedural; 4=story; 5=don’t know; 6=own rule; 7=implicit analogical. The 
(partial) absence of a bar represents verbalizations including at least one correct transformation (see Appendix a 
for a more elaborate description). WM = working-memory. Practice condition: children mainly expressed one or two 
non-analogical strategies, including mostly copies, part copies and their own rules. Training condition (after training): 
more varied in their non-analogical strategies per session, included the ‘own rule’ strategy more often than other 
strategies and provided more implicit and explicit analogical explanations. Explicit analogical explanations increase 
especially after training.
Figure 7 
Explanations of solution strategies1 (non-analogical and implicit analogical) per child and session.  
Practice, lower WM, low variability Practice, higher WM, low variability Practice, lower WM, high variability            Practice, higher WM, high variability 
  
Training, lower WM, low variability Training, higher WM, low variability Training, lower WM, high variability Training, higher WM, high variability 
 
Note1: strategies: 1=copy; 2=part copy; 3=procedural; 4=story; 5=don’t know; 6=own rule; 7=implicit analogical. The (partial) absence of a bar 
represents verbalizations including at least one correct transformation (see Appendix a for a more elaborate description). WM = working-memory. 
Practice condition: children mainly expressed one or two non-analogical strategies, including mostly copies, part copies and their own rules. Training 
condition (after training): more varied in their non-analogical strategies per session, included the ‘own rule’ strategy more often than other strategies 
and provided more implicit and explicit analogical explanations. Explicit analogical explanations increase especially after training.
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Explanations of solution strategies1 (non-analogical and implicit analogical) per child and session.  
Practice, lower WM, low variability Practice, higher WM, low variability Practice, lower WM, high variability            Practice, higher WM, high variability 
  
Training, lower WM, low variability Training, higher WM, low variability Training, lower WM, high variability Training, higher WM, high variability 
 
Note1: strategies: 1=copy; 2=part copy; 3=procedural; 4=story; 5=don’t know; 6=own rule; 7=implicit analogical. The (partial) absence of a bar 
represents verbalizations including at least one correct transformation (see Appendix a for a more elaborate description). WM = working-memory. 
Practice condition: children mainly expressed one or two non-analogical strategies, including mostly copies, part copies and their own rules. Training 
condition (after training): more varied in their non-analogical strategies per session, included the ‘own rule’ strategy more often than other strategies 



































Figure 8  Explanations of solution strategies1 (non-analogical and implicit analogical) per child and session. 
Note: 1Strategies: 1=copy; 2=part copy; 3=procedural; 4=story; 5=don’t know; 6=own rule; 7=implicit analogical. The 
(partial) absence of a bar represents verbalizations including at least one correct transformation (see Appendix a 
for a more elaborate description). WM = working-memory. Children that were more variable in number and type of 
solutions strategies at the start tended to increase in implicit and explicit analogical explanations over time through 
both practice and training. However, training was able to have a more ‘abrupt’ effect than practice, as could be seen 
in child number 82. This child initially gave procedural explanations, but the session after training s/he provided 
explicit analogical explanations only.
Figure 8 
Explanatio s of so tion strategies1 (non-analogical and implicit analogical) per child and session.  
Practice, lower WM, low variability Practice, higher WM, low variability Practice, lower WM, high variability Practice, higher WM, high variability 
  
Training, lower WM, low variability Training, higher WM, low variability Training, lower WM, high variability Training, higher WM, high variability 
 
Note1: strategies: 1=copy; 2=part copy; 3=procedural; 4=story; 5=don’t know; 6=own rule; 7=implicit analogical. The (partial) absence of a bar 
re esents verbalizatio  inc udi g at least one co ect transformation (see Appendix a for a more elaborate description). WM = working-memory. 
Children that were more variable in number and type of solutions strategies at the start tended to increase in implicit and explicit analogical 
explanations over time through both practice and training. However, training was able to have a more ‘abrupt’ effect than practice, as could be seen 
in c ild number 82. This child initially gave procedural explanations, but the session after training s/he provided explicit analogical explanations only. 
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Explanations of solution strategies1 (non-analogical and implicit analogical) per child and session.  
Practice, lower WM, low variability Practice, higher WM, low variability Practice, lower WM, high variability Practice, higher WM, high variability 
  
Training, lower WM, low variability Training, higher WM, low variability Training, lower WM, high variability Training, higher WM, high variability 
 
Note1: strategies: 1=copy; 2=part copy; 3=procedural; 4=story; 5=don’t know; 6=own rule; 7=implicit analogical. The (partial) absence of a bar 
represents verbalizations including at least one correct transformation (see Appendix a for a more elaborate description). WM = working-memory. 
Children that were more variable in number and type of solutions strategies at the start tended to increase in implicit and explicit analogical 
explanations over time through both practice and training. However, training was able to have a more ‘abrupt’ effect than practice, as could be seen 



































Figure 9  Explanations of solution strategies1 (non-analogical and implicit analogical) per child and session. 
Note: 1Strategies: 1=copy; 2=part copy; 3=procedural; 4=story; 5=don’t know; 6=own rule; 7=implicit analogical. The 
(partial) absence of a bar represents verbalizations including at least one correct transformation (see Appendix a 
for a more elaborate description). WM = working-memory. This subgroup appeared very similar in both conditions: 
children mainly gave explicit and implicit analogical explanations, followed mainly by their own rules and ‘don’t 
knows’. No child was unable to explain at least some correct transformation(s) on several items. It also appeared 
that when these children found the item too difficult they would give an explanation of making their own rule or they 
explained that they ‘didn’t know’ what they did.
Figure 9 
Explanations of solution strategies1 (non-analogical and implicit analogical) per child and session.  
Practice, lower WM, low variability Practice, higher WM, low variability Practice, lower WM, high variability Practice, higher WM, high variability 
 
Training, lower WM, low variability Training, higher WM, low variability Training, lower WM, high variability Training, higher WM, high variability 
 
No 1: s rategies: 1=cop  2=part copy; 3 procedural; 4=story; 5=don’t know; 6=own rule; 7=implicit analogical. The (partial) absence of a bar 
represents verbalizations including at least one correct transformation (see Appendix a for a more elaborate description). WM = working-memory.  
This subgroup appeared very similar in b th c nditio s: c ildren m inly gave explicit and implicit analogical explanations, followed mainly by their 
own rules and ‘don’t knows’. No child was unable to explain at least some correct transformation(s) on several items. It also appeared that when these 
children found the item too difficult they would give an explanation of making their own rule or they explained that they ‘didn’t know’ what they did. 
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Explanations of solution strategies1 (non-analogical and implicit analogical) per child and session.  
Practice, lower WM, low variability Practice, higher WM, low variability Practice, lower WM, high variability Practice, higher WM, high variability 
 
Training, lower WM, low variability Training, higher WM, low variability Training, lower WM, high variability Training, higher WM, high variability 
 
Note1: strategies: 1=copy; 2=part copy; 3=procedural; 4=story; 5=don’t know; 6=own rule; 7=implicit analogical. The (partial) absence of a bar 
represents verbalizations including at least one correct transformation (see Appendix a for a more elaborate description). WM = working-memory.  
This subgroup appeared very similar in both conditions: children mainly gave explicit and implicit analogical explanations, followed mainly by their 
own rules and ‘don’t knows’. No child was unable to explain at least some correct transformation(s) on several items. It also appeared that when these 



































Figure 10  Explanations of solution strategies1 (non-analogical and implicit analogical) per child and session. 
Note: 1Strategies: 1=copy; 2=part copy; 3=procedural; 4=story; 5=don’t know; 6=own rule; 7=implicit analogical. The 
(partial) absence of a bar represents verbalizations including at least one correct transformation (see Appendix a for 
a more elaborate description). WM = working-memory. 
This subgroup appeared very similar to those in Figure 7 in both conditions. A few children still provided several 
non-analogical explanations at the start, which were very variable in number and type. At later sessions these 
explanations were increasingly implicit or explicit analogical.
Figure 10 
Explanations of solution strategies1 (non-analogical and implicit analogical) per child and session.  
Practice, lower WM, low variability Practice, higher WM, low variability Practice, lower WM, high variability Practice, higher WM, high variability 
 
     Training, lower WM, low variability Training, higher WM, low variability Training, lower WM, high variability Training, higher WM, high variability 
 
Not 1: strategies: 1=cop ; 2=part copy; 3 procedural; 4=story; 5=don’t know; 6=own rule; 7=implicit analogical. The (partial) absence of a bar 
represents verbalizations including at least one correct transformation (see Appendix a for a more elaborate description). WM = working-memory.  
This subgroup appeared very similar to those in Figure 7 in both conditions. A few children still provided several non-analogical explanations at the 
start, which were very variable in number nd type. At later session  thes  explanations were increasingly implicit or explicit analogical. 
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Explanations of solution strategies1 (non-analogical and implicit analogical) per child and session.  
Practice, lower WM, low variability Practice, higher WM, low variability Practice, lower WM, high variability Practice, higher WM, high variability 
 
     Training, lower WM, low variability Training, higher WM, low variability Training, lower WM, high variability Training, higher WM, high variability 
 
Note1: strategies: 1=copy; 2=part copy; 3=procedural; 4=story; 5=don’t know; 6=own rule; 7=implicit analogical. The (partial) absence of a bar 
represents verbalizations including at least one correct transformation (see Appendix a for a more elaborate description). WM = working-memory.  
This subgroup appeared very similar to those in Figure 7 in both conditions. A few children still provided several non-analogical explanations at the 



































As expected, children’s strategies within each subgroup were more similar to each other. 
Copying and using a single strategy was the most common in the lower ability groups for 
the practice condition. the training condition displayed a greater variation of non-analogical 
strategies per session, included the ‘own rule’ strategy more often than other strategies, and 
resulted in more implicit and explicit analogical explanations. However, those children who, 
at the start, most varied in the number and type of solution strategies tended to improve 
their implicit and explicit analogical explanations over time as a result of both training and 
practice. Nevertheless, as expected, training sometimes had a powerful effect as could be seen 
in child number 82 in Figure 8 (graph of the training subgroup with a lower working-memory, 
but high initial variability). this child initially provided procedural explanations, but after 
training s/he consistently offered explicit analogical explanations. However, and somewhat 
unexpectedly, many children reverted back to non-analogical, but variable strategies after 
training. 
4.4 Discussion
the current study sought to investigate inter- and intra-individual development in the 
analogical reasoning of individual children within subgroups of learners. Results will be 
discussed in accordance with the five dimensions of cognitive change (source, variability, 
rate, path, and breadth) of the overlapping waves theory (Siegler, 1996; 2006). 
 the source of change refers to underlying factors that encourage changes in reasoning 
(Siegler, 2006). the current study integrated sources of change and attempted to gain greater 
understanding of their combined relationship to figural analogical performance measures 
over time. Both repeated practice over time and dynamic-test-type training were related to 
complete analogical solutions and correct transformations, although the effect of the dynamic 
training proved to be greater (e.g., tunteler et al., 2008; Resing et al., 2012). Unexpectedly, 
children’s explanations about their strategies (explained transformations) were not improved 
by repeated practice alone. Improved explanations tended to follow training  (tunteler et al., 
2008) and initial variability in analogical performance (e.g., Siegler, 2007; tunteler & Resing, 
2007a). 
 At the initial session, spatial working-memory (Ven et al., 2012; Rasmussen & Bisanz, 
2005), but not verbal working-memory (e.g., St. Claire-thompson & Gathercole, 2006), 
was positively related to complete analogical solutions and subsequent explanations. As 
expected, working-memory was unrelated to the overall number of transformations in 
behavioral solutions. It did not seem difficult for children to get the solutions partially correct 
although they struggled to achieve complete accuracy. this was in accordance with the view 
that working-memory capacity is likely to place a limit upon complete analogical solutions, 
where several transformations need to be processed in parallel, until greater skill at the 
serial processing of transformations is reached (Halford et al., 2010; Richland et al., 2006). 
the influence of working-memory on the number of verbalized transformations might also 
explain why children beginning to discover a new strategy – and therefore encountering more 
demands upon working-memory – at first appear unable to verbalize the correct strategies 
they used (Siegler & Stern, 1998). 
 the variability of change refers to children’s differences in the source, rate, path and breadth 
of change, as well as changes within individual children’s array of strategies (Siegler, 2006, 
2007). Our data showed that children’s initial variability in the use of analogical strategies was 
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related to development over time, but interestingly, the dynamic-test-type training reduced 
this influence. this finding reflects the belief that dynamic-test-type training should reveal 
children’s ‘true’ potential, by making the test situation more equitable than static testing 
(Grigorenko, 2009). A longer dynamic training procedure or more frequent training sessions 
might have decreased the influence of children’s initial performance further and could have 
potentially prevented the reduced performance noted at the final session. this was confirmed 
by the qualitative findings where we saw children making rapid progress from little use of 
analogical reasoning to its more consistent use after training (see also, tunteler et al., 2008). 
the children in our study also displayed variable behavior in several other ways, although 
these will be discussed in connection to the other dimensions of change.
 the rate of change refers to the timeline and amount of experience related to development 
from initial to consistent adequate performance (rate of uptake) (Siegler, 2006). In the current 
study, we made the rate of change and the rate of uptake of the analogical performance 
measures visible by displaying subgroup regression lines over time, as well as revealing 
individual children’s developmental trajectories within their respective subgroups. It made 
sense to categorize children into subgroups, as MLA pointed to a significant relationship 
between the rate of change and our subgroup categorization, as well as individual variation 
within those subgroups (Van der Leeden, 1998). Inspecting and comparing a combination 
of analogical performance measures for the various subgroups also proved useful within this 
context. In accordance with our expectations, individual developmental trajectories generally 
displayed a fair degree of similarity within subgroups separated by the three analogical 
performance measures, as well as specific verbalized strategy use (tunteler et al., 2008; Fabio, 
2005). However, the rate of change within the subgroups was variable, both between and 
within children over sessions.
 For all performance measures, children with poorer initial performance tended to profit 
relatively faster from training than those who had already displayed variable analogical 
reasoning. Nevertheless, growth through training was followed by a dip at the final session 
for all subgroups, suggesting that not all the benefits of training were maintained. Several 
individual child trajectories showed such a dip at the final session, particularly in the case 
of those in the lower ability subgroups. the finding that the performance of able children 
sometimes deteriorated was contrary to our hypothesis that higher ability children who 
received training, would generally be relatively consistent in their rate of change and up-
take of analogical strategies. It is possible that some of the more able children lost interest in 
explaining all of the various transformations for every task that they solved (tunteler et al., 
2008). In addition, certain transformations may have been more difficult to explain than others 
(Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979), especially for higher ability children who might have switched 
from analytical to more heuristic problem solving (Klauer & Phye, 2008, Resing et al., 2012). 
Other contributory explanations for this dip could include the extent of children’s motivation 
for tackling the tasks (Siegler & Engle, 1994), or a failure to provide feedback concerning the 
accuracy of children’s answers (Siegler & Svetina, 2002). Also, specific subgroups of children 
may require a varied and tailored way of instruction (Davidson & Sternberg, 1984) when 
they are at a particular stage of readiness to learn (Vygotsky, 1978; Alibali & Goldin-Meadow, 
1993). 
 the path of change refers to developmental trajectories in terms of sequences of changing 
knowledge states and problem-solving behavior (Siegler, 2006). We identified seven different 
verbalized strategies that children employed: providing a full or part copy of another term, 



































know, offering their own rule, and providing implicit analogical answers (see Appendix 4A). 
Although quite elaborate, these categories were broadly similar to those identified in other 
studies of analogical reasoning (e.g., Siegler & Svetina, 2002; tunteler et al., 2008). Overall, 
and in accordance with our expectations, children in both conditions displayed a greater 
variety of non-analogical and implicit analogical strategies before progressing to an increased 
number of implicit and explicit analogical solutions. this finding echoed those reported by 
Siegler and Svetina (2002), where children also displayed a variety of non-analogical solutions 
to matrix analogies immediately before progressing to a situation where they were able to 
provide adequate solutions. However, such a finding was rather less common in Siegler and 
Svetina’s (2002) study than our own. It is possible that our open-ended format, the higher 
number of potential transformations, and the lack of any instruction and feedback in the 
practice situations were contributory factors (Stevenson et al., manuscript under revision). 
 We also anticipated that children would rarely revert back to the use of non-analogical 
strategies once having demonstrated training-induced analogical reasoning; instead, we 
expected them to provide incomplete answers in those cases where the correct solution 
was not found (tunteler et al., 2008). this hypothesis was confirmed in part as, in several 
cases, children reverted back to non-analogical strategies after training. At such times, they 
demonstrated greater variability in their use of non-analogical strategies than they had before 
training, or they started making up their own rules. Higher ability subgroups tended to use 
more of their own rules or simple ‘don’t know’ explanations when reverting to non-analogical 
behavior during the final two sessions. As noted earlier in this paper, this suggests that 
children may have (partially) shifted to a more heuristic form of strategy behavior that is 
quicker to execute, but potentially reduces accuracy when tasks become more difficult than 
anticipated (Klauer & Phye, 2008; Resing et al., 2012).
 Another interesting finding concerned some children in the lower ability groups who 
showed greater variability in their use of non-analogical strategies after training, but regressed 
to less variable, (possibly) less skilled performance once again during the final session. this 
indicated that a ‘teachable moment’ might have been lost between the final two sessions. 
It is possible that these children might not have regressed, but rather progressed in their 
performance if they had received another training session between the final two sessions 
(Vygotsky, 1978; Alibali & Goldin-Meadow, 1993; Siegler, 2006).  
 In sum, the open-ended figural analogical tasks and dynamic-test-type training proved 
sensitive for all ability groups, with evidence of variability being demonstrated at several 
levels. Our examination of several ‘sources of change’, and use of several analogical and non-
analogical outcome measures in subgroups of children may prove to be a valuable means 
of measuring development that could potentially help predict individual development, and 
identify ‘teachable moments’ for particular children. 
 It may be profitable for future research to investigate whether assessment should move 
beyond reliance upon the production of ‘right or wrong’ answers and, instead, give credit 
for partial answers and even ‘inadequate’ (non-analogical) strategies. A child moving from 
a single inadequate non-analogical strategy to using a variety of non-analogical strategies 
could possibly also be seen to have made progress and have benefited from training. It is 
also possible that children who create their own rules may be at a more advanced stage and 
require different instructional emphases than those who merely use ‘copy’ strategies or 
‘tell stories’ about the animals. these outcome measures are less conventional, but perhaps 
important in their capacity to differentiate between children of lower ability. the number and 
type of transformations a child is able to provide may also prove a sensitive measure to help 
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differentiate between high ability children. Future research should seek to verify quantitatively 
these more qualitative outcomes and use this information to construct assessment batteries 
that are able to measure intellectual potential more broadly with the goal that insights from 
these can be used to better inform educational interventions. 
 It may also be valuable to investigate children’s breadth of change in relation to problem-
solving activities of this kind. this construct refers to transfer, to the generalization of newly 
acquired strategies to other contexts and problems. In a diagnostic context, it may prove 
useful to add a reversal task to the assessment, where the child is asked to construct a problem 
(in this case a figural analogy) rather than solve one (Bosma & Resing, 2006; Harpaz-Itay, 
Kaniel, Ben-Amram, 2006). Findings from these studies suggest that a reversal task may 
activate higher-level metacognition, additional strategies and better explanations thereof, 
thus potentially providing additional diagnostic information and direction for (educational) 
interventions. 
 Within the field of educational psychology, there continues to be significant debate as 
to the value of cognitive assessment for the purposes of informing educational intervention 
(Fletcher and Vaughn, 2009; Reynolds and Shaywitz (2009); Compton, Fuchs, Fuchs, 
Lambert, and Hamlett, 2012;  Hale et al., 2008, 2010; Fletcher et al., 2011). In the eyes of 
many educationalists and psychologists, psychometric tools and approaches have proven 
valuable for the purpose of selection, yet continue to offer little to help teachers for making 
informed decisions about how best to help individual children. It is surely incumbent 
upon educational and cognitive psychologists to devise more sophisticated approaches to 
understanding individual children’s development, and to use this information to inform the 
design of powerful forms of instruction tailored to individual needs. the approach outlined in 




































Scoring system of the figural analogies
Category Description Example
1. Copy The child indicates that their solution is a 
copy of another term of the analogy. 
‘It’s this one’, while pointing to another term 
of the analogy.
2. Part copy The child indicates that s/he has copied 
part(s) of other term(s), and the behavioral 
solution confirms this.
‘I took that one and that one, but not that 
one’, while pointing to specific animals 
relating to another term.
3. Procedural The child gives simple information about 
picking up particular animal cards and 
putting them in the empty term.
‘I picked up this card and put it down here. 
I also wanted to lay down this one, but it 
didn’t fit.’
4. Story The child tells a story about the animals. ‘This horse likes that one and this is the 
mummy and that is her baby.’
5. Don’t know The child indicates ignorance as to how he or 
she solved the puzzle.
‘I don’t know’, ‘I guessed’, ‘I just liked it.’
6. Own rule The child indicates that s/he made up a rule 
and applied it to the analogy. However, this 
isn’t a correct transformation.
 ‘I made this one blue, because there was no 




Correct transformations are clearly present 
in the behavioral solution, but the child only 
refers to them implicitly.
‘I made it just like there,’ while pointing to 








Structure of analogical reasoning development data
Level-1 
Range
Variable names Description Min Max
Cons Vector consisting of ones 1 1
Session Test sessions: four measurement moments 0 3
Level-2
Student Numbers assigned to individual pupils 0 104
Condition1 Condition: 0 = practice; 1 = dynamic testing 0 1
Verbal WM Verbal memory group: 0 = low; 1 = high 0 1
Spatial WM Spatial memory group: 0 = low; 1 = high 0 1
Variability Variable analogical reasoning: 0 = low; 1 = high
Dependent Variables
Complete Analogies Complete analogical solutions per child and session 0 20
Explanations Explained transformations per child and session 0 110
Transformations Correct transformations per child and session 0 110
Note: 1Since conditions didn’t differ for sessions 1 and 2, both conditions were coded 0 for these sessions; after 




































Regression equations per final MLA model of each analogical performance measure
Regression Equation
Solutions Correct = .62 + .44 x session + 7.32 x variability + 1.45 x spatial working-memory + 5.97 x condition – 
3. 42 x condition*variability – 1.12 x session*condition + 1.56 x session*variability.
Transformations Correct (in behavioral solutions) = 32.96 + 1.41 x session + 46.90 x variability + 34.60 x condition 
– 20.71 x condition*variability – 4.82 x session* condition + 3.58 x session*variability. 
Transformations Explained = 7.30 –  .10 x session + 28.79 x variability + 5.55 x spatial working-memory + 22.37 x 
condition – 12.35 x condition*variability – 3.96 x session*condition + 2.64 x session*variability.
Note: All variables contain a meaningful 0-point (including session). To obtain regression equations per subgroup, 
replace variables with group codes and session numbers. 
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CHAPtER 5
What can an analogical construction task reveal 
about changes in children’s problem-solving 
strategy?
Pronk, C.M.E., Elliott, J.G., de Rooij, M.J., & Resing, W.C.M. (submitted). What can an 





















































In this study, improvements in children’s analogical performance were assessed, by asking them to 
construct analogies rather than solve them, as is traditionally the case. Quantitative and qualitative inter- 
and intra-individual measures were investigated. After holding important background variables (working-
memory and initial capacity) constant, results showed that those children, who had made most progress 
in utilizing and explaining analogical strategies when solving classical analogies, demonstrated similar 
strengths when asked to construct analogies. It was also shown that the dynamic training resulted in 
improved capacity on the par of the children to reflect upon the strategies employed.  therefore, adding 
an analogical construction (transfer) task to dynamic-test-situations could provide additional important 
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5.1 Introduction
the development of inductive (particularly analogical) reasoning in children has been 
extensively described elsewhere (Goswami, 1992; Morrison et al., 2004), especially its role in 
cognitive development (Goswami, 2002) and classroom learning  (Csapó, 1997; Vosniadou, 
1989). the first years of primary school are a time for rapid intellectual development and, 
unsurprisingly, this results in the variable use of inter- and intra-individual cognitive strategies 
(e.g., Siegler & Svetina, 2002). In order to gain insight into such processes, analogical tasks, 
sometimes incorporating dynamic testing procedures (Grigorenko, 2009), have been 
employed for differentiating and, potentially, predicting children’s cognitive development and 
future educational progress. However, to achieve this, in-depth understanding of children’s 
developmental trajectories is required. Here, the use of a microgenetic research design may 
prove especially helpful (Siegler & Svetina 2002; tunteler & Resing, 2007).
Microgenetic research & dynamic testing
Microgenetic research designs involve the detailed study of children at times when they are 
likely to display rapid developmental growth. to achieve a fine-grained picture, these designs 
utilize frequent sampling of performance over a relatively short time period. Observation 
of children’s responses, when given repeated practice experiences, enables researchers to 
identify changes in reasoning strategies and differential developmental trajectories as they 
happen. Development is considered to occur naturally, as, by design, the practice sessions 
include no explicit forms of intervention (Flynn & Siegler, 2007; Siegler & Crowley, 1991). 
 In contrast with traditional forms of assessment, dynamic approaches seek to ascertain 
what children can achieve when they are provided with tailored assistance during the testing 
procedure. In line with Vygotskian theory, such a procedure may add important information 
about children’s potential, should they be given an appropriate educational program 
(Grigorenko, 2009; Resing & Elliott, 2011; Swanson & Lussier, 2001). In fact, a (dynamic) 
training procedure combined with a microgenetic research design has been found to yield 
significant differential inter- and intra-individual learning trajectories after both repeated 
practice, and training experiences (Pronk, Elliott, de Rooij & Resing, submitted; Resing, 2013; 
tunteler, Pronk, & Resing, 2008). However, it is unclear whether an analogical construction 
task, deemed in this case to be an example of transfer of learning, can offer additional and 
valuable information. It is the exploration of this issue that is reported in the present paper.
 
Breadth of change (transfer) 
According to Siegler’s (1996) overlapping waves theory, cognitive change is meaningfully 
described along five dimensions of change: the source, path, rate, variability and breadth of 
change. the theory co-evolved alongside the microgenetic research approach as a means to 
interpret observed developmental processes of variability, choice, and change. the focus of 
the current study was ‘the breadth of change’ dimension, which refers to generalization, or 
transfer, of previous learning to other problems and contexts. 
 transfer of learning has been the subject of research for more than a century (Larsen-
Freeman, 2013; Engle, 2012). With reference to dimensions such as content and context 
(Barnett & Ceci, 2002), researchers have differentiated between surface versus deep transfer 
(Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1995), formal versus material transfer (Klauer, 1998), and near 
versus far transfer. transfer has been found to occur consciously and unconsciously (Day & 





































after task mastery (Siegler, 2006), or after more variable strategic behavior (Perry, Samuelson, 
Malloy, & Schiffer, 2010).
Transfer of strategies to construction tasks  
We attempted to examine differences in children’s learning by using an analogical construction 
(transfer) task after they had earlier received a number of practice opportunities and a 
dynamic-test-type training procedure geared to help them solve such problems. For this 
subsequent study, children were not required to solve analogies in the traditional fashion, 
but instead, were asked to take a more active role by constructing similar problems for the 
examiner to solve (Bosma & Resing, 2006). to encourage transfer of previously learned 
strategies, the surface features of the task were the same as those of the classical analogical 
tasks that had been tackled earlier during the practice and training sessions. We primed 
the children to draw upon previous learning (Day & Goldstone, 2012) by using the same 
matrix-format and the same animal cards, which permitted the same types of transformation. 
Nevertheless, these surface similarities did not necessarily make the process of transfer 
straightforward. the construction format was more challenging than the open-ended classical 
version, since the former required children to extract analogical strategies from schemas in 
their memory in order to construct the transformations. Such complexity was not required 
when tackling the classical format (Martinez, 1999). Effective constructors in our sample 
were therefore assumed to have gained a more thorough or ‘deeper’ understanding of the 
underlying principles of the analogical tasks (Harpaz-Itay et al., 2006; Perkins, 1992). It would 
appear that patterns in strategy use might differ when constructed response tasks (Stevenson, 
2012), or construction tasks (Harpaz-Itay et al., 2006) are employed rather than multiple-
choice tasks (Stanger-Hall, 2012). 
 Some patterns in strategy use in young children’s performance on figural analogies have 
already emerged. Siegler & Svetina (2002), for example, found that when children were given 
analogical tasks with a multiple-choice format, the most common error was the selection of a 
duplicate of one of the matrix cells. 
 Providing children with the opportunity to move beyond practice experiences to 
engagement in problem construction may shed light on individual differences in their 
developing use of strategic reasoning (Pittman, 1999; Kim, Bae, Nho, & Lee, 2011; Haglund & 
Jeppsson, 2012; Siegler, 2006). As such, the analogical construction task used in the current 
study served a twofold purpose. First, we sought to assess the extent to which children’s 
learning in relation to performance on a traditional analogical task subsequently transferred 
to one that involved construction. Second, we examined the ways in which this may provide 
additional information, both qualitative and quantitative, that could be used within a dynamic 
assessment context (Grigorenko, 2009; Resing, 2013).     
 to aid our analysis, we made use of immediate retrospective self-reports (Siegler & 
Stern, 1998; Church, 1999; Bosma & Resing, 2006). For children aged five years and older, an 
increasing body of literature points to the strength of combining observations of behavioral 
solution strategies with immediate retrospective self-reports. the value of this approach has 
been found in studies of arithmetic (Siegler & Stern, 1998), reading (Farrington-Flint, Coyne, 
Stiller, & Heath, 2008), and inductive reasoning (Resing, Xenidou-Dervou, Steijn, & Elliott, 
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Initial ability and working memory
two additional factors were included in this study: initial ability in task performance 
and working memory. these have been regarded as important indicators of future task 
performance that draws upon previously learned material (Day & Goldstone, 2012; Rittle-
Johnson, Star, & Durkin, 2009). Working memory, which typically becomes more efficient 
with age (Siegler, 2006), is considered to be the workspace for the construction of relational 
representations (Halford, Wilson, & Philips, 2010). If processed in parallel, only a limited 
number of relations can be constructed at any one time (Halford, Wilson & Philips, 1998). 
However, complex relations can be recoded into representations of lower complexity, or be 
segmented into smaller parts, in order that these can be processed serially (Halford et al., 
2010). More efficient execution of strategy use is therefore likely to reduce working-memory 
demands (Siegler, 2006). 
Research aims and hypotheses
In this study, a transfer task requiring the construction of analogies was employed in order 
to examine children’s progress in analogical performance. to achieve this, we utilized 
quantitative and qualitative, inter- and intra-individual measures. 
 1. A first set of hypotheses concerned the number of correct analogies that a child would 
be able to construct. We expected that this would be related to (1a) spatial working-memory 
(Halford et al., 2010; Rasmussen & Bisanz, 2005), and (1b) initial performance on traditional 
analogical tasks (Day & Goldstone, 2012). When holding these background variables 
constant, we did not expect to find a relationship between children’s progress in the number 
of analogical tasks they correctly solved following (1c) repeated practice experiences or (1d) 
dynamic training, and the number of completely correct constructed analogies at the transfer 
session (e.g., tunteler & Resing, 2010). We did, however, expect to detect transfer of learning 
in analogical strategy use by closely considering the processes involved. thus, we examined 
the individual transformations within the solved and constructed analogies, and also the 
children’s subsequent accounts of these.
 2. A second set of hypotheses concerned the number of transformations that were 
constructed correctly at the transfer session. Again, our expectations were related to our 
background variables. It was anticipated that children’s employment of transformations in 
their constructed analogies would be related to (2a) spatial working-memory (Halford et al, 
2010; Rasmussen & Bisanz, 2005), and (2b) their employment of transformations during their 
first session with the conventional analogical tasks (Bosma & Resing, 2006). When holding 
these background variables constant, we expected to find a relationship between children’s 
progress in analogical strategy use through (2c) repeated practice, (2d) dynamic training, and 
the number of transformations they employed during the transfer session. 
 3. A third set of hypotheses concerned children’s reflections on their analogical strategy 
use. We expected that children would be able to discuss and explain a greater number of 
transformations at the transfer session, if their accounts were also (3a) superior at the first 
session with conventional analogies, and their performance had improved as a result of (3b) 
repeated practice experience and (3c) dynamic training (tunteler et al., 2008). 
 4. Our fourth set of hypotheses concerned children’s qualitative reports of non-analogical, 
and analogical strategy use. We hypothesized (4a) that both children in the dynamic training 
condition, and those who were more successful in producing correctly constructed analogies, 
would cite analogical strategy use or offer their ‘own rules’ for incorrectly constructed 





































construct any correct analogies would either provide ‘copy’ or ‘procedural’ explanations, or 
tell stories about the animals involved in their constructions. Furthermore we hypothesized 
(4c) that the transformations that would be explained most frequently would involve color, 
size and number. We expected the transformations, ‘orientation’ and ‘position’, to be explained 
less frequently, as these are seemingly more difficult to explain (Siegler & Svetina, 2002). 
5.2 Method
Participants
Participants3 (N=104; 51 boys; 53 girls) were aged 7-8 years with a mean of 93.6 months (SD 
= 4.8 months). they were selected from the second grade of eight regular primary middle-
class schools located in the Netherlands. Parental informed consent was obtained for each 
participant. 
Design
In an earlier study involving this sample (Pronk et al., submitted), each child’s inductive 
reasoning and working-memory capacity were assessed by means of an Exclusion test and a 
measure of spatial working-memory  (see descriptions below). Subsequently, a microgenetic 
two-pretest-two-posttest control-group design was employed with randomized blocks based 
on the Exclusion test (see table 1). After the fourth (final) session, both conditions received 
the same analogical construction task, which served to assess their breadth of cognitive 
change (transfer). It is this final stage that is the focus of this paper.
Table 1. Research design1
   Session
Condition Pretest 1 2 Training2 3 4 Transfer
Practice x x x - x x x
DT x x x x x x x
Note: 1Sessions 1 to 4 were reported elsewhere (Pronk et al., submitted). The current study’s focus was transfer of 
cognitive changes induced by this type of design.  2The practice-condition received the same items as the training 
condition, but the practice-condition received no dynamic-test-type training.
Instruments
Exclusion
Exclusion is a visual inductive reasoning subtest of a Dutch child intelligence test (RAKIt: 
Revisie Amsterdamse Kinder Intelligentie test (Bleichrodt, Drenth, Zaal, & Resing, 1984). 
the subtest consists of 40 items each comprising 4 geometric figures. three of the figures can 
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be grouped together on the basis of a rule that needs to be identified. the task requires the 
child to select the figure that, in each case, does not fulfill the rule. 
Spatial recall 
the Spatial recall test from the computerized Automated Working Memory Assessment 
(AWMA) battery (Alloway, 2007) was used to measure visual spatial working-memory 
capacity. the task involves recalling the positions of dots in relation to arbitrary shapes that 
rotate and/or flip from left to right. 
Figural analogies
the analogical reasoning task consisted of an age-adapted version of the concrete figural 
analogies measure developed by Stevenson and Resing (e.g., Stevenson, Resing, & Froma, 
2009; Stevenson, touw, & Resing, 2011). the four practice sessions included four parallel 
sets with 20 open-ended 2x2 figural matrix analogies. the figures consisted of various 
permutations of six types of animals with three familiar colors, and two sizes; features that 
would be easily recognized by the participating children (Goswami, 1992). Items contained 
up to six transformations, involving size, color, number, orientation, position, and animal. 
Other than in the training session, the examiner provided minimal instruction, and this was 
unrelated to solving the analogies. After the production of each solution, the child was asked 
how he or she had solved the ‘puzzle’. 
Figural analogies dynamic-test-type training
the dynamic-test-type training material (Pronk et al., submitted), consisted of an age-
adapted set of seven concrete figural analogy problems similar to those employed in the other 
sessions (these were adapted from Stevenson et al., 2009; 2011), and operated in accordance 
with Resing’s (e.g., 1993) graduated-prompts dynamic test format. this approach has been 
successfully utilized in several previous studies (e.g., Resing, 2000; Resing & Elliott, 2011; 
Resing, tunteler, de Jong, & Bosma, 2009; Resing, Steijn, Xenidou-Dervou, Stevenson, & Elliott, 
2011, Resing et al., 2012). It utilizes a series of adaptive and standardized, hierarchically 
ordered, metacognitive (self-regulating) and cognitive prompts that proceed from general to 
task-specific. the prompts are provided only if the child is unable to proceed independently. 
Prompts become increasingly explicit, until the child arrives at the solution. 
 Our procedure involved the presentation of more challenging items from the beginning. 
While seemingly counter to usual practice, this has proven to be a helpful means of enabling 
even the most able performers to benefit from training from the outset. As a result, all the 
children in the sample are equipped to draw upon their newly learned strategies when tackling 
easier items (e.g., Resing, 1993; Resing & Elliott, 2011). 
Construction tasks 
the first analogical construction task included an A4-sized sheet displaying an empty matrix 
with four cells and baskets with all 72 animal cards. they were informed that they would now 
be the teacher and the examiner would take on the role of the child. the child was shown 
the empty matrix and told that this was an ‘empty puzzle’ in which he or she was allowed 
to make a puzzle using any of the cards for the examiner to solve, just like the puzzles the 
examiner had provided earlier. In this way, the child was able to spontaneously display his or 





































 Prior to commencing the other construction tasks, the examiner filled one of the cells of 
the matrix (the B or C cell) and the child was given the exact cards needed to create the puzzle 
for the examiner to solve. While the first construction task left freedom for the child to use 
any number and type of the 72 cards, the child was now given a restricted set of cards, all of 
which she or he was required to utilize for constructing ‘the puzzle’. the restricted set of cards 
provided for these tasks were such that in order to utilize all the given cards and construct 
a correct analogy, the transformations number, color, and size, (and animal for the 3rd task 
only) needed to be included. By their own insight, children could opt to make the constructed 
analogies even more complex by choosing to flip the cards and/or position to include the 
transformations ‘position’ and ‘orientation’. 
 For each of the tasks, the children were given as little instruction as possible in order to 
maximize spontaneous strategic analogical behavior. Some children, however, failed to start 
the task or forgot to leave one of the cells of the analogy open for the examiner to complete. 
In such situations, the child was given up to a maximum of 3 hints. Assistance was only given 
to help the child construct something that had the appearance of an analogy (with three 
filled and one empty cell) that the examiner could be asked to solve (see Appendix A for 
the procedure). After the child had finished creating the puzzle, the examiner placed down 
some random animal cards and asked a) if this was the correct answer, b) what was the child’s 
correct answer, and c) why that was the correct answer. All explanations that the children 
gave about their analogy, including those that were provided before the examiner had asked 
for their explanations, were included in the scoring process.
Scoring















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the first outcome variable (table 2) was an ordinal variable, violating the assumptions of 
least-squares regression. For this reason ordinal logistic regression was performed. (Agresti, 
2007). the second and third outcome measures were specified as counts (table 2). An 
appropriate regression analysis for this class of data is Poisson regression, of which type we 
performed a negative binomial regression. (Agresti, 2007). All regression analyses were run 
with successive nested models that each included an additional expected variable. these 
nested models were compared with a likelihood ratio test to determine if the succeeding 
model – and therefore the added predictor – presented a significantly better fit than the 
previous one (Agresti, 2007). For each outcome measure we first included the background 
variables (working-memory and/or initial capacity) in the models, after which the variables 
of main interest were included: progress in analogical performance and condition. 
 For the qualitative analyses, the focus was on the strategies that children described when 
discussing how they solved each of their ‘puzzles’ (see Appendix B), and their accounts of the 
type and number of transformations at the transfer session. 
5.3 Results
Before conducting the regression analyses, we checked for possible initial differences between 
the dynamic test and practice conditions. the mean scores on the Exclusion test did not differ 
significantly, nor did the mean number of complete analogical solutions, transformations or 
explanations at session one. Means and standard deviations for the analogical measurements 
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations of analogical measurements
Progress over time1 Transfer Session
Condition Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Correct Solutions
Practice (N=52) 11.06 (15.16) .67 (.88)
Dynamic Training (N=52) 22.60 (20.73) .73 (.89)
Total (N=104) 16.83 (18.89) .70 (.88)
Transformations Correct
Practice (N=52) 6.28 (11.88) 3.13 (4.53)
Dynamic Training (N=52) 18.36 (20.98) 3.60 (4.54)
Total (N=104) 12.32 (18.02) 3.37 (4.52)
Explained Transformations
Practice (N=52) .81 (10.55) 1.44 (1.93)
Dynamic Training (N=52) 7.20 (15.69) 2.02 (2.42)
Total (N=104) 4.00 (13.68) 1.73 (2.20)
1Progress over time is given in percentages.
Regression analyses with likelihood ratio tests
to investigate our first set of hypotheses concerning the number of correctly constructed 
analogies at the transfer session (ranging 0-3), we performed ordinal logistic regression 
analyses with five successive models (including the intercept only model, see table 4). 
the best fitting model – Model 3 in table 4 – confirmed our expectations that children 
would construct more correct analogies at the transfer session if at the start of the study 
they demonstrated (1a) superior spatial working-memory (β=.02, p=.03), and (1b) a higher 
score for the analogical tasks (while holding spatial working-memory constant) (β=.05, 
p<.001). the final two models – Models 4 and 5 in table 4 – did not prove to be a significant 
improvement to our first models. this confirmed our expectation that we would be unable 
to detect a relationship between progress in the number of correct solved analogical tasks 
following (1c) repeated practice experience (β=.02, p=.19),  or (1d) dynamic training and 
the number of correctly constructed analogies at the transfer session (while holding spatial 





































Table 4. Results of the likelihood ratio tests for the nested models
Outcome measure of the 
transfer session






  1.   Intercept only (Null)  0 - -
  2. + Working Memory Spatial Span 19.94 19.94* < .001
  3. + Initial Capacity6 45.72 25.78* < .001
  4. + Progress in analogical performance 47.56   1.85 .17
  5. + Condition4 47.57     .01 .92
Transformations present 
in complete analogies5
  1.   Intercept only (Null)  0 - -
  2. + Working Memory Spatial Span 15.62 15.62* < .001
  3. + Initial Capacity 75.14 59.52* < .001
  4. + Progress in analogical performance6 79.77   4.63* .03




  1.   Intercept only (Null)  0 - -
  2. + Initial Capacity 18.52 18.52* < .001
  3. + Progress in analogical performance6 25.25    6.73*    .009
  4. + Condition 26.10      .85    .36
* Significantly better fit than former models at p ≤  .05; 1Each successive model included one additional predictor 
and the former model was nested within the succeeding model. 2The likelihood ratio chi-square is the difference 
between the -2 log likelihoods of the intercept-only and the current model. 3DLR is the difference in the Likelihood 
Ratio statistics of two nested models and is a statistical test for the variable that enters the model. 4Ordinal regression 
with nested models compared with a likelihood ratio test. 5Negative binomial regression compared with a likelihood 
ratio test. 6Bold = this was the final model as the additional effect included in this model was the last one to further 
improve the model.
to investigate our second set of hypotheses concerning the number of transformations 
included in the correctly constructed analogies (observed range: 0-17) at the transfer session, 
negative binomial regression analyses were utilized. Again, five successive models were run 
and compared to each other using a likelihood ratio test (see table 4). Model 2 confirmed 
hypothesis 2a, concerning working-memory capacity. However, the best fitting model was 
Model 4, where working-memory no longer contributed significantly (β=.01, p=.22). Model 
4 did confirm our expectations that children would use more transformations in their 
constructed analogies at the transfer session if they initially utilized more transformations at 
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2c, which anticipated a positive relationship between children’s progress in analogical strategy 
use through repeated practice experience over time, and the number of transformations these 
children used within their correctly constructed analogies at the transfer session (β=.02, 
p=.03) (again, while holding spatial working-memory and initial capacity constant).  Model 5 
(table 4) included the condition variable, but unexpectedly this model was not a significant 
improvement upon the former model. this, therefore, failed to support hypothesis 2d, which 
anticipated a positive relationship between the dynamic-test-type training and the number 
of transformations children used within their correctly constructed analogies at the transfer 
session (while holding the former significant effects constant).
 to investigate our third set of hypotheses concerning the number of transformations 
explained correctly after each construction task had been completed (observed range: 0-10), 
negative binomial regression analyses were utilized. Four successive models were run and 
compared with a likelihood ratio test (see table 4). the best fitting model, Model 3, confirmed 
our expectations that children would provide explanations indicating superior analogical 
strategy use at the transfer session if they had performed well at the first session (β=.03, 
p<.001) (hypothesis 3a), and if they had made progress explaining analogical strategies during 
the practice sessions (β=.02, p=.01) (hypothesis 3b). 
 Model 4 (table 4) included the condition variable, but unexpectedly this was not a 
significant improvement upon the former model, and, therefore, did not support hypothesis 
3c.
Qualitative investigations
to investigate our fourth set of hypotheses, we explored children’s statements about their 
strategy use (see Figures 1-3). Figure 1 displays explained strategy use per constructed analogy 
of ‘subgroups’ of children based on condition and their number of correctly constructed 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































hat can an analogical construction task reveal about strategy changes?
Overall, children in the training condition constructed ‘more than one correct analogy’ more 
often than just ‘one correct analogy’, while the practice condition showed the opposite. 
Hypothesis 4a was confirmed (see Figure 1).
 Hypothesis 4b was partially confirmed. As expected, children in the practice condition 
who were unable to construct any correct analogy provided more ‘copy’ explanations. 
However, contrary to our expectations, they often also included their own rules and hardly 
ever told stories about the animals or gave procedural information, as they had done after 
solving the traditional analogical tasks (Pronk et al., submitted). 
 We also hypothesized (4c) that transformations would be explained most frequently by 
reference to color, size and number. We expected the more challenging transformations, 
‘orientation’ and ‘position’, to be identified less frequently. Figure 2 demonstrates that, indeed, 
this pattern was found for the practice condition. 





Figure 3. Type and number of transformations explained per child by condition and number of correctly 






the results for the training condition were somewhat different, however (see Figure 2). Here, 
children explained more transformations and made more frequent references to the ‘more 
difficult’ transformations (orientation and position). 
 Figure 3 offers a more in-depth look at the distributions displayed in Figure 2. Here, it can 
be seen the subgroups of children presented in Figure 1, which were based on condition and 





































Figure 3. Type and number of transformations explained per child by condition and number of correctly constructed 
analogies: 0 correct, 1 correct, more than 1 correct.





Fig re 3. Type and number of transformations explained per child by condition and number of correctly 






the largest differences are those between the lowest and highest performing subgroups. In the 
former, where children were unable to construct a complete analogy, several children from 
the training condition, but none from the practice condition, were able to display or explain 
analogical strategy use. In the latter, where most children were from the training condition, a 
larger variety of explained transformations per child were evident. 
5.4 Discussion
In this study we sought to assess the depth and breadth of changes in analogical performance, 
induced by either a dynamic test-type-training or repeated practice experiences. Although 
initial performance and progress on traditional analogical tasks predicted how well children 
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(such as use of only a single transformation), rather than complete solutions, that was the 
key predictor. this had been expected as other studies have shown that high-level mastery in 
analogical performance is needed to detect transfer of learning at this level (e.g. Siegler, 2006; 
Day & Goldstone, 2012). 
 the analogy construction tasks in the current study, especially the more complex ones, 
were difficult to fully master in such a relatively short study period (tzuriel & George, 2009), 
particularly for children of this age (Halford & McCredden, 1998). It was notable that partial 
construction scores were important even after initial capacity and working-memory had been 
held constant. Clearly, we can conclude that the capacity to solve analogies is related to the 
capacity to construct them (see also, Harpaz-Itay, Kaniel, Ben-Amram, 2006; Bosma & Resing, 
2006). the relationship we found between spatial working-memory and analogy construction 
confirmed earlier studies as well (e.g., Rasmussen & Bisanz, 2005; tunteler et al., 2008; Halford 
et al., 2010). Unsurprisingly, children were better constructors when they executed their 
analogical strategies (more) efficiently (Siegler, 2006). these outcomes indicate that those 
who progressed further with the construction tasks, acquired a more thorough or ‘deeper’ 
understanding of the underlying principles involved. After all, while constructing analogy 
tasks, children needed to extract the earlier learned analogical relationships from schemas in 
their memory, rather than working out existing relationships in the tasks presented to them 
(Perkins, 1992; Harpaz-Itay et al., 2006; Martinez, 1999).
 It is interesting that the dynamic-test-type training appeared to provide no additional 
improvement in task performance over that of repeated practice alone. Perhaps, for a 
quantitative effect to emerge, the training will need to be rendered more extensive by adding 
more items or an extra session in between the final practice sessions (e.g., tzuriel & George, 
2009). 
 Children in the training condition explained a greater percentage per possible 
transformation and were more likely to refer to the more difficult types of transformations: 
orientation and position (Siegler & Svetina, 2002; Stevenson et al., 2011). While this was a 
specific feature of high achievers, it was noticeable that this also applied to  poorer performers. 
Apparently, even many of them had understood and retained several of the taught analogical 
relationships, and were able to successfully access, apply and cite these (Harpaz-Itay et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, although the greater number of fully correct analogies produced 
by children in the training condition at the transfer stage was not statistically significant, 
they often provided qualitatively different explanations for these solutions. Where their 
constructed analogy was incorrect, they obviously had created their own rules. they rarely 
demonstrated the more simple solution strategies that complete novices often show, such 
as mere copy strategies, as was the case for many of the children in the practice condition 
(Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979; Siegler & Svetina, 2002). the evidence from the qualitative part of 
our investigation suggests that training was having an effect on the breath of change, but the 
training procedure may need to be more substantial for quantitative differences to become 
possible to emerge.  
 Although many children in the practice condition cited copying strategies for solving 
their self-constructed analogies, they also often included their own rules and, in contrast 
with the earlier assessment sessions, rarely reverted to storytelling or procedural strategies. 
It is possible that multiple choice, and even constructed response analogical task formats, 
encourage children to adopt strategies such as copying and storytelling (Martinez, 1999; 
Stanger-Hall, 2012; Morrison, Doumas, & Richland, 2011). However, a more empty task, 





































Future studies should investigate whether creative solutions of this nature, garnered from 
either dynamic testing or practice situations, are able to provide additional data about the 
child’s developing problem solving capacities. 
 In the somewhat different domain of science, creative reasoning, where children generated 
self-made analogies during their lessons, has been found to be an important precursor in 
their understanding of natural phenomena, (e.g., Pittman, 1999; May, Hammer, & Roy, 2006; 
Haglund, Jeppsson, & Anderson, 2012). these self-generated analogies revealed children’s 
previously acquired knowledge and experience, and appeared to encouraged them to 
process the material deeply and consequently gain understanding of underpinning structural 
relations (e.g., Blanchette & Dunbar, 2000; Harpaz-Itay et al., 2006). Assessment of children’s 
constructed analogies, using non-academic, domain general tasks, such as those used in the 
present study, could possibly reveal their current depth of general understanding of the 
complexity of analogical strategies. Examining children’s differential responses to training 
and practice on analogy construction tasks has the potential to offer educational psychologists 
and teachers additional insights into the stability of the individual’s reasoning processes. 
 the current study has shown that an analogical construction task, serving as a measure 
of transfer, can provide additional information about young children’s depth of learning 
and learning potential. Such information, perhaps in combination with working-memory 
assessment data (Alloway, Gathercole, & Pickering, 2006; Alloway & Gathercole, 2006; St. 
Claire-thompson & Gathercole, 2006), may prove to be of practical benefit to teachers (May 
et al., 2006), although more research is needed to justify such a claim. More specifically, this 
study suggests that knowledge of the types of strategies children utilize and verbalize can 
yield insights and understanding about  (individual) children’s readiness for learning. Such 
a conclusion has important implications for both individual and larger scale educational 
dynamic-test situations and particular curricula areas (e.g., Grigorenko, 2009; Haglund et 
al., 2012), for example in science education or math. Whether analogical construction tasks 
provide more valuable information to educationalists when these are domain specific (e.g. 
relating to math or science content) or domain general, such as the task reported in the 
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Appendix A
Hint procedure for the transfer tasks 
Nr Hint Procedure
1 [If a child does not get started proceed with the 
first hint.] What was it that you needed to do? First 
you choose (animal) cards for the first two cells, for 
example for these two (point to A & B cells) or for 
these two (point to A & C cells), and you lay down 
these cards. Do you remember now?
If the child gets started, no more hints are 
provided until cards have been laid down in three 
of the four cells of the matrix. Otherwise proceed 
to the next hint. 
2 After that, you think about which cards you want to 
put into the last two cells, so that everything goes 
together. Do you remember now?
Same as above.
3 Then you put down the cards for the third cell and 
you leave the last cell open. After that you may tell 
me what I need to do. 
If a child is still unable to construct something that 
looks like an open-ended figural analogy, move on 
to the next task.
Note: Children were given up to three hints (if needed), so that ‘their puzzle’ looked like the open-ended figural 
analogies that they had solved during the practice and dynamic training sessions. Hints were only provided to help a 
child get started if he/she didn’t start on their own. Hints were not provided to explain how a proper analogy should 






































Scoring system of the figural analogies
Category1 Description Example
1. Copy The child indicates that their solution is a 
copy of another cell of the analogy. 
‘It’s this one’, while pointing to another cell 
of the analogy.
2. Part copy The child indicates that s/he has copied 
part(s) of other cell(s), and the behavioral 
solution confirms this.
‘I took that one and that one, but not that 
one’, while pointing to specific animals 
relating to another cell.
3. Procedural The child gives simple information about 
picking up particular animal cards and 
putting them in the empty cell.
‘I picked up this card and put it down here. 
I also wanted to lay down this one, but it 
didn’t fit.’
4. Story The child tells a story about the animals. ‘This horse likes that one and this is the 
mummy and that is her baby.’
5. Don’t know The child indicates ignorance as to how he or 
she solved the puzzle.
‘I don’t know’, ‘I guessed’, ‘I just liked it.’
6. Own rule The child indicates that s/he made up a rule 
and applied it to the analogy. However, this 
isn’t a correct transformation.
 ‘I made this one blue, because there was no 




Correct transformations are clearly present 
in the behavioral solution, but the child only 
refers to them implicitly.
‘I made it just like there,’ while pointing to 
the top two cells and then to the bottom 
two cells.
Note: 1Categories were created in accordance with children’s answers and partially derived from the work of others 






























to date, conclusions regarding the nature of changes in the ability to reason by analogy have 
frequently been drawn on the basis of results obtained from cross-sectional training studies 
(e.g., Chen, 1996). In contrast, the studies presented in this dissertation were designed to 
microgenetically investigate young children’s inter- and intra-individual variable analogical 
learning trajectories over time. By providing children with repeated non-guided practice, 
dynamic-test-type training and transfer tasks, as well as applying specific methods and 
analyses, detailed accounts of changing strategic analogical performance were revealed. In 
this discussion, these accounts will be interpreted in accordance with Siegler’s (1996, 2006) 
overlapping waves theory of cognitive change, along five dimensions: the source, rate, path, 
breadth and variability of change. 
The Source of Change
Study results in this dissertation have pointed to several factors that appear to underpin and 
encourage changes in analogical reasoning. the overlapping waves theory refers to these 
factors as ‘sources of change’ (Siegler, 2006). the results sketched in the first three studies 
(Chapters 2, 3, and 4) clearly showed that repeated practice experiences are sufficient to 
prompt spontaneous progression in analogical performance on both geometric and figural 
analogical task, in children attending first and second grade. According to Siegler (2006), 
this type of change may be considered as natural because it does not arise from explicit 
interventions. the finding that practice alone was sufficient to activate the use of analogical 
strategies suggests that analogical reasoning skills must have been already present, albeit in a 
rather rudimentary form, in the repertoire of children of this age and that the opportunity to 
practice accelerated its spontaneous use (e.g., tunteler & Resing, 2002, 2007a,b). 
 Nevertheless, training (in the form of a dynamic test) had a greater effect upon children’s 
performance than repeated practice (see also, Resing, Xenidou-Dervou, Steijn, & Elliott, 
2012). Interestingly, the data from the present study revealed different groups of learners. 
Some children benefited most when provided with either practice or training alone, while 
others gained most from a combination of practice and training. there were also other 
children for whom neither practice nor training appeared to make a difference to their 
analogical performance. these results confirm the suggestion of others that the acquisition 
and development of cognitive abilities may show differing pathways when acquired through 
instruction than through more ‘natural’ unprompted opportunities, making it essential to 
examine both in combination (Kuhn, 1995; Bjorklund, Miller, Coyle & Slawinsky, 1997; Opfer 
& Siegler, 2004). However, it was only training that appeared to influence first and second 
grade children’s explained analogical strategy use to a significant extent (tunteler & Resing, 
2007a; Siegler, 2006, 2007).  
 the studies described in Chapters 3 and 4 also found that at the initial non-guided 
practice session, spatial working-memory (Ven, Boom, Kroesbergen, & Leseman, 2012; 
Rasmussen & Bisanz, 2005), but not verbal working-memory (e.g., St. Claire-thompson & 
Gathercole, 2006), was positively related to complete analogical solutions and subsequent 
correct analogical explanations of those solutions. It was additionally discovered that spatial 
and verbal working-memory were unrelated to the overall number of transformations 
in behavioral solutions. It did not seem difficult for children to get the solutions partially 
correct although they struggled to achieve complete accuracy. this finding was in accordance 
with the proposition that (spatial) working-memory capacity is likely to place a limits upon 
completion of full analogical solutions, where several transformations need to be processed 





Wilson & Philips, 2010; Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006). the influence of spatial 
working-memory on the number of verbalized transformations might also explain why 
children beginning to discover a new strategy, and therefore encountering more demands 
upon their working-memory, initially appear unable to describe the correct strategies that 
they had used (Siegler & Stern, 1998). 
The Rate of Change
the earlier mentioned sources of change were found to be closely related to children’s rate 
of cognitive change. Siegler (2006) depicts the rate of change as the timeline and amount 
of experience related to development from initial to consistent adequate performance 
(rate of uptake). In Chapter 2, the qualitative analysis revealed that children in the practice 
condition gradually changed their analogical performance from incomplete to complete 
answers between the first two sessions. the short training, however, induced in some 
children a continuation of a gradual change in analogical performance, while others changed 
rather rapidly from completely associative responding to consistent analogical strategy use. 
these results provide evidence to support Siegler’s observation (2006) that microgenetic 
studies tend to show a relatively large number of children going through a gradual change 
in their rate of discovery and generalization of a cognitive strategy, while a smaller number 
demonstrate a more rapid change. they also challenge any notion that analogical reasoning is 
an age constrained competence that cannot be induced by training in children that only show 
non-analogical, associative reasoning (Hosenfeld, Van der Maas, & Van den Boom, 1997b). 
Apparently, changes in analogical reasoning were already present in the cognitive processing 
abilities of these young children, but needed some prompting, in accordance with their 
zone of proximal development (Vygotsky, 1978). Furthermore, this increase in analogical 
performance persisted over a 3-month period for both conditions, revealing a rather rapid 
rate of up-take (Siegler, 2006). Apparently, changes in analogical reasoning obtained through 
experience or a short training procedure persists over a longer period of time, even when 
children are not given further training. 
 the subsequent quantitative studies in Chapters 3 and 4 confirmed these more gradual 
and rather rapid change trajectories. Multilevel Analyses for repeated measurements were 
applied in both studies, where children (Level-2) were nested in the repeated measurements 
(Level-1). In this manner, both individual and group variation were taken into account and 
could be displayed. this resulted in change trajectories (regression lines) for the individual 
children, as well as change trajectories (regression lines) for subgroups of these children based 
on systematic variation between background variables and experimental treatment (sources 
of change) (Van der Leeden, 1998).  In the first, preliminary study with a smaller sample 
(Chapter 3), it was found that children displaying greater spatial working-memory capacity 
had a greater rate of change induced by repeated practice experiences alone. However, the 
rate of change induced by the dynamic-test-type training was unrelated to working-memory 
scores.  After training though, children with a smaller spatial working-memory displayed a 
drop in analogical performance at the final session. However, this relatively small number of 
children per subgroup, a known drawback of microgenetic research (Siegler, 2006), did not 
permit us to arrive at comprehensive and strong conclusions and prevented us from adding 
additional background variables, such as variability in analogical strategy. 
 the study sample was therefore enlarged (Chapter 4). Like the former study outcomes 
(Chapter 3), individual developmental trajectories and rates of change generally displayed 












measures (complete analogical solutions, partial solutions measured by the number of 
transformations, and number of transformations cited by the child), as well as specific 
verbalized (non-) analogical strategy use. the rate of change within the subgroups was 
variable, both between and within children over sessions. For all performance measures, 
children with poorer initial performance tended to profit relatively faster from training than 
those who had displayed variable performance in their analogical reasoning. Nevertheless, in 
contrast with findings in Chapter 2, growth through training was followed by a dip at the final 
session for all subgroups, suggesting that not all the benefits of training were maintained. It 
is possible that the figural analogy tasks were more challenging than the geometrical items 
utilized in Chapter 2. Accordingly, children may have had greater difficulty citing certain 
transformations of the figural analogy tasks used in Chapters 3-5 than the geometric analogy 
tasks used in Chapter 2 (Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979), especially for higher ability children who 
might have switched from analytical to more heuristic problem solving (Klauer & Phye, 2008; 
Resing et al., 2012). Other contributory explanations for this dip could include the degree 
of children’s motivation for tackling the tasks (Siegler & Engle, 1994), or the fact that the 
assessor did not provide feedback concerning the accuracy of children’s answers (Siegler & 
Svetina, 2002). 
The Path of Change
the path of change refers to developmental trajectories in terms of sequences of changing 
knowledge states and problem-solving behavior (Siegler, 2006). In this dissertation these 
sequences were investigated in accordance with Siegler’s work (2007), which posited the 
benefit of trial-by-trial assessments of strategy use. In Chapters 2 and 4, a microgenetic, 
session-by-session assessment was employed in order to investigate variability in subgroup 
and individual children’s use of analogical and non-analogical strategies and subsequent 
progress in a) their behavioral responses and b) the verbal explanations that they were able 
to offer for these. 
 In Chapter 2 various patterns of improvement in analogical reasoning were identified 
within the two conditions of first graders. Children showing a similar pattern of improvement 
were grouped together. these subgroups took varying routes in the acquisition of analogical 
strategies to solve geometric tasks. Children within subgroups performed more similarly to 
each other, but subgroups still displayed much variability both within and between children, 
indicating diverse and variable strategy use within as well as across trials. this finding is 
consistent with findings obtained from earlier studies using problem analogy tasks (tunteler 
& Resing, 2002, 2007a,b).
 With respect to the paths of change of the trained children in Chapter 2, the short training 
procedure had a particular effect on children’s use of explicit correct analogical strategies 
(where they could verbalize their analogical solution strategies) and, to a lesser extent, on 
their use of incomplete analogical strategies. Interestingly, some children, who only gave 
associative responses prior to the short training procedure, improved their analogical reasoning 
performance more during the unprompted test sessions after the short training procedure 
than did their peers who had already showed some capacity for analogical reasoning prior to 
the short training procedure. 
 these results have important implications for education as it clarifies how 6-8 year old 
children from first grade can address logical operations on spatial objects through analogies. 
However, caution is needed in making claims as the data reported here originated from one 





research investigating whether similar results can be obtained while instructing children of 
other ages, and with different types of analogies, will be necessary to strengthen or disconfirm 
these findings.
 Underlying differences in strategy use were subsequently investigated in the study 
reported in Chapter 4. Here, subgroups were based on background variables, such as spatial 
working-memory. Inter- and intra-individual (analogical) strategy use of individual children 
within subgroups of learners could be displayed and specific strengths and weaknesses that 
influence particular learning trajectories were made apparent. Furthermore, several different 
verbalized strategies that were employed by the children, were identified.
 As expected, children in both conditions displayed a greater variety of non-analogical 
and implicit analogical strategies before progressing to an increased number of implicit 
and explicit analogical solutions. this finding echoed those reported by Siegler and Svetina 
(2002). Children in their study also displayed a variety of non-analogical solutions to matrix 
analogies immediately before progressing to a situation where they were able to provide 
adequate solutions. However, this strategic behavior was not as common in their study as it 
was in the study described in Chapter 4.
 In contrast with findings from the study reported in Chapter 2, in several cases, children 
reverted back to non-analogical strategies after training. At such times, they demonstrated 
greater variability in their use of non-analogical strategies than they had before training, 
or, instead, they started making up their own rules. Higher ability subgroups tended to use 
more of their own rules or simple ‘don’t know’ explanations when reverting to non-analogical 
behavior during the final two sessions. As noted earlier in this discussion, this finding suggests 
that children may have (partially) shifted to a more heuristic form of strategy behavior that is 
quicker to execute, but which potentially reduces accuracy when tasks become more difficult 
than anticipated (Klauer & Phye, 2008; Resing et al., 2012).
 Another interesting finding concerned some children in the lower ability groups who 
showed greater variability in their use of non-analogical strategies after training, but regressed 
to less variable, (possibly) less skilled performance during the final session. If caused by task 
difficulty (e.g., Halford et al., 2010), this indicated that a ‘teachable moment’ might have been 
lost between the final two sessions. Children may not have regressed, but rather progressed 
in their performance if they had received another training session between the final two 
sessions, in accordance with their zone of proximal development (Vygotsky, 1978; Alibali & 
Goldin-Meadow, 1993; Siegler, 2006).  
The Breadth of Change
the breadth of change refers to transfer, to the generalization of newly acquired strategies 
to other contexts and problems (Siegler, 2006). For the transfer task described in Chapter 5, 
children were no longer required to solve figural analogies in a classical way of assessment, 
but instead were asked to take a more active role by constructing similar figural analogies for 
the examiner to solve.  Although initial performance and progress on traditional analogical 
tasks predicted how well children would fare on the self-construction transfer task, particular 
partial performances (such as partial use of correct transformations), rather than complete 
solutions, were key to predicting this progress. this had been expected as other studies have 
shown that high-level mastery in analogical performance is needed to detect transfer of 
learning at this level (e.g., Siegler, 2006; Day & Goldstone, 2012). 
 It was notable that these partial construction measures were important even after initial 












is related to capacity to construct them as a few other studies have found (Harpaz-Itay et al., 
2006; Bosma & Resing, 2006).).  the relationship we found between spatial working-memory 
and analogy construction confirmed the findings of earlier studies (e.g., Rasmussen & Bisanz, 
2005; tunteler, Pronk, & Resing, 2008; Halford et al., 2010). Accordingly, children were 
better constructors, if they executed their analogical strategies (more) efficiently (Siegler, 
2006). these outcomes indicate that children who progressed further in solving constructed 
response analogies, also acquired a more thorough or ‘deeper’ understanding of the underlying 
principles of the analogical tasks. After all, while constructing analogical tasks, children were 
required to extract earlier learned analogical relationships from schemas in their memory 
and could no longer rely on simply encoding these relationships from given analogical tasks 
(Perkins, 1992; Harpaz-Itay et al., 2006; Martinez, 1999).
 Qualitative assessments of the self-construction tasks revealed that those children who 
were dynamically trained in solving figural analogies, explained a greater percentage of correct 
transformations and were more likely to refer to the more difficult types of transformations, 
such as orientation. Furthermore, although the greater number of analogies produced by 
children in the training condition at the transfer stage was not statistically significant, the 
children often provided qualitatively different explanations for these solutions. Where their 
constructed analogy was incorrect they often appeared to have created their own rules, 
rarely demonstrating the copying behavior of a complete novice, as was the case for many 
of the children in the practice condition (Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979; Siegler & Svetina, 2002). 
Evidence from the qualitative investigations suggests that the dynamic-test-type training was 
having an effect. However, for quantitative differences to emerge the length of training may 
need to be more extensive.     
 these self-generated analogies may have revealed children’s previously acquired 
knowledge and experience, how deeply they had processed the material and consequently how 
much understanding they had gained of underpinning structural relations (e.g., Blanchette & 
Dunbar, 2000; Harpaz-Itay, Kaniel, Ben-Amram, 2006).    
The variability of change
Siegler (2006, 2007) portrays the variability of change as referring to differences between 
children in the above-mentioned sources, rates, paths, and breadths of change, as well 
as changes within individual children’s array of strategies. the various study outcomes 
described in this dissertation showed considerable inter- and intra-individual variability 
in the use of analogical strategies in both untrained and trained first and second graders. 
Siegler (2007) posits that such cognitive variability is an important variable in understanding, 
predicting, and describing the amount and type of cognitive change. Results described in 
Chapter 2 provide evidence for this position for the untrained group. Within this group, a 
natural increase in analogical reasoning was evidenced in children showing variable, diverse 
strategies on the first test session, whereas children demonstrating only non-analogical, 
associative reasoning did not change their performance over time. However, no conclusive 
evidence was found for the trained group. the short training procedure induced change in 
the analogical performances of both children initially showing variable analogical reasoning, 
and those showing only non-analogical, associative reasoning during the test session prior to 
the training session. Moreover, quantitative analysis at the group level showed that the short 
training procedure did not have a greater effect on children who displayed variable analogical 





be interpreted with caution, since the groups in this analysis were rather small and of unequal 
size. 
 In Chapter 4, results of children’s initial variability in the use of analogical strategies, 
revealed a positive relationship between initial variability and increased analogical 
performance over time. this finding was possible due to the application of MLA, and the 
advantage this procedure has over the more traditional analyses utilized in Chapter 2. Using 
this method of analysis, it was also found that the dynamic-test-type training reduced the 
influence of initial variability. this outcome reflects the assumption that dynamic-test-type 
training should reveal children’s ‘true’ potential, by making the test situation more equitable 
than static testing (Grigorenko, 2009). A longer dynamic-test-type training procedure, or 
more frequent dynamic training sessions, might have decreased the influence of children’s 
initial performance further. this was confirmed by the qualitative findings where we saw 
children making rapid progress from little use of analogical reasoning to its more consistent 
use after training (see also, tunteler et al., 2008). 
Conclusion
throughout this dissertation, inter- and intra-individual variable analogical reasoning was 
investigated both quantitatively and qualitatively. Specific strengths and weaknesses that 
influence particular learning trajectories were found, leading to insights that appear valuable 
for both the understanding of the nature of intellectual development and the prediction of 
children’s learning trajectories to inform targeted education and educational interventions at 
an early stage (e.g., Grigorenko, 2009). 
Dynamic testing may ultimately reveal particular forms of instruction, from metacognitive 
to more concrete (Resing, 2000), that are most powerful for children with different profiles. 
In addition, dynamic testing and working-memory assessment in combination may help 
to indicate the type of training or working-memory support most suited for an individual 
child (Morrison, Doumas, & Richland, 2011) although the current ability to offer classroom-
based interventions for such difficulties remains sorely limited (Elliott, Gathercole, Alloway, 
Kirkwood, & Holmes, 2010).
Clearly, multiple sources of information are required to guide the design of high quality 
holistic, but targeted, education and educational interventions. In the current dissertation, 
a combination of open-ended figural analogical tasks, self-construction tasks and dynamic-
test-type training proved sensitive for all ability groups, with evidence of variability being 
demonstrated at several levels. In addition, examination of several ‘sources of change’, and the 
use of several analogical and non-analogical outcome measures in subgroups of children may 
prove, as noted above, to be a valuable holistic means of measuring and predicting individual 
change trajectories, and so identify ‘teachable moments’ for particular children. 
For example, it may be profitable for future research to investigate whether assessment should 
move beyond reliance upon the production of ‘right or wrong’ answers and, instead, give 
credit for partial answers and even ‘inadequate’ (non-analogical) strategies. A child moving 
from a single inadequate non-analogical strategy to using a variety of non-analogical strategies 
may be seen to have made progress and have benefited from training. It is also possible 
that children who create their own rules may be at a more advanced stage, and require 
different instructional emphases, than those who merely use ‘copy’ or narrative strategies. 
these outcome measures are less conventional, but perhaps important in their capacity to 
differentiate between children of lower ability. the number and type of transformations a 












ability children. Future research should seek to verify these outcomes and, where appropriate, 
use this information to construct assessment batteries that are able to measure intellectual 
potential more broadly to better inform targeted educational interventions. 
Further educational implications of the approaches outlined in this dissertation could apply 
to science education. Research indicates that analogical reasoning in science education is 
an important tool to help children deeply process and gain understanding of underpinning 
scientific principles and phenomena (e.g., Pittman, 1999; May, Hammer, & Roy, 2006; 
Haglund, Jeppsson, & Anderson, 2012; Blanchette & Dunbar, 2000). these studies, however, 
also indicated that eliciting children’s self-generated analogies of newly introduced scientific 
principles could be associated with several challenges, such as drawing upon children’s 
associative or narrative reasoning rather than their analogical problem solving. Future research 
should investigate similarities between children’s (non-) analogical strategies found in the 
current dissertation and their (non-) analogical strategies utilized in generating analogies 
during science or other domains of education. 
Within the field of educational psychology, there continues to be significant debate as to the 
value of cognitive assessment for the purposes of informing educational intervention (Fletcher 
and Vaughn, 2009; Reynolds and Shaywitz (2009), Compton, Fuchs, Fuchs, Lambert, and 
Hamlett, 2012;  Hale et al., 2008; 2010; Fletcher et al., 2011). In the eyes of many educationalists 
and psychologists, psychometric tools and approaches have proven valuable for the purposes 
of selection, yet continue to offer little to help teachers for making informed decisions about 
how best to help individual children. It is surely incumbent upon educational and cognitive 
psychologists to devise more sophisticated approaches to understanding individual children’s 
development, and to use this information to inform the design of powerful forms of instruction 
tailored to individual needs. the approaches outlined in the present dissertation represent an 
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Binnen de schoolpsychologie vindt een belangrijk debat plaats over het nut van cognitieve 
tests voor het inzetten van educatieve interventies. In de ogen van veel orthopedagogen en 
psychologen hebben psychometrische instrumenten hun nut bewezen voor het doel van 
selectie. toch bieden deze instrumenten nog onvoldoende mogelijkheden aan leerkrachten 
als het gaat om het maken van goede beslissingen met betrekking tot educatieve interventies 
voor individuele kinderen. Het is daarom van belang om in detail individuele leertrajecten te 
onderzoeken, zodat vernieuwender vormen van instructie en educatieve interventies kunnen 
worden ontwikkeld. De aanpak in de huidige dissertatie had als doel  hiertoe een aanzet te 
geven. 
 Leertrajecten voor het oplossen van cognitieve taken werden onderzocht door 
veranderingen in het strategiegedrag van groepen en individuele kinderen in kaart te brengen. 
Hierbij werd voornamelijk analogisch probleemoplossend strategiegedrag onderzocht, zoals 
jonge kinderen in de leeftijd van zes tot acht jaar dit laten zien. Dit type probleemoplossend 
redeneren wordt als een belangrijke bouwsteen voor de cognitieve ontwikkeling van 
academische, analytische intelligentie gezien. 
 Het woord analogie komt van het Griekse woord ana logon: volgens de ratio, volgens het 
menselijk denkvermogen. Aristoteles verwoordde de analogie als: “Zoals A staat tot B, zo staat 
C tot D” en “Zoals A is in B, zo is C in D” (Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 2002). Een voorbeeld 
hiervan is: “Zoals een deur staat tot een huis, zo staat een poort tot een stad” en “Zoals een 
deur is in een huis, zo is een poort in een stad.” De basis voor het zien van dergelijke relaties 
is volgens diverse onderzoekers al aanwezig op heel jonge leeftijd (Goswami, 1992). Met 
name de eerste jaren van de basisschool worden gezien als een belangrijke periode voor de 
ontwikkeling van analogisch redeneren en worden in de literatuur dan ook beschouwd als 
cruciaal om leerprocessen met betrekking tot analogisch redeneren in kaart te brengen (e.g. 
tunteler & Resing, 2007a). 
 De studies in deze dissertatie werden derhalve ontworpen om gedetailleerd inzicht 
te verschaffen in de leerprocessen van jonge kinderen met betrekking tot analogisch 
probleemoplossend strategiegedrag. Kinderen kregen herhaaldelijk complexe analogietaken 
aangeboden zonder hulp en/of met hulp, waarna hen in een van de studies werd gevraagd om 
zelf (complexe) analogietaken te maken. Zowel kwalitatieve als kwantitatieve analysemethoden 
werden gebruikt om bovenstaande leerprocessen en daarmee samenhangende leertrajecten in 
analogisch strategisch redeneren zichtbaar te maken. 
 In hoofdstuk 1 werden de theoretische en methodologische achtergronden van de 
studies in deze dissertatie besproken. De rode draad in dit hoofdstuk was de microgenetische 
onderzoeksmethode die berust op de ideeën van Werner en Vygotsky en meer recentelijk 
is geadopteerd door onder andere Siegler (1991). Dit is een methode waarbij in korte tijd 
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verscheidene herhaalde metingen verricht worden bij dezelfde proefpersonen. Zodoende 
kunnen (kleine) veranderingen in gedrag tussen metingen, binnen en tussen proefpersonen, 
nauwkeurig vastgelegd worden. Video- opnamen, zoals gebruikt in deze dissertatie, bleken 
uitermate geschikt om achteraf op gedetailleerde wijze (kleine) strategieveranderingen in 
kaart te brengen. Dit gaf als het ware een close-up van de veranderingen in de loop van de 
tijd. Zo werden in de huidige dissertatie de leertrajecten van individuele kinderen, maar ook 
van groepen kinderen met gelijksoortige leertrajecten nauwgezet bestudeerd. Siegler (1996) 
beschreef de bevindingen van studies die gebruik maakten van deze onderzoeksmethode in 
zijn ‘Overlapping Waves’ theorie over cognitieve verandering. Deze theorie beschrijft vijf 
dimensies van cognitieve verandering in de loop van de tijd: de oorzaken van verandering, de 
snelheid van verandering, de breedte/diepte van verandering, de variabiliteit van verandering 
en het traject van verandering. Op deze aspecten van verandering werd in het eerste hoofdstuk 
dieper ingegaan. 
 Naast veranderingen in analogisch probleemoplossend strategiegedrag door herhaalde 
oefenmomenten, waarbij kinderen geen hulp aangeboden kregen, werden ook strategie-
veranderingen na interventies in kaart gebracht. Interventies bestonden uit dynamische 
tests/trainingen. In tegenstelling tot traditionele ‘statische’ tests krijgen kinderen bij 
dynamische tests, mocht dit nodig zijn, feedback en hints bij het maken van de opgaven 
(Resing, 1993; Elliott, 2003; Grigorenko, 2009). Het is de bedoeling van deze vorm van testen 
om op deze manier de meest geschikte persoonlijke hulp te geven om de opgaven zo goed 
en snel mogelijk te maken. Dynamische tests kunnen zodoende het type en de hoeveelheid 
benodigde hulp in kaart brengen, hetgeen meer inzicht verschaft in het potentieel tot leren 
en de mogelijke specifieke educatieve behoeften van het individuele kind. Dynamische tests 
richten zich derhalve op datgene wat het kind zou kunnen wanneer hij of zij de juiste hulp 
krijgt. traditionele tests, daarentegen, richten zich op datgene wat het kind al kan en geleerd 
heeft tot op het moment van de test (Grigorenko, 2009).
 Om de individuele verschillen in leertrajecten van kinderen zo goed mogelijk zichtbaar 
te maken, werden specifieke data-analyse methoden gebruikt, waaronder Multilevel 
Analysis. Normaal gesproken wordt Multilevel Analyse ingezet voor data met verschillende 
niveaus: zogenaamde ‘Levels’ (Hox, 2010). Dergelijke niveaus kunnen bijvoorbeeld bestaan 
uit kinderen binnen scholen, scholen binnen schoolregio’s, en regio’s binnen landen. In 
hoofdstukken drie en vier werd deze methode echter op een alternatieve manier ingezet, 
door de bovengenoemde herhaalde meetmomenten binnen kinderen te laten vallen (in 
plaats van kinderen binnen bijvoorbeeld scholen). Derhalve konden algemene leertrajecten 
van verschillende groepen kinderen gemodelleerd worden, maar ook de leertrajecten van de 
individuele kinderen binnen deze groepen. 
 In hoofdstuk 2 werden variatie en veranderingen in analogisch probleemoplossend 
strategiegedrag bij kinderen uit groep drie in kaart gebracht. In de eerste fase van dit onderzoek 
kregen kinderen enkel oefenopgaven met geometrische figuren, zonder uitleg of feedback. Na 
twee sessies met oefenopgaven kreeg de helft van de kinderen een korte dynamische training. 
Vervolgens kregen alle kinderen nog drie sessies met enkel oefenopgaven. Uitkomsten van 
dit onderzoek gaven een close-up van variabel strategiegedrag binnen individuele, alsmede 
binnen groepjes kinderen. Zo werd zichtbaar dat herhaald oefenen met analogietaken, zonder 
uitleg of feedback, bij sommige kinderen reeds een spontane verbetering in analogisch 
redeneren teweeg bracht. Deze verbetering werd voornamelijk zichtbaar bij kinderen 
die aan het begin van de studie gedeeltelijk analogisch strategiegedrag vertoonden, maar 
vervolgens (meer) volledig analogisch strategiegedrag ontwikkelden. De korte dynamische 
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training bracht echter een grotere verbetering in analogisch strategiegedrag teweeg. Na 
training ontwikkelden sommige kinderen, die daarvoor nog geen analogisch strategiegedrag 
vertoonden, dit gedrag op een wat ‘abrupte’ en snelle manier. Andere kinderen, die daarvoor 
al wel enig analogisch strategiegedrag vertoonden, ontwikkelden dit strategiegedrag wat meer 
geleidelijk, tijdens zowel de oefensessies als tijdens de training. Daarnaast bleek de training 
invloedrijk voor de vaardigheid van kinderen om dit analogisch strategiegebruik expliciet te 
kunnen benoemen, nadat de onderzoeker hiernaar vroeg. Bovengenoemde effecten werden 
na drie maanden nogmaals gemeten en werden op dat moment zelfs nog duidelijker zichtbaar. 
 In hoofdstukken 3 en 4 werden de variatie en veranderingen in analogisch 
probleemoplossend strategiegedrag bij kinderen uit groep vier in kaart gebracht. Deze kinderen 
kregen geen geometrische, maar matrix analogietaken met dierenfiguren. Multilevel Analyse 
werd ingezet om leertrajecten in analogische redeneren zichtbaar te maken bij subgroepen 
en individuele kinderen. Kinderen werden in subgroepen ingedeeld op basis van conditie 
(wel of geen training) en mogelijk invloedrijke variabelen, zoals werkgeheugenprestaties. 
Uitkomsten lieten zien dat leertrajecten van kinderen binnen subgroepen meer op elkaar leken 
dan leertrajecten tussen subgroepen. Zo bleek een dynamische test/training het analogisch 
strategiegebruik meer te verbeteren dan alleen herhaald oefenen (zonder hulp of feedback). 
 Daarnaast was het ruimtelijk-visueel werkgeheugen invloedrijk bij het analogisch 
strategiegedrag aan het begin van de studie. Dit analogisch strategiegedrag aan het begin van de 
studie vertoonde vervolgens een relatie met meer analogisch strategiegebruik en uitleg tijdens 
de vervolgsessies, bij kinderen die later geen training kregen. Bij kinderen die wel training 
kregen, werd na de dynamische test/training, zowel meer variatie in typen strategiegedrag, 
als meer analogisch strategiegebruik gevonden. Zo creëerden getrainde kinderen, wanneer 
zij de analogietaak (deels) niet-analogisch oplosten, regelmatig hun eigen (niet-analogische) 
oplossingsregels in plaats van simpele kopieerstrategieën te gebruiken. Zij gaven bijvoorbeeld 
aan dat zij een bepaalde telling van de dieren hadden gemaakt, of naar bepaalde kleuren 
hadden gekeken (op een niet/ (pre-)analogische manier). 
 Het op deze manier vergelijken van de leertrajecten tussen subgroepen was veelbelovend 
om zicht te krijgen op specifieke sterkten en zwakten van deze trajecten. Mogelijk kunnen 
in de toekomst gespecialiseerde educatieve interventies ingezet worden voor individuele 
kinderen met specifieke sterkte- en zwakteprofielen, zoals gevonden bij de leertrajecten 
in huidig onderzoek. toekomstige studies zal de mogelijkheden voor dergelijke educatieve 
interventies moeten onderzoeken. 
 In hoofdstuk 5 vond onderzoek plaats naar de diepgang van het groeiproces in 
(analogisch) strategiegedrag bij kinderen uit groep vier, zoals gevonden in hoofdstukken 3 
en 4. Kinderen werd gevraagd om puzzels (analogietaken) te maken voor de onderzoeker, 
net zoals de puzzels (analogietaken) die de onderzoeker voor hen had gemaakt. Kinderen 
kregen daarbij enkel de materialen aangeboden om de puzzels te maken. Zij kregen verder 
geen inhoudelijke uitleg hoe zo’n puzzel gemaakt kan worden. Resultaten van dit onderzoek 
wezen uit dat aanvankelijk analogisch strategiegebruik van kinderen (zoals beschreven in 
hoofdstukken 3 en 4), alsmede hun ruimtelijk-visueel werkgeheugen van invloed zijn op de 
juistheid en de moeilijkheidsgraad van de puzzels die door deze kinderen werden gemaakt. 
Daarnaast bleek dat kinderen die de meeste groei in analogisch strategiegebruik hadden 
doorgemaakt tijdens het oplossen van de eerder aangeboden analogieën, ook de meeste 
(complexe) analogieën konden creëren. Kinderen die daarnaast ook een dynamische test/
training in het oplossen van analogieën hadden gehad, konden de (analogische) relaties 
binnen hun zelfgemaakte analogieën beter benoemen. Een dergelijke ‘constructietaak’ lijkt 
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derhalve belangrijke informatie te verstrekken over de diepgang van strategieveranderingen 
in analogisch redeneren, die plaatsvindt in kinderen tijdens en na statische en dynamische 
testsituaties. 
 In hoofdstuk 6 werden de uitkomsten van voorgaande hoofdstukken besproken aan de hand 
van de eerder genoemde ‘Overlapping Waves’ theorie, met haar vijf dimensies van cognitieve 
verandering (Siegler, 1996). Er werd geconcludeerd dat er veel variatie en variabiliteit in 
analogisch strategiegedrag was gevonden tussen subgroepen kinderen onderling, alsmede 
binnen de individuele kinderen zelf. Hierbij werden specifieke leertrajecten zichtbaar, die 
een verscheidenheid aan cognitieve sterkten en zwakten vertoonden. Deze uitkomsten 
leken waardevol te zijn voor zowel de algemene kennis van de ontwikkeling van analytische 
intelligentie, als voor het voorspellen van individuele leertrajecten bij jonge kinderen. 
Uitkomsten zouden van nut kunnen zijn voor het ontwikkelen van gespecialiseerde educatieve 
interventies, die ingezet kunnen worden in een vroeg stadium, wanneer een kind deze hulp 
nodig lijkt te hebben. 
 Dynamische tests zouden in de toekomst kunnen uitwijzen dat bepaalde vormen van 
instructie het meest effectief ingezet kunnen worden bij kinderen met een daarbij passend 
leerprofiel. De mogelijkheden en beschikbaarheid van dergelijke educatieve interventies 
binnen het huidige schoolsystem is echter nog erg beperkt. 
 Uit de huidige dissertatie kwam naar voren dat verschillende bronnen van informatie 
nodig zijn voor het ontwikkelen van holistische en specifieke cognitieve tests en educatieve 
interventies. Het bleek dat een combinatie van analogietaken, waarbij kinderen zelf de 
oplossing moesten samenstellen, met daarnaast een dynamische test en een constructietaak, 
gevoelig was voor ieder niveau van cognitief functioneren van de betrokken kinderen. 
Daarbij bleek het gebruik van verschillende analogische en niet-analogische uitkomstmaten 
een belangrijke bron van voorspelling van individuele leertrajecten. Binnen deze trajecten 
konden momenten geïdentificeerd worden waarop kinderen met bepaald strategiegedrag 
mogelijk meer of minder gevoelig waren voor verschillende typen instructie. 
 Deze uitkomsten suggereren dat in de toekomst leertests gevoelig(er) moeten worden 
voor gedeeltelijk correct en zelfs ontoereikend strategiegedrag. Zo kan een kind aanvankelijk 
één ontoereikende strategie gebruiken en vervolgens, naar aanleiding van training, een 
verscheidenheid van ontoereikende strategieën toepassen. Hoewel het kind, na training, nog 
geen correct strategiegedrag vertoont, is dit type van variabel strategiegedrag mogelijk wel 
een voorstadium daarvan (Siegler, 2007), zoals ook gemeten werd door Siegler en Svetina 
(2004). Wanneer enkel correct strategiegedrag gemeten zou worden, zou deze mogelijk 
positieve verandering onder invloed van training onopgemerkt blijven. Derhalve zouden er 
verkeerde conclusies getrokken kunnen worden met betrekking tot het leerpotentieel en de 
mate waarin het kind getraind kan worden. 
 Ook is het bijvoorbeeld mogelijk dat kinderen, die hun eigen regels creëren om analogietaken 
‘op te lossen’, zich in een verder gevorderd voorstadium van correct strategiegedrag bevinden 
en daarbij andere instructie behoeven dan kinderen die enkel kopieerstrategieën laten zien. 
 tenslotte zou het aantal en het type (analogische) relaties dat een kind gebruikt bij het 
oplossen en creëren van analogieën een goede maat kunnen zijn voor het differentiëren tussen 
kinderen met een grotere cognitieve capaciteit. Vooral bij constructietaken komt dit helder 
tot uitdrukking, omdat het kind niet meer kan steunen op datgene wat hij of zij voor zich ziet 
liggen. Vanuit het eigen (werk)geheugen van het kind en de eigen kennisbasis moeten relaties 
gecreëerd worden die samen een correcte analogie vormen. Het aantal (analogische) relaties 
dat een kind aan een dergelijke zelfgemaakte analogie toevoegt, alsmede het type relatie dat 
147
het kind gebruikt, zijn goede maten om onderscheid te maken tussen kinderen met minder en 
meer geavanceerd analogisch strategiegedrag.
 toekomstig onderzoek moet de huidige uitkomsten verifiëren. Uitkomsten kunnen 
vervolgens gebruikt worden voor de ontwikkeling van een vernieuwende testbatterij die 
cognitieve intelligentie en leerpotentieel breder kan meten. Een dergelijke testbatterij zou 
meer specifieke informatie kunnen verschaffen voor mogelijk noodzakelijke educatieve 
interventies bij individuele kinderen. Daarnaast kunnen uitkomsten van huidig en toekomstig 
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